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MILITARY
EXPEDITIONS
BEYOND THE SEAS



MILITARY EXPEDITIONS
BEYOND THE SEAS.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

MILITARY TRANSPORT.

**MOBILIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF AN
ARMY CORPS.**

**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.**

INFORMATION IN WAR.

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

BEYOND THE SEAS.

BY

COLONEL GEORGE ARMAND FURSE, C.B.
(LATE OF THE "BLACK WATCH").

"But, in the art of war, as in every other art, all our teachings come from those who have preceded us, and the most important of these are recorded in the books they have left for our consideration."

KIRK MUNROE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.



LONDON:
WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LIMITED,
13, CHARING CROSS, S.W.
1897.

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LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

DEDICATED

AS A TOKEN OF FRIENDSHIP AND REGARD

TO

MAJOR-GENERAL COLERIDGE GROVE, C.B.

PREFACE.

MOST of our military undertakings commence with an expedition across the seas ; in others, the land forces, operating not far from the coast, gladly avail themselves of the assistance of the navy. From this peculiarity it would appear that a study of combined operations by sea and by land must possess a special interest for our officers.

Though no man can hold that he has done his duty as long as there remains an unperformed task for which he is fitted, still our personal bent has always been to acquire knowledge, and not to presume to impart it. If we have written on matters of transport, lines of communication, mobilization and embarkation, this has been brought about by the scarcity of works dealing with these important subjects, which we may truly call some of the bases of future success. This want has rendered our studies more toilsome, and in publishing the governing laws and particulars of these

matters, we have always had in mind that the information might be profitable to other students. If it has saved them a laborious research our object will have been partly attained.

On the subject of embarkation and landing, Admiral Sir William Mends, who for many years administered with great credit the Transport branch of the Admiralty, in a lecture on disembarkation of troops, said: "In all the operations I have quoted, beyond the fact of their accomplishment, we have few details to aid the practical officer in preparing for such an undertaking. And when I carry my mind back to that of 1854, I am more than ever sensible of the unpreparedness of the practical mind to grapple with them, and our lack of the proper appliances to ensure rapidity and precision."

It has been our endeavour in the following pages to give some details of the operations involved, such as we have been able to glean from the narratives of past wars. We are, nevertheless, bound to admit that in the majority of instances very little has been recorded. The execution of the preliminary operations, as if they could have little interest for any one, have often been condensed in a few short paragraphs.

Experience being the best teacher, the subject has been largely illustrated by precedents taken

from history. Though many of the instances quoted are generally known, we have not been forgetful of King David's advice to Joab's messengers : " That the best method of making war with success, was to call to mind the accidents of former wars, and what good or bad result had attended them in the like cases, that so they might imitate one and avoid the other."

The reader will easily understand how impossible it has been to preserve the chronological order of the precedents which we have borrowed to establish certain principles. When incidents of the same campaign crop up afresh in different places, he will find that they have been taken to illustrate separate parts of our text.

When so many alterations and innovations in the arms, in the system of war, in shipping, in means of locomotion and transmission of intelligence have had their origin during the reign of Her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, it is befitting that this book should be published this year, in which all her loyal subjects are commemorating the sixtieth year of her glorious reign.

G. A. FURSE.

FRENHAM VALE,
30th April, 1897.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY EXPE- DITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS	I
II. THE MASTERY ON THE SEA	34
III. PREPARATIONS	83
IV. SECRECY AN ELEMENT OF SUCCESS	107
V. THE COMMAND	124
VI. THE OLD AND THE NEW	163
VII. PROVISION OF TRANSPORTS	198
VIII. THE EMBARKATION	225
IX. SELECTION OF A SUITABLE LOCALITY FOR LANDING	245
X. THE LANDING	268
XI. NAVAL BRIGADES	302
XII. BASE OF OPERATIONS	316
XIII. THE ATTACK	342

MAPS AND PLANS IN VOL. I.

MAP OF PEH-TANG AND PEIHO	...	<i>To face page</i>	257
ARRANGEMENT OF TRANSPORTS IN LINES...	" "		270
PLAN OF PORT AND CAMP OF ZULA	... " "		316

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.

Definition—Purposes for which they may be intended—Hostilities to be determined on after mature reflection—The country must bear the burden with resolution—The Government needs the advice of the naval and military experts—Causes which may influence the plans—Due preparations must be made—Responsibility of the Government and of the General—Napier's strictures on the action of the British Government at the beginning of this century—Absence of any plan when Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed for the Peninsula—Expeditions against Ferrol, Cadiz, and Calabria—Bonaparte's reasons for seizing Egypt—Nelson's views thereon—British forces might have been better employed in the war with France—Troops available to raise the strength of the army in the Peninsula—The Government did not provide the army in Spain with the necessary funds—Cost of Russian co-operation—Clauswitz's remarks on diversions—He considers the advantages doubtful—Mahan's definition of diversions—Why England sent troops to Holland—The Walcheren expedition—Sir E.

2 *MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.*

Creasy's remarks on the fault of the Athenians in delaying the attack on Syracuse—Expedition to Lorient—Lissa as an example of operations undertaken to find employment for the forces of a country.

EXPEDITIONS beyond the seas are all those enterprises in which large bodies of troops are conveyed in ships to a distant country, there to be landed to undertake military operations.

A State may resort to expeditions of this nature for a variety of purposes ; the principal among these are—

(a) An invasion with the object of conquest and territorial aggrandizement.

(b) As a means of transferring a war into the enemy's country.

(c) As a diversion, to ease the pressure brought on an allied power.

(d) As a preliminary measure, to establish a base for ulterior offensive operations.

(e) To curb the arbitrary power of a state or ruler.

(f) To destroy the enemy's arsenals, dockyards, etc., which constitute a standing menace.

(g) To deliver a country from foreign domination.

(h) To obtain redress, or to avenge an insult to the national flag.

(i) To protect the commerce of the world.

For a nation which holds the command of the sea, so long as the organization of its forces in view of any possible contingencies is good, a combined

naval and military operation should not present any very serious difficulties. Taking, nevertheless, into account the enormous cost which such operations entail, they should not be undertaken with a light heart.

Appalled by some imaginary calamity, or stirred by strong provocation, the population may clamour for war; but, as the population is an irresponsible power, it behoves the Government to calm its ferment, to reassure it by the wisdom of its measures, and to save the country the cost and horrors of a prolonged contest by making a firm stand against any over-hasty action.

It lies with the ruling authorities to watch over the course of events, and to detect when any national interest is likely to suffer from the action of any foreign country, when it may become expedient to afford tangible support and assistance to a weak state which is bravely defending its rights, or when the aggressive policy pursued by a stronger one is likely to disturb the balance of power. There are at all times, more or less, political questions which, as they can be amicably settled by mutual concessions, give no cause for uneasiness. There are other contentions, however, in which the feelings of the people run so high and the ordinary friendly intercourse between two countries becomes so strained, that there are good grounds for dreading the most serious consequences. The Cabinet is bound to inquire into the political bearing of each

4 *MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.*

question as it occurs, and should only resort to hostilities after mature consideration, when it is found utterly hopeless to attain some end of great national importance in any other way.

An expedition by sea need not necessarily lead to a landing on a hostile shore, it may only be the sending of a large reinforcement to protect some weakly-guarded frontier, or a demonstration of power with the object of staving off an attack.

In all that relates to the power of a nation for offence and defence, the governing authorities are always in need of the advice of the naval and military experts. Without it they may either rush into a war for which the resources of the country are inadequate, or may abstain from upholding a given line of policy by forming too low an estimate of its fighting strength. In every case, therefore, in which the relations with a foreign power are strained, the first step must be to form a correct appreciation of the military possibilities involved; this cannot be done without obtaining the opinion of the officers who are responsible for the preparations for war, and whose duty it is to watch and gauge the power of other nations.

The decision to resort to war must be the result of the conclusions formed by the political body to whom the interest and honour of the country have been especially confided. It is natural, however, to suppose that when this important step is taken, after a close and intimate interchange of views with

competent and experienced naval and military officers, the Government is able to anticipate that a series of naval and military operations will have some prospect of compelling the adversary to accept a peace which will ensure the settlement of the question at issue.

Having formulated in a general way what are the national interests to be defended, or the aggressive undertakings which are most likely to inflict the greatest injury on the enemy, the chiefs of the naval and military services must again be consulted to see how the ideas of the Government can best be carried into effect. All that relates to the number of troops to be employed, to their composition, to their equipment, to their conveyance, and to the general plan of campaign, requires a larger amount of military knowledge than the generality of statesmen possess, and must be left for the consideration of the combatant officers of the State. In other words, the means for reducing the enemy's naval and military forces to impotence, demand a thorough investigation by men who have made war the study of their lives.

It is from them that the Cabinet must demand a very well-studied and argued exposition of the advantages and disadvantages which the several possible alternatives may offer. When Philip II. threatened to invade England, Elizabeth consulted all the most able ministers and military men respecting the defence of the country. In Tytler's

A MILITARY EXPEDITION BEYOND THE SEAS.

words, "These councillors were chosen by the Queen, as being not only bred to arms, and some of them, as Grey, Norris, Bingham, and Grenville, of high military talents, but of grave experience in affairs of State, and in the civil government of provinces: qualities by no means unimportant when the debate referred, not merely to the leading of an army or the plan of a campaign, but to the organization of a militia, and the communication with the magistrates for arming the peasantry, and encouraging them to a resolute and simultaneous resistance." *

In a thorough consideration of the question it is not sufficient to gauge the strength and the weakness of the adversary and the possible attitude of its allies, for there are other points which must have more or less influence on the course recommended. It will be, for example, necessary to ascertain the nature of the climate in different seasons of the year; the condition and direction of the main roads; the prospect of finding an abundant supply of grass and forage for cattle, of water, of fuel; the general characteristics and disposition of the population and the assistance or resistance we can expect to meet with on their part.

Experience shows how carefully every particular should be investigated. In 1754 the expedition of the *Albatross*, 140 tons ton in the *Seas*. Fleet on the voyage across the Black Sea, then was indicated

* *Journal of the Council.*

of this. Referring to the night of the 11th of September, Sir W. Russell wrote, "The night was fine, but the sharpness of the air told of the approach of winter. Two heavy showers of hail, which fell at intervals in the morning covered the decks with a coating of ice a couple of inches thick."

We are bound to go deep into all these and other details; many will be found amongst the records of the Naval and Military Intelligence Departments; others must be obtained through political and special agents, travellers, or traders, whose business has called them to reside in or visit the countries in question. As a ruling principle, nothing in the way of information should ever be neglected, for who can ever tell what light an observant individual may throw on any unknown circumstances or doubtful points?

We are very often guilty of neglecting local experience. In discussing the expedition to Algeria, 1830, to which the older naval officers were opposed, the French Minister of Marine had the good sense to seek information from those officers who were well acquainted with the African coast in several seasons of the year, and who had special experience of the question under debate. Baron d'Haussez sought the advice of two naval officers, Captains Dupetit-Thouars and Guay de Taradel, both highly qualified through having for two years taken part in the blockade of the Algerian coast. The first was the officer in the French navy who knew most

of the city of Algiers and the littoral, of which he had made a special study.

Before getting involved in offensive action a Government must not only become thoroughly convinced of its necessity, but must see that the preparations are made on such a scale as will offer every prospect of the operations leading to a successful termination. In every contest both sides have to submit to heavy sacrifices, and, as long as the honour and interests of the country demand them, these burdens must be borne with resolution. No important or lasting advantages can ever be reaped by resorting to half-measures; to obtain results proportionate to the cost and waste of life incurred we must not only strike quickly but must strike strongly.

The most promising plan having been accepted, the Government becomes responsible for the general direction of the war, and the officers selected to command are responsible for the management of the naval and military operations. Instances have occurred in which this distinction was not observed, and in which the former, having gone beyond their proper province, and having attempted to dictate how the campaign was to be conducted, have given an unfortunate turn to the course of the operations.

We have an example of this when the Earl of Nottingham laid down the course which Lord Torrington was to pursue in 1690, and ordered him to bring the French fleet to action—just the thing

that the adversary desired. The Earl absolutely ignored what Torrington had written to him when alluding to the superior strength of the enemy. "I shall not think myself very unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon equaller terms than for the present I see any prospect of."

The authorities at Washington in 1861—yielding to the clamour of the press and the impatience of the people—ordered an immediate advance, although the officers were fully aware of the deficiencies of the volunteer troops placed under their command. General Scott came in for a large share of the blame for the defeat at Bull Run, but he had, under considerable pressure, sanctioned a movement which his better judgment condemned.

As the efforts a country is prepared to make should be directed to the attainment of some definite object, the executive must have a clear and well-founded view of what it purposes to gain by war, and of the way in which success is to be secured.

The folly of engaging in warlike operations without some settled plan of action was strikingly illustrated at the commencement of this century, when the British Government frittered away the strength of the nation in diversions and small expeditions of a fruitless nature. In vindicating the conduct of one of our most illustrious commanders,

Sir William Napier shows the state of things in the following words :—

“The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and a blind chance governed the councils at home. For, first, a force collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to the Baltic, at a time when an expedition composed of troops which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic was sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the moment when an unexpected event called for its services in Portugal. A division destined to attack the Spaniards at Ceuta arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection of Andalusia fortunately prevented it from making an attempt that would have materially aided Napoleon’s schemes against the Peninsula. Again, three days after Moore had withdrawn his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying off the Spanish troops under Romana, an operation for which it was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely frustrated, the campaign in Portugal, but the ministers were resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the army destined for Portugal. Nor was it the least part of England’s fortune that in such long-continued voyages in bad seasons no disaster befel the huge

fleets thus bearing her strength from one extremity of Europe to the other." *

When, on the 12th of July, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the head of ten thousand men, sailed from Cork for the Peninsula, he received no more definite instructions than to afford to the Spanish and Portuguese nations every possible aid in throwing off the yoke of France. The Ministry having laid down no special plan of action, nor determined where the British troops were to be landed, it devolved on Sir Arthur to decide in which quarter he could act against the French with the best effect. Being thoroughly convinced that with the small force at his command there was no prospect of coping with the invaders in Spain, he resolved to undertake operations against Junot in Portugal.

Later in the same year "Sir John Moore penetrated as far as Salamanca without a plan of operations, or data upon which to found one; his instructions merely directed him to open communication with the Spanish authorities for the purpose of 'framing the plan of campaign.'" †

Ten years before the commencement of the Peninsular War, Bonaparte demonstrated to the Directory the two ways in which Great Britain could be injured. One was by occupying Hanover and Hamburg, the principal channels through which her trade found its way into the Continent; the other

* Napier's "Peninsular War," book iv. chap. 6.

† Ibid., chap. 3.

by seizing Egypt as a base of operations against India. "The time is not far distant," he wrote, "when we shall feel that truly to destroy England we must take possession of Egypt." *

It is beyond all doubt that the expedition to Egypt was planned and proposed to the Directory by Bonaparte. James relates the following circumstance. "During the negotiations at Campo-Formio, in the summer of 1797, General Bonaparte took away from the Ambrosian library at Milan all the books he could find on subjects connected with the East; and on their being brought to Paris, marginal notes were discovered in every page that treated specially on Egypt; hence it has been inferred that Bonaparte was, even at this time, ruminating upon the plan, in the attempted execution of which his military fame subsequently received so serious a check and his moral character so fatal a stab." †

It has been written that the expedition to Egypt was an adventure carried out in a burst of Republican enthusiasm which would not stop to calculate chances. ‡ All that has been narrated on this subject leaves no doubt in our mind that it was principally the work of one man. Bonaparte was far from being what many people imagined, a martyr to the enmity of the Directory. The Directory

* "Correspondance de Napoléon," 16 Août, 1797, vol. ii.

p. 311.

† "The Naval History of Great Britain," by W. James, vol. ii.

p. 149.

‡ "Naval Warfare," Rear-Admiral Colomb, chap. xviii. p. 399.

most probably accepted his views to get rid of a powerful rival, of a man of singular capacity, whose ambition was obnoxious to them; but they had no share whatsoever in the conception of the expedition to Egypt.

Bonaparte's imagination, as his intimates have recorded, constantly dwelt on the formation of an Empire in the East, the land of mighty enterprises. His ambition was to perform deeds which would equal those of the great Alexander. He was possibly thinking of this Eastern Empire of his fancy when from Mount Cœur de Lion, pointing to St. Jean d'Acre, he told his staff that the capture of that city would decide his destiny, and would change the face of the world. In any case, chafing at his dependence on a Government both unpopular and devoid of ability, by going to Egypt he regained his liberty as a commander, and expected to add to his glory in a region where the echo of success always appears more resounding. He omitted, however, to take into account all the efforts England would make as soon as she saw her Indian possessions threatened.

Our danger in that direction had not escaped the attention of our great naval commander. In Nelson's despatches there is a letter written on the 24th of June, 1798, to the British Consul at Alexandria, which contains the following passage: "I am so persuaded of the intention of the French to attempt driving us from India in concert with Tippoo

Saib that I shall never feel secure till Mangalore and all Tippoo's coast is in our possession." * After that powerful chief had been killed when defending Seringapatam, very clear evidence was found amongst his papers that a friendly understanding had existed between him and the Government of the French Republic.

In a letter addressed to Tippoo Saib, Sultan of Mysore, Bonaparte wrote : "You will have heard of my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with a numerous and invincible army, wishing to deliver you from the yoke of the English. I wish you would send to Suez or Cairo an intelligent and confidential person with whom I might confer." It may be remembered that it was to punish the Sultan's perfidious intrigues against the British, that hostilities commenced in March, 1799, which ended with the capture of Seringapatam and his death.

We may well doubt if Bonaparte ever believed that he could take his army from Egypt to India without serious impediment. To march it by land from the Nile to the Indus, a distance of two thousand miles, through the deserts of Arabia and Persia was not a possible feat. On the other hand, looking at the large number of transports he had found necessary to convey it to Egypt, was

* The French expedition to Egypt had the result of leading Nelson astray. Always harping on the old possibilities, it led him to Egypt in February, 1805, when Villeneuve was bent on getting out of the Mediterranean.

there any prospect of finding anything like an equal number at Suez or on the shores of the Red Sea, where trade is never so brisk as in the Mediterranean?

In the transport of the expedition from the southern shores of France a large number of neutral vessels were employed. At all events some of these, chiefly Danish and Swedish, were captured and burnt by the British as they were trying to effect their escape from Alexandria. Can we believe that such vessels as Bonaparte hoped to find on the Red Sea were capable of crossing the Indian Ocean and depositing his troops on some part of the Malabar coast? There remained the possibility of constructing boats and vessels for this purpose; but that plan was frustrated by the defeat of Aboukir, which must have destroyed the shipwrights and necessary implements. Given, nevertheless, that most of these difficulties could have been overcome, what ships of war had the French for convoying an armament from Suez? Could they dare to run the risk of falling in with British men-of-war in the Indian Ocean?

The war with France in the first years of the present century offers several examples of small expeditions which were either conducted without sufficient determination, or without any well-defined object. In August, 1800, an attempt was made by a naval and military force to carry the defences which protected a Spanish squadron lying in the

harbour of Ferrol ready for sea. The guns of some of the works were silenced by the fire of the fleet on the 25th, and in the evening the troops, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir James Pultney, landed on the shores of the bay without the loss of a man. A detachment of seamen was landed with these, to carry the scaling ladders and to drag the guns up the heights.

As the British troops gained the summit of the first ridge, a detachment of the enemy was encountered and driven back. The following day, Major-General the Earl of Cavan with the first brigade repulsed a considerable body of Spanish troops, and gained possession of the heights of Brion and Balon, which overlook the town and harbour of Ferrol. The general commanding then became alarmed by the apparent strength of the Spanish defences, and by the preparations of the enemy which were reported to him. At his request the admiral re-embarked the troops and conveyed them back to Gibraltar.*

A couple of months later eighty transports, containing eighteen thousand troops, under the command of Sir R. Abercrombie, escorted by twenty-two ships-of-the-line, with thirty-seven frigates and sloops, anchored in the Bay of Cadiz. The purpose of this expedition was to get possession of the Spanish squadron anchored in the harbour, and with this intent the town was

* James, "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 26.

summoned to surrender. Only a small number of the troops were landed, but hitches occurred and difficulties increased; lastly, the reports of a terrible plague, which was said to be raging in Cadiz, caused the expedition to be withdrawn.

In 1806, Sir John Stuart, who commanded the British troops in Sicily, crossed over to Calabria with five thousand men, and, having defeated Regnier at Maida, drove the French out of the whole province. However, Sir John, having soon discovered that his force was too small to hold it, was obliged to carry it back to Sicily. In 1809 he crossed again to the main land at the head of fifteen thousand men, but, even with this larger force, he effected nothing of any real importance.

The forcing of the Dardanelles by Admiral Sir John Duckworth in 1807 was another case in which nothing was done because there was no definite object, and an undue estimate had been made of the opposition likely to be encountered. Napoleon, through the energy and tact of General Sebastiani, the French ambassador at Constantinople, had acquired an ascendancy over Sultan Selim, and British influence had received a complete check. In this state of affairs, the Admiralty sent orders to Lord Collingwood to despatch part of the Mediterranean fleet, strengthened by some ships of Rear-admiral Louis and Sir Sidney Smith, to act offensively against Constantinople.

As the current impeded navigation in those

days of sailing, the Dardanelles could not be passed unless the ships were favoured by a strong southerly wind. Duckworth's squadron was delayed at the entrance of the Dardanelles for several weeks before this favourable opportunity occurred; on the 19th of February it wended its way towards the Sea of Marmora. The British fleet, which consisted of seven ships-of-the-line, two frigates, a few corvettes and bomb ketches, sustained the fire of the Turkish forts without staying its course, the ships replying as they passed. At the cost of sixty killed and wounded, and with little damage done to his ships, Admiral Duckworth reached the Sea of Marmora, and Constantinople appeared at his mercy.

Neither the admiral nor the British ambassador, however, knew how to turn this first success to advantage. The fleet anchored near Prince's Island, about ten miles from Seraglio Point, and negotiations ensued. The appearance of the British squadron caused terror among the Sultan's ministers; but Sebastiani came to the rescue. In five days he had the coast batteries armed with six hundred guns, one hundred small gunboats afloat, and a line of vessels laid along the shore, each with a broadside ready to be discharged at the English fleet. At the same time the defences of the Dardanelles were strengthened so as to prevent the return of the British fleet. Apprised on the latter point, Duckworth determined to retire without delay. He gives as his reasons that "had they (the Turks)

been allowed another week to complete the defences throughout the channel, it would have been a very doubtful point whether a return lay open to us at all."

On the 1st of March the fleet weighed in the morning, and all the ships were out of the Dardanelles by noon. In this return journey the British fleet was exposed to a terrific fire, and sustained a heavy loss in men killed and wounded, whilst some of the ships were so badly damaged that they had to be sent to Malta for repairs.

Nothing was effected against Constantinople. Duckworth reported that "from the moment of our anchorage till we weighed in the morning of the 1st of March, such was the unfortunate state of the weather, that it was not at any time in our power to have occupied a situation which would have enabled the squadron to commence offensive operations against Constantinople." The Admiral had come to the conclusion that it was utterly impracticable for the fleet to make any impression on the capital, considering the ships and the troops the Turks had gathered together, also the number and strength of the city batteries.

At the commencement of this century England had no lack of experienced and enterprising commanders and able officers, whilst the French themselves have often testified to the admirable fighting qualities of her troops. There can be no question that all the millions spent in a fruitless

movement of troops, in aiding the inhabitants of the Peninsula to hold out against Napoleon, and in subsidizing the great powers, would have enabled the ministry to place a numerous and well-appointed army in the field, which would have carried out a war with great credit. With an adequate army Wellington might have crossed the French frontier two years before he did, and given to Napoleon's power in 1812 a blow from which it would have never recovered. Several expeditions at points far apart can never be so fruitful as a well-conducted single one. In 1809 the Walcheren expedition was undertaken at a time when the troops detailed for it would have been unquestionably much better employed in reinforcing the army in the Peninsula.

At no period of the war in Portugal and Spain was the British force employed adequate to the end in view. That it was possible to render it a really powerful instrument at the commencement of the war, is shown by the following appendix given in the first volume of Napier's "*Peninsular War*:"

No. XXIV.

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE BY HIS
ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK IN 1808

Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign of 1808-9 in *Spain*, without detriment to the other services :

“There are at present in Portugal—

Cavalry	1,640	}	31,446
Infantry, 34 battalions			29,806		

“Under orders to embark—

Cavalry	3,410	}	14,829
Infantry	11,419		

Total			46,275		
-------	--	--	--------	--	--

“Of this force the 20th Dragoons and eight battalions should remain in Portugal. The disposable force would then be—

			Cavalry.	Infantry.
From Portugal	1,313	23,575
Under orders	3,200	11,419
Force to be drawn from Sicily		8,000
		Total	4,513	42,994

To this may be added four regi-	}			
ments of cavalry and the two				
brigades of guards	2,560	2,434

Grand total			7,073	45,428
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“When to this you add four battalions of infantry, which may be spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of about sixty thousand rank and file.”

NOTE.—The details of names and strength of the regiments are omitted to save space.

Napier, in the following words, shows what were the advantages of mixed naval and military operations in the Peninsula in 1808. “Nineteen thousand British troops posted in strong ground might have offered battle to very superior numbers ; yet, where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain ? Nothing could be gained, but he (Moore) might, by a quick retreat, reach the ships unmolested, and carry his army from that narrow corner to the southern provinces, and renew the war under more

favourable circumstances. It was by this combination of a fleet and army the greatest assistance could be given to Spain, and the strength of England became most formidable; a few days' sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz; six weeks constant marching would not bring the French from Galicia to that neighbourhood." *

The Government of those days had a strange contempt for Napoleon's power, and expected a commander to do great things with a few thousand men. It engaged in several small and doubtful undertakings at the same time, in fields far apart, and displayed singular carelessness in providing an army with the sinews of war. Sir John Moore, campaigning in Portugal and in Spain, was so short of money that he wrote to Lord Castlereagh: "I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassment we are thrown into from the want of that essential article." Sir David Baird was sent out without money, and had to borrow £40,000 from the supply sent from England to feed the Spanish insurrection. A little more reflection, a little more knowledge of the difficulties of war would have prevented much of this, and would have saved the military commanders from having to repair many mistakes for which they were in no way answerable.

* Napier's "*Peninsular War*," book iv. chap. 5.

The following passage will convey some idea of what England had to pay at that period for the co-operation of foreign powers. "A treaty had also been entered into between Great Britain and Russia; wherein the latter stipulated to furnish 17,593 men, also six ships-of-the-line and five frigates, all armed *en flûte*, and two transports, to carry a portion of the troops. The emperor was to receive for the hire of the troops £88,000 sterling; half of which was to be paid when the troops were ready to embark at Revel, and the remainder in three months afterwards. A subsidy of £44,000 a month was also to be paid, from the day on which the troops were ready. For the ships Great Britain was to pay £58,976 10s. sterling, as the three months' subsidy for expenses of equipment, etc., to be computed from the day on which the ships should depart from Cronstadt; and, after the expiration of those three months, she was to continue to pay at the rate of £19,642 10s. sterling a month. All this was independent of subsistence. The emperor, therefore, made a tolerable market of his ships and troops." *

Clausewitz observes, with respect to the expedition to North Holland in 1799, and to Walcheren in 1809, that, regarded as diversions, they were justified in so far that there was no other way of employing the English troops. That learned writer evidently overlooked the fact that in 1809 there was a British

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 306.

army in the Peninsula, which might have been rendered powerful if largely reinforced. It was not because no way could be found of employing her troops that Great Britain undertook the expedition to Walcheren, it was because the Government took more pains to help her continental allies than in giving to the general already in the field the number of troops that he needed for conducting his operations with credit.

Seldom can any tangible advantage be reaped by employing a small body of troops in fighting a strong power. A diversion may cause annoyance, but nothing more, and the result, generally speaking, is not commensurate with the cost.

On the question of diversions, Clausewitz expresses himself thus :—"According to the ordinary use of language, under the term diversion is understood such an incursion into the enemy's territory as draws off a portion of his force from the principal point.

"Naturally the diversion must at the same time always have an object of attack, for it is only the value of this object that will induce the enemy to send troops for its protection ; besides, in case the undertaking does not succeed as a diversion, this object is a compensation for the forces expended in the attempt.

"These objects of attack may be fortresses, or important magazines, or rich and large towns, especially capital cities, contributions of all kinds :

lastly, assistance may be afforded in this way to discontented subjects of the enemy.

“ . . . The chief condition is that they should withdraw from the principal theatre of the war more of the enemy's troops than we employ on the diversion ; for if they only succeed in drawing off just the same number, then their efficacy as a diversion, properly called, ceases, and the undertaking becomes a mere subordinate attack.”

He considers the advantages of large diversions very doubtful, for, as he explains, “ Every diversion brings war into a district into which it would not have penetrated ; for that reason it will always be the means, more or less, of calling forth military forces which would otherwise have continued in obedience ; this will be done in a way which will be very sensibly felt if the enemy has any organized militia, and means of arming the nation at large.” *

According to Mahan, “ a diversion is only a subordinate part of the drama of war. It is either a deceit, the success of which depends rather upon the incapacity of the opponent than upon its own merits ; or it is an indirect use of forces which, from their character or position, cannot be made to conduce directly to the main effort of the enterprise in hand.” †

* “ On War,” by General Carl Von Clausewitz, book vii. chap. xx.

† “ The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Mahan, vol. i. p. 98.

The Walcheren expedition was an excellently devised one, and, under other leaderships, might have had the desired results.

From the very first the annexation of Belgium had caused considerable uneasiness to Great Britain. When Bonaparte made a tour through the northern provinces of France in 1803, he was struck by the advantages which Antwerp offered as a military and commercial port. Resolved to turn it into the principal naval arsenal of the Republic, he issued orders for the commencement of a series of works which were to render it so. The daily-increasing development of the port of Antwerp, which had become one of the great constructing establishments of the French navy, being considered a source of danger, the British Government determined to despatch an expedition for its capture.

On the 21st of July, 1809, thirty-seven ships of war, twenty-three frigates, one hundred and fifteen sloops and gunboats, accompanied by transports carrying forty-one thousand soldiers quitted our shores, and reached the Dutch coast on the following day. The main object of the expedition was to take the enemy unawares, and to carry Antwerp, at that time inadequately garrisoned, by a *coup de main*. The moment was well chosen, for Napoleon had withdrawn most of his troops from this part of his dominions for the war on the Danube.

The Dutch general, Bruce, evacuated Weere without fighting, and the British were fortunate in

securing the passage of Slon—which gave access to the eastern Scheldt—without having to encounter the fire of the batteries of Flushing and Cadzand. Thus on the third day after the disembarkation the British force had reached a point three leagues from Antwerp.

Beyond capturing Flushing, which was poorly defended by General Monnet, Lord Chatham, who commanded the troops, undertook no decisive operations, and contented himself with making purposeless demonstrations. By failing to comply with Lord Castlereagh's instructions to advance at once in force against Antwerp, he gave time to King Louis Bonaparte to reinforce the garrison and to gather thirty thousand picked men of the National Guard to confront the invaders. Besides these troops Kellerman had formed a reserve at Wesel, Moncey another at Lille, and Sainte-Suzanne had assumed command of the coast.*

* Bernadotte was one of the most able generals of the empire. His bearing at the Battle of Wagram (as it had been at Austerlitz, and more so at Auerstaedt) greatly irritated Napoleon, who on the morrow of the battle refused to receive him and ordered him to return forthwith to France. Arriving in Paris just as the news of the landing of the British force at Brée-Zandt reached the capital, through the intrigues of Fouché, he was given by the King of Holland the command of the army of the North. He arrogated to himself all the credit for the arrangements made for the defence of the country, though, when he arrived at Antwerp, the greatest danger was over. In Napoleon's words, "When he reached it the English expedition had failed."—"Mémoires de Napoléon," tome i. p. 219.

The opportune moment was lost, and an expedition, said to have cost the country twenty millions, was rendered fruitless by the incapacity of its leader, who was unable to understand the value of a surprise and the importance of making all other operations secondary to the real object in view.

Sir Edward Creasy, referring to a somewhat similar case in the Athenian attack on Syracuse, says, "and if they (the Athenians) had properly attacked the city itself, instead of wasting nearly a year in desultory operations in other parts of the island, the Syracusans must have paid the penalty of their self-sufficient carelessness in submission to the Athenian yoke." *

In the middle of the eighteenth century, in 1746, an expedition was being organized to operate against Quebec. The preparations, however, were so dilatory that the season was found to be too far advanced to send the armament to North America. The British Government then deemed it desirable to utilize it somewhere nearer to England, and despatched it to Quimperlé Bay, with the object of destroying the stores and ships of the French East India Company at Lorient. Notwithstanding that the French were taken by surprise, and that the landing was effected with little difficulty in face of a small force hastily

* "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." Sir Edward Creasy.

collected, the issue of the expedition did not redound to our credit. The force was not furnished with a siege train to reduce Lorient, nor was there sufficient ammunition for the few guns dragged ashore, so that a week after landing, as the French had been reinforced, General Sinclair resolved to re-embark his troops. The real reason for undertaking this expedition has never been explained; a little more consideration might have kept the Government from venturing into an enterprise, which, from want of adequate means and a safe anchorage for the fleet, evidently could not lead to a satisfactory result.

The operations about Lissa in 1866 are a striking example of an attack undertaken to find some employment for the forces of a country. On the 24th of June the Italian land forces had been signally defeated by the Austrians on the field of Custozza, and Italy hoped to retrieve that disgrace by a victory at sea.

During the preceding six years Italy had spent some twelve millions on her navy, and the country was very proud of its ships. The Italian navy, nevertheless, was very incomplete as a fighting machine; its commanders were inexperienced, its gunners young and untrained, its petty officers ignorant, whilst the standard of discipline in all ranks was very low.

Admiral Persano, on whom the nation counted very much, could not show any remarkable record

of war services, and, as events proved, was devoid of ability, had no determination, and lacked the power of enforcing obedience to his orders. A greater failing was that he had no confidence in his fleet, which he considered was not ready for war.

The Cabinet had formed no plans ; the Admiral was entreated to do something, to fight the Austrians and drive their ships out of the Adriatic. On peremptory orders from the King and the Minister of Marine, on the 16th of July, Admiral Persano put to sea to attack Lissa, an island in the Adriatic which the Austrians had fortified, and which at that time held a garrison of 1883 men with eighty-eight guns.

The Italian fleet was composed of twelve iron-clads, five first-class frigates, four corvettes, three despatch boats, three gun-boats, one hospital ship, one transport, and two unarmed merchant steamers. With the fleet there were fifteen hundred soldiers and marines to be employed as a landing party. Two days later the frigates *Carlo Alberto* and *Principe Umberto* brought reinforcements which raised the landing party to two thousand six hundred men, and on the 20th the transport *Piemonte* arrived before Lissa with one more battalion.

The Admiral had no maps, and only a very vague idea of the strength of the place he was about to attack. The island was assailed from three sides. Rear-admiral Vacca, with three iron-

clads, was to bombard Comissa on the west; Vice-admiral Albini, with the unarmoured ships, was to attack Porto Manego on the south; and the rest of the fleet, under Admiral Persano, was to assail Porto San Giorgio on the east.

In making these dispositions sufficient account was not taken of the possibility of the Austrian fleet coming in sight; the *Esploratore*, however, was detailed to keep a look-out to the north and the *Stella d'Italia* to the west. Commander Sandri was to cut the telegraph cable which lay in the neighbouring island of Lesina.

Sandri cut the cable, but not before full details of the arrival of the Italians had been transmitted to Rear-admiral Tegetthoff,* who telegraphed in reply, "Hold out till the fleet can come to you"—a warning which should have put Persano on his guard, but he was fully persuaded that the Austrian fleet dared not attack him.

On the 18th and 19th a powerful fire was brought to bear on the defences of the island; but little impression was made on the Austrian works, and, whilst on the morning of the 20th the bombardment was being resumed, the *Esploratore* was seen making for the island, signalling suspected vessels in sight.

Admiral Persano was in a serious predicament, for some of his ships were to the west of the island, some were bombarding San Giorgio, others were

* Tegetthoff with his fleet was at Pola, one hundred and seventy-five miles to the north of Lissa.

cruising to the north-east, and Albini's ships, encumbered with troops, were in the process of disembarkation. However, by nine a.m. he was able to form his and Vacca's ships into line.

An account of the subsequent combat between the Austrian and Italian fleets is beyond the range of this work. The expedition has only been taken as an example of a combined naval and military operation; it failed, and the Austrian fleet, though inferior to the Italian, was able to frustrate the attempted capture of the island of Lissa.

Persano seems to have had no conception of the power of resistance which fortifications have against a simple bombardment by men-of-war; nor did he appear to know how much more easy it is to attack from the land side. Indeed, examples of attacks of works made by ships unassisted by a landing party are very few. Where the Admiral made a mistake was in not making it his first concern to land the troops he had, whereas he relied entirely on the effects of the bombardment. Having a body of troops with the fleet, their co-operation on shore was of the highest importance, as it would have enabled the Italians to attack the enemy on two sides at once, which would have considerably weakened the defence.

When arraigned before the Senate, Persano pleaded in his defence, that the landing force was insufficient for its task. It has nevertheless been shown that, on the arrival of the reinforcements on

the 18th of July, the landing force amounted to two thousand six hundred men. The garrison in the island, having three principal points to defend, consisted of a total of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, so that, leaving aside the crews of the ships, the Italians had eight hundred men in excess of the whole Austrian garrison.

Vice-admiral Albini, whose conduct throughout was pusillanimous, was much to blame for this waste of forces. Porto Manego, which he was directed to attack on the 18th, was weakly garrisoned, and on the works there were mounted only two 12-pounder rifles and four 18-pounder smooth-bores. A more enterprising commander, by landing a body of seamen from his ships, might have easily carried the place. Nor did he show more resolution on the following day when ordered to land the troops at Porto Karober. The co-operation of the land forces was very much to be desired, and no surf would have kept a determined commander from putting the troops ashore.

CHAPTER II.

THE MASTERY ON THE SEA.

No successful landing possible without the command of the sea—

Lessons from the last English and French war—First step to measure the enemy's strength at sea—William the Conqueror and Napoleon—What led to the success of the former—Danger of William when Harold ordered the reassembling of his fleet—Effect of the weather in a successful invasion—Asclepiodotus evades Allectus's fleet in a fog—The conditions as to the command of the sea have been the same in all ages—Napoleon's scheme for withdrawing part of the British fleet from the coast—What became of it—Bonaparte's communications lost when his fleet was destroyed at Aboukir—His departure for Europe—Sir Sidney Smith—Bonaparte defeated before St. Jean d'Acre—Condition of the British and French in Egypt in 1801—Danger from the combined action of two or more fleets—Copenhagen—Superiority at sea depends more on knowledge of naval tactics and good seamanship than on the number of ships—Advantages in conveying troops and materials conferred by the mastery on the sea—Every effort to be made to maintain the superiority on that element—Lord Wolseley's remarks on the wealth of our mercantile marine.

INVASIONS of a country by sea have played a very conspicuous part in the history of the world, and have been fraught with very important and lasting consequences.

Of all the conditions necessary for effecting a

successful landing on a hostile coast, the most essential one is to possess a decided superiority over the adversary at sea.

Bearing in mind the helpless state in which a large number of fighting men are, whilst being conveyed from one country to another, an operation of this nature is most hazardous as long as the adversary has a fleet in a condition to give battle. Before embarking on such an enterprise, therefore, the first thing to be done is to form an accurate estimate of the actual extent of the enemy's power at sea. If this is such as to afford a sufficient number of vessels for the protection of his shores and to cruise about to ward off an attack, his fleet must, as a preliminary measure, be overcome or driven off, and thus prevented from in any way obstructing the landing of our forces.

Nothing demonstrates the full value of holding the command of the sea better than the wars between England and France from 1793 to 1802, and from 1803 to 1815. These wars, above all, deserve to be diligently studied, for they are full of most useful lessons.

The mastery on the sea, in so far as it enables a state to take its power for offence to a distant land, is a means to an end. It may be accepted as an axiom that nothing will be attempted in the way of a hostile landing as long as this mastery is a matter of uncertainty. The real or reported superiority of the adversary's naval forces will make a nation

very chary about engaging in such a doubtful enterprise.

No one would ever dream of comparing the military talent of William the Conqueror with that of Napoleon, although the former enjoyed the reputation of being the most renowned knight, and the most capable general of his age. Nevertheless, the Duke of Normandy was able to land his knights and archers on the shores of England, whilst the Emperor, with the whole military forces of France at his command, and with even greater preparations, was compelled to abandon his most cherished design. The narrow belt of sea which separates the two countries proved a more effective barrier to his progress than the steep and ice-covered peaks of the Alps. His brilliant military talents, by the aid of which he planted his eagles in most of the capitals of Europe, were powerless to devise means for overcoming the wooden walls of Great Britain.

William the Conqueror was successful in his invasion of England because there was no fleet to oppose him at sea, and no army to contest his landing.*

* In the Hotel de Ville at Bayeux is an old tapestry which gives a representation of the invasion and conquest of England by the Normans. This pictorial history is more minute than any written history we have, and what adds to its interest is, that tradition asserts it to be the work of Matilda, wife of William the Conqueror, and her maids, who afterwards presented it to the Cathedral of Bayeux. The tapestry represents seventy-two distinct occurrences, each bearing an explanatory Latin inscription.

In the spring of 1066, in all the ports of Normandy many hands were employed in constructing and fitting ships, whilst armourers and smiths were busy preparing lances, swords, coats of mail, and other armour.

By the middle of August, William had assembled his ships at the mouth of the Dive—a river which falls into the sea between the Seine and the Orne; but for some time the winds, which have often marred similar enterprises, were adverse, so much so that his first attempt to cross the Channel ended in disaster. "They eagerly embarked, and set sail"—writes Creasy—"but the wind soon freshened to a gale, and drove them along the French coast to St. Valery, where the greater part of them found shelter, but many of their vessels were wrecked, and the whole coast of Normandy was strewn with the bodies of the drowned. William's army began to grow discouraged and averse to the enterprise, which the very elements thus seemed to fight against."

Harold had assembled a fleet at Harwich, and sailed with it to the Isle of Wight. He was not ignorant of William's preparations, and was in the south, watching for the invaders, who had been expected for some time with great uneasiness. All the summer was spent in such places as lay nearest to the Norman coast, and most favoured a disembarkation, but the delay seemed to indicate that nothing would be undertaken till winter.

Another, and a real danger, however, threatened

in the north, where the Norwegians had actually landed on the British coast. Under the circumstances, Harold conceived that it would be possible for him, by a rapid march, to crush the Norwegians, and to be back in the south in time to face the Norman invaders. He accordingly led his forces to York.

The delay caused by the weather was fortunate for the Norman Duke, for not only had Harold's army quitted the south to do battle with Harald Hardrada, but his fleet had dispersed with the object of refitting and taking in fresh provisions. At this very opportune moment William made his second attempt. The wind having changed, and the weather turned fine, preparations were instantly made for the embarkation, and the Norman armada set sail, steering with a favourable breeze direct for the English coast.

In warrior-chiefs, knights, and soldiers of inferior degree, the army numbered about sixty thousand men. According to the Norman chronicle, professional adventurers and vagabonds flocked from all parts of the continent and offered their services, so promising seemed the return they were likely to reap. Thierry states that the vessels employed to convey the army from the Norman coast comprised seven hundred large sails, and more than a thousand transport boats.* In a return prepared some years

* "*Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands*," Augustin Thierry, vol. i. p. 303.

ago to show the shipping employed in some notable expeditions across the seas, the Norman fleet is said to have numbered nine hundred and seven sail, and two thousand transports; taking into account the large number of combatants, artificers, horses, carriages, materials, provisions, etc., the larger estimate is probably the most correct.

The country they were about to invade was well known to the Normans. Edward the Confessor, who had been brought up in Normandy, and who, when called to the throne, had promised to bring over with him as few Normans as possible, was followed by many. The national fortresses were placed in charge of Norman chiefs, Norman clergymen were appointed English bishops, and other individuals from over the sea became the counsellors and intimate confidants of the king. By degrees the Normans had attained the same ascendancy which the Danes had formerly conquered by the sword, and all at the cost of the king's popularity, for the nation which had shed its blood so that England might be free, seemed to perceive under other appearances a renewal of the foreign yoke.

The Duke of Normandy was able to give to his invasion a semblance of justice by laying before the Court of Rome a complaint against Harold's perjury, and his undertaking received the sanction of the Pope. Thierry, in the following passage, shows that the Holy See was under some obligation to the Normans, inasmuch as some of their knights had

aided the Pope in the acquisition of his temporal power.

"The consistory of Saint John-in-Lateran was at that period directed by a man whose celebrity surpassed all others of the middle ages; he was Hildebrand, monk of Cluny, created, by Pope Nicholas II., archdeacon and chancellor of the Church of Rome. After having reigned in the name of that Pope, he was powerful enough to have one elected of his choice, Alexander II., and to uphold him, notwithstanding the opposition of the imperial court. All the aims of this personage, gifted with an astonishing vigour of mind and character, tended to transform the religious supremacy of the Holy See into universal supremacy over all the Christian states. This revolution, which commenced in the ninth century by the reduction of several towns of central Italy to the obedience or suzerainty of the Pope, continued for the two following centuries. All the towns of Campania, of which the Roman pontiff was the immediate metropolitan, had passed of their own accord or by force under his temporal power, and by a strange circumstance, in the first half of the eleventh century, Norman knights, who had emigrated from their country, were seen conducting under the flag of Saint Peter, the Roman soldiery to this conquest." *

On reaching the coast in Pevensey Bay, not far

* "*Conquête de l'Angleterre*," par Augustin Thierry, vol. i. p. 289.

from Hastings, on the 29th of September, 1066, four days after Harold's victory over the Norwegians, the invaders found no obstacle in the way of their landing. Pevensey was a most fitting place at which to effect a landing, for Beachy Head projecting considerably to the south protects it from the swell occasioned by the south-west wind, the wind which most violently affects the English Channel. Of such a nature also is the strand at Pevensey that ships can be beached with the greatest ease.

The landing was apparently made with some system. The archers, or light troops, were disembarked first, then the knights and other mounted men, lastly the pioneers, artificers, carpenters, and smiths, with materials for three wooden forts. The landing completed, the army advanced on Hastings, in the neighbourhood of which a camp was formed, and two wooden forts were erected to hold the provisions. Bodies of the invaders scoured the country around foraging, and, as the people would not submit, pillaged and burned their houses.

Harold was at York wounded, and resting his army, when a messenger arrived in all haste to inform him of the landing of the Normans. He bitterly grieved that he had not been on the spot when the Normans landed, that he might have driven them into the sea. He at once set his army in motion for the south, and issued orders for all

the chiefs to lead their contingents to London. Impelled by his impatience, and disturbed by the accounts he received of the ravages which the Normans were carrying on round their camp, he hurried on towards Hastings without giving himself time to collect a sufficient force. His army numerically was a long way inferior to the Norman, and very deficient in cavalry.

Before trusting to the fortune of war the Duke of Normandy had sent ambassadors to Harold to propose terms, amongst others that by mutual consent the cause of quarrel should be submitted to the Pope, and that the two disputants should abide by his decision. Thus spoke Hugues Maigrot, "Next, offers William to withdraw his troops from the land, if thou and thy council and chiefs will submit to the arbitrement of our most holy pontiff, Alexander the Second, and abide by his decision whether thou or my liege have the best right to the throne."

"This, as Churchman," said the Abbot of the great convent of Peterborough (who, with the Abbot of Hyde, had joined the march of Harold, deeming as one the cause of altar and throne)—"this, as Churchman, may *I* take leave to answer. Never yet hath it been heard in England, that the spiritual suzerain of Rome should give us our kings."

"And," said Harold, with a bitter smile, "the Pope hath already summoned me to this trial, as if the laws of England were kept in the rolls of the

Vatican! Already, if rightly informed, the Pope hath been pleased to decide that our Saxon land is the Norman's. I reject a judge without a right to decide; and I mock at a sentence that profanes heaven in its insult to men. Is this all?"*

William—who was warned of the movements of the Saxons by a Norman, one of the many whom Harold in his imprudence had not driven out of England at the death of his predecessor†—was fully alive to the danger which menaced his army as soon as Harold, on receipt of the news of the landing, ordered the fleet to reassemble on the coast of Sussex to intercept the enemy's communications. He clearly foresaw that his best course of action was to come as soon as possible to an issue with the king's land forces, and to defeat them. The spirited words by which he endeavoured to stimulate his barons, knights, and soldiers to gallant deeds before the battle of Hastings, are a clear proof of how he appreciated the danger of his position. He reminded them that there was no safety in asking for quarter or in flight. Think well, he said, that, if you

* "Harold, the last of the Saxon Kings," by the Right Hon. Lord Lytton, p. 435.

† Referring to a visit William had paid to England in 1051, Thierry says, "Traversing England, the Duke of Normandy might for a moment believe that he had not quitted his dominions; Normans commanded the fleet he found stationed at Dover; at Canterbury, Norman soldiers formed the garrison of a fort built on the slope of a hill; other Normans came to pay their respects dressed as superior officers or prelates."—"Conquête de l'Angleterre," p. A Thierry, vol. i. p. 243.

are beaten you are done for, for you have no means of retreat. You will find before you on one side arms and a hostile and unknown country ; on the other the sea and arms. In the chronicler's words : *ad effugium nullam via patere, cum hinc arma et inimica ignotaque regio obsistant illinc pontus et arma.*

All the efforts of the Normans, covered as the Saxons were by their intrenchments and palisades, proved of no avail ; they lost a large number of men, and became dispirited, and had it not been for William's stratagem—a feigned retreat devised to draw the enemy from their intrenchments—the battle would have been lost. A defeat under the circumstances in which the invaders were placed would have been utter ruin.

It is hard to conceive that an invader would be so foolhardy as to attempt a landing if he saw any likelihood of being soon attacked by the enemy's fleet, for a defeat at sea, by cutting off his retreat and stopping his supplies, would place his army in a most critical predicament. This risk might be incurred when the invaded provinces are entirely unprotected, and when their resources are more than sufficient to meet the necessities of the invaders. Such instances now will be very rare, and in any case warlike stores and materials of special pattern cannot be found locally, and must be put ashore as soon as the mass of the combatants has landed.

Cases may certainly occur in which the enemy's

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troops, merchandize, and provisions. This fleet was to separate ; some of the trade ships were to go to the East Indies ; the other ships with soldiers and stores were to proceed to Canada to enable the French to recapture Cape Breton.

On the 3rd of May, a day or two before this separation was to be carried out, when abreast of Cape Finisterre, De la Jonquière came in sight of a British squadron under Vice-admiral Anson. The French admiral signalled to the transports to make their escape, and sent the *Émeraude* to direct their course, while he made ready for battle. In the action which followed he fought bravely to save the convoy, but his own ships and one third of the transports were captured.

The conditions with respect to the supremacy at sea have always been the same, and we find this supremacy admitted as the most necessary element in an invasion of our shores in all ages. It has been shown how in the eleventh century the absence of Harold's fleet favoured the descent of the Normans. In the sixteenth century, to secure the command of the sea, Medina Sidonia, sailing from Spain, was directed to drive the Dutch and English squadrons off, and then join the fleet which the Duke of Parma had collected in the neighbourhood of Calais. The plan was to form an overpowering force, under the protection of which the Spanish troops could effect a safe landing.

When, some two hundred years later, Napoleon

entertained the idea of an invasion of England, he had to conceive some plan which would give him the mastery at sea. What importance he attached to this point is clearly demonstrated by the following passage which occurs in a letter he wrote to the Directory on the 23rd of February, 1798. "To make a descent upon England, without being masters of the sea, is the boldest and most difficult operation ever attempted." *

Fully alive to the fact that a landing on our shores in the face of our fleets was impracticable, that pre-eminent organizer devised a plan of concentrating a large number of French war-ships in distant waters. His scheme was to draw the greatest portion of the British naval forces away from Europe in pursuit of the French fleets, and to get the latter to return to the Channel, so as to form a force far superior to what remained to the English in those waters. This would render him master of the sea at the exact moment contemplated for the crossing of the flotilla.

With this object he directed Admiral Villeneuve to quit Toulon, to cross the Atlantic, and to make for the West Indies; a move which it was naturally supposed would cause much uneasiness to England with respect to the safety of her colonies in that quarter.

The Admiral was ordered to sail for the Antilles, and form a junction with the fleet commanded by

* "Correspondance de Napoléon," No. 2419.

Rear-admiral Missiessy, and sail back to Europe. Missiessy sailed from Rochefort on the 11th of January, 1805, with instructions to wait at the Antilles only thirty-five days for the squadron from Toulon. The first part of Napoleon's plan, the combination of Missiessy and Villeneuve, miscarried, for the latter—as will be seen later on—took his fleet back to Toulon on the 21st of January. Apprised of this fact, and being authorized not to wait for him, Missiessy quitted the West Indies, and unknowingly crossed his comrade's squadron on the Atlantic.

When the French fleet from Rochefort reached the Little Antilles in February, 1805, there was no fleet to protect the British Islands, they were entirely at the mercy of the enemy. If Missiessy did no very great injury, it was because his stay was very short, and his movements were fettered by his having to meet Villeneuve at Martinique.*

Napoleon's strategic genius was great, his scheme for combining the various fleets into a powerful armada, which, by a united movement, was to render him master of the British Channel, was admirably conceived. All that he needed were leaders capable of carrying it into effect. It was to no purpose that Decrès wrote to Villeneuve, "The destinies of the world hinge on the success of your arrival before

* A sketch of his operations will be found in Colonel H. de Poyen's '*Les Guerres Des Antilles*,' chap. xx.

Boulogne. Fortunate the Admiral who will have the glory of connecting his name with such a memorable event."

The Emperor was blind to the predominance which the British navy was daily acquiring; he never seems to have realized to the fullest extent the detrimental effect which the decrees of the Convention had on the French navy, and how seriously the destruction of that splendid corps of officers, which the grandsons of Louis XIV. had raised with such pains, had undermined its efficiency. The French fleets, confined by a rigorous blockade to their ports, had no opportunity for manœuvring, and therefore could not compete with any prospect of success against ships which had for years formed part of active squadrons at sea. This admitted superiority forced itself more and more on the French naval officers, till they dared no longer keep the sea.

It is a very remarkable fact that Charles I. had placed the navy of England in a condition which it had never attained in any previous reign, and left a fleet of eighty-two ships-of-war, to which Cromwell owed his power at sea. The equally unfortunate French monarch, Louis XVI., on his dethronement, also left to his nation a very powerful navy.

In the reign of Louis XIV., it was held that it was a mistake to seek at the same time to be first on land on the European continent, and first on the

ocean. This opinion may be said to have equally prevailed during the first French republic and empire; the French triumphs on land were sufficient to make the nation forget its defeats at sea.

As Mohammed II., surnamed *Bujuk*, or the Great, the conqueror of Constantinople, intended to invade Hungary, he attacked Belgrade. His fleet of two hundred ships having been destroyed in the Danube by Janos Hunyadi, he avowed that *Allah* had bestowed on him the dominion on land, but not on the water. Napoleon might well have said the same, for Providence did not give to him to rule both by land and by sea.

In the month of July, 1804, Vice-admiral Latouche-Treville was appointed to command the French naval forces, and a complicated programme was formulated. That officer died during the following month, and, after some hesitation, Villeneuve was appointed to succeed him; the plan was then modified, or, more properly speaking, recast.

Villeneuve's first attempt to comply with the Emperor's orders was made on the 17th of January; as some of his ships, however, were disabled in a gale, after three days he returned to Toulon. His second effort, made in the last days of March, was successful. On the 9th of April he appeared before Cadiz, drove before him Sir John Orde's observing squadron of five ships, and was joined by Admiral Don Frederico Gravina, with one French and

six Spanish ships. In the night he set sail for Martinique.

The French fleet consisted of the *Bucentaure* (Villeneuve's flag-ship), *Formidable* (Dumanoir-Lepelley's flag-ship), *Neptune*, and *Indomptable*, of 80 guns; *Pluton*, *Mont Blanc*, *Aigle*, *Atlas*, *Intrepide*, *Swiftsure* (captured from the English), *Scipion*, and *Berwick*, of 74 guns. The frigates, *Cornélie*, *Hortense*, *Hermione*, and *Rhin*, of 40 guns; and the *Syrène* and *Thémis*, of 36 guns; the corvets *Torche*, of 20, and *Cyane*, of 28 guns; and three 18-gun brigs, *Furet*, *Naiade*, and *Argus*.

The Spanish fleet was composed of the *Argonaute* (Gravina's flag-ship) and *San Rafael*, of 80 guns; *Terrible* and *Firma*, of 74 guns; *Espana* and *America*, of 64 guns; and the frigate, *Santa-Madalena*, of 44 guns.

The two fleets formed a total of thirty ships of war, mounting 1726 guns. About eight thousand soldiers were on board, commanded by General Law de Lauriston, Napoleon's *aide-de-camp*, with Brigadier-General Reille as his second in command.

Villeneuve arrived at Martinique on the 13th of May, 1805.

Though the arrival of this powerful fleet spread terror through the islands, caused all the British merchant ships to fly in the direction of Europe, and led the population of the British colonies to consider what ransom might be imposed on them, for fifteen days, from the 13th to the 28th

of May, Villeneuve quietly remained at his anchorage near Fort de France. On the 29th a small expedition sailed to attack Diamond Island.

Having embarked part of the garrison of Martinique and of Guadeloupe in the vessels of the fleet, he set sail on the 6th of June and passed several of the British islands. Near Antigua, on the 8th, his fleet fell in with fourteen merchantmen escorted by a frigate. The latter effected its escape, but the convoy was captured and sent under escort of the *Syrène* to Guadeloupe. On the 9th the news spread that Nelson had arrived at Barbadoes; Villeneuve at once gave up the expedition he intended to carry out, and determined to quit the Antilles. The troops taken from the garrisons of Guadeloupe and Martinique were sent back to those islands in the frigates, *Hortense*, *Hermione*, *Thétis* and *Didon*, and the fleet having been rejoined by these at a given rendezvous set sail for Europe.

The hasty departure of the allied fleets in face of one half as large did not appear very creditable. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse in his vexation cried out, "I would give ten years of my life to command Villeneuve's fleet for the two days required to attack Nelson. Whatever might be my orders, I would feel quite sure of being applauded in France after having crushed England's most formidable admiral." It was not quite a question of being bold and enterprising, but of complying with the Emperor's orders; and, once the most dreaded Admiral had been drawn

away from Europe, Villeneuve might reasonably have hoped to have the good fortune of gaining on him by hastening his departure from the West Indies. At that time, however, Nelson was the incarnation of the British power at sea, and his name disturbed the mind of his opponents more than the strength of his fleet.

Nelson, who was badly served by his look-out ships, only knew on the 16th of April that the French admiral had sailed for some destination across the Atlantic. Not only had he to guess what were Napoleon's plans, but he experienced considerable difficulty in acquiring information, and was retarded by contrary winds in getting to Gibraltar. What, however, he thoroughly understood, was that, wherever the French fleet had gone, there he was also bound to go.

It was only by chance that Nelson got some reliable information. At sea he fell in with a Portuguese officer of Scotch origin, Rear-Admiral Donald Campbell, who had served under his orders at Naples in the squadron of the Marquis of Niza—the officer who was saddled with having burnt the Neapolitan ships when the Royal family retired to Sicily. This officer informed him of the rumours which were running at Cadiz, and told Nelson that Villeneuve was sailing in the direction of the Antilles. Notwithstanding that the French had a start of thirty-one days, the pursuit was carried out with such eagerness that twenty-one days after

Villeneuve's arrival at Martinique, Nelson's fleet was casting anchor at Barbadoes. His fleet had taken twenty-three days to cross the Atlantic, the allied fleets having taken thirty-six.

Villeneuve's original orders were to remain at Martinique for forty days to allow Gantheaume time to join him. At Martinique, however, he heard of Gantheaume's unsuccessful attempts to get out of port, and received instructions to return at once to Europe. Rear-admiral Magon had, on the 1st of May, sailed from Rochefort with two ships to carry the news to Villeneuve. If by the 21st of June Gantheaume had not put in an appearance at the Antilles, Villeneuve was to return to Ferrol. At Ferrol it was possible he might find fifteen ships; these would have brought his numbers to thirty-five, with which it was thought that, in spite of Cornwallis's eighteen ships, he could have effected a junction with Gantheaume.

A French fleet of twenty-one war-ships was confined in Brest by the blockading fleet of Cornwallis. In all the month of April of that year, which, according to Jurien de la Gravière, was of a *sérénité désespérante*, Gantheaume had not found a single day which permitted him to get out of Brest without fighting. He made an attempt to get out when the British fleet had been driven away by a gale on the 11th of April; two days later, however, the British squadron resumed the watch; and as it numbered twenty-four sail-of-the-line, whereas the

French had only twenty-one, Gantheaume led his fleet back into Brest.

Nelson was very wroth with Brigadier-General Brereton for putting him on a false scent. Lieutenant-General Sir William Myers, commanding at Barbadoes, on the night of the 3rd of June had received a letter from Brereton at St. Lucia, stating that twenty-eight sail of the enemy's fleet had been seen to windward of St. Lucia steering to the southward. Nelson, who was assured that the information could be relied on as very correct, steered for Tobago, Trinidad, and Grenada, which were possibly the enemy's points of attack.* The French fleet was, however, moving northward, but only on the 9th of June at Grenada did he hear from General Prevost of the real direction it had taken.

Nelson, when off Antigua, convinced, from the reports that reached him, that the allied fleets were bound for Europe, followed in pursuit about noon of the 13th of June. Believing that Villeneuve intended to regain the Mediterranean, he steered for Cadiz and Gibraltar. On the 18th of July he arrived at Gibraltar, and naturally enough under this impression, imagined that he had repeated his manœuvre of 1798, and outstripped the enemy's

* "I resisted the opinion of General Brereton's information till it would have been the height of presumption to have carried my disbelief further. I could not, in the face of admiral and generals, go N.W. when it was *apparently* clear that the enemy had gone south."—Nelson to A. Davison, July 24, 1805.

fleet. Had he guessed that Ferrol was the destination of the French admiral, it is very probable that he would have overtaken him. When about to quit the West Indies Nelson sent the brig *Curieux* with despatches to the Admiralty, which Bettesworth, the captain, was enjoined to deliver in person. On the 17th of June, when three hundred leagues N.N.E. of Antigua, Bettesworth sighted the allied fleets and discovered the direction they were following. Whilst they were delayed by contrary winds, he sailed with all speed direct for Plymouth. Early in the morning of the 9th of July Lord Barham received Bettesworth's important communication. He at once dictated his orders, and a few days later, on the 15th of that month, a fleet of fifteen ships, under Admiral Calder, sailed to attend Villeneuve in the vicinity of Finisterre.

To say, as has been said, that Nelson was *decoyed* to the West Indies, is quite wrong, for the British admiral followed Villeneuve there and back, and kept such a watch on him that he could not entirely evade him at any time. Even the authorities in England were not quite ignorant of the movements of the French fleet: for, states Mahan, "Two hours after Villeneuve passed the Straits, a frigate had started for England with the news."¹

There can be no better proof of the confidence

¹ "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," Mahan, vol. ii. p. 120.

the British admirals had in their mastery of the sea than the way in which they employed single vessels to carry momentous information from distant points to England.

In Villeneuve, Napoleon had not the daring commander he needed for the execution of his scheme. At twenty leagues from Cape Finisterre he was met by Admiral Calder. A fight ensued, which continued from 4 to 8.30 p.m. without any decided result. The weather was foggy, without any clear view. Two Spanish ships, the *San Rafael* and the *Firme*, struck to the British fleet.

To appease the discontent of the people, Sir Robert Calder was severely reprimanded for not bringing the combined fleets again to battle (really for not having captured more than two of the enemy's ships), and having allowed the enemy to slip away from him. No allowance was made for the state of the weather, or for the fact that the allies were stronger by five line-of-battle ships. Even Nelson was sorry that *John Bull* was not content, and wrote on this point to an old comrade, "Who can command all the success which our country may wish?" Notwithstanding the popular discontent, Calder's action ruined Napoleon's great scheme, and had memorable results.

La Gravière remarks that the idea of uniting the French fleets at the Antilles to bring them to the Channel was a stroke of genius, which was calculated to disconcert the shrewdness of the British

Admiralty. But, as this imposing concentration of forces could only be effected by surprise, it required a marvellous concurrence of circumstances, such as are seldom met with in maritime operations, to make it succeed.

On the 30th of July, Villeneuve sailed from Vigo, and on the 1st of August, favoured by a strong south-westerly gale, which sprung up at an opportune moment and drove Calder to the north-east, he passed unobserved into Ferrol. Having effected a junction with the fleet there, he set sail for Brest ; but, tormented by the prospect of having to encounter a superior enemy, he altered his course and made for Cadiz. The Emperor's plans were entirely upset by this false move, and when he realized that there was nothing to be hoped for from the French fleet, he abandoned his cherished design of invading Great Britain, and took his legions to gather fresh laurels in the centre of Europe. There his unrivalled talents were not likely to be thwarted by difficulties like those which, by a merciful dispensation of Providence, saved our country from the ruinous effects of an invasion.

The result is thus pithily summed up in the inscription on the arch of the Carrousel in Paris—

L'ARMÉE FRANÇAISE EMBARQUÉE À BOULOGNE
MENAÇAIT L'ANGLETERRE.
UNE TROISIÈME COALITION ÉCLATE SUR LE
CONTINENT.

LES FRANÇAIS VOLONT DE L'OcéAN AU DANUBE.
LA BAVIÈRE EST DELIVRÉE, L'ARMÉE AUTRI-
CHIEENNE PRISONNIÈRE À ULM.
NAPOLÉON ENTRE DANS VIENNE, IL TRIOMPHE
À AUSTERLITZ.
EN MOINS DE CENT JOURS LA COALITION EST
DISSOÛTE.

1805! What an eventful year. It witnessed Napoleon threatening our shores, his great combination to gain the command of the Channel, and the collapse of his scheme; one of the finest marches of an army on record, ending in the capture of Ulm fifteen days after the beginning of the campaign; Nelson's great victory of Trafalgar on the 21st of November, fraught with such important issues; and the memorable battle of Austerlitz, one of Napoleon's crowning victories.

The collapse of Napoleon's plan for bringing a powerful fleet to the waters of the Channel was, nevertheless, not the first occasion on which that extraordinary genius had an opportunity of realizing how great is the power of the nation which holds the supremacy at sea. Seven years before, the brilliant victories of the Republican forces on the banks of the Nile were tarnished by the destruction of the French fleet in the roads of Aboukir.

Owing to the insufficient depth of water in the harbour of Alexandria, the French fleet proceeded to

the bay of Aboukir, where it anchored on the 4th of July, 1798. Dreading the result of a naval engagement with Nelson, Bonaparte had advised Brueys to quit that anchorage as soon as possible, and, if he could not place his fleet in safety in the old port of Alexandria, to proceed to Malta, Corfu, or Toulon. The Admiral, who did not much relish the idea of a battle at sea,* saw little hope of being able to cross the Mediterranean a second time without falling in with the British fleet.

He appears, in any case, to have ceased to believe in the possibility of Nelson's return. Consequently, instead of following Bonaparte's advice, he remained with his fleet in the roadstead of Aboukir, or, as the French called it, the bay of Bequis. With singular carelessness he moreover neglected to follow Dupetit-Thouars' advice, to send some of his four frigates a few miles away to scout, and to warn him of the approach of the enemy. The advent of the British fleet came as a surprise, at a moment when a large number of the French seamen had gone ashore for water.

It was on the 1st of August that Nelson reappeared before Alexandria. At first it looked as if all his exertions were doomed to go unrewarded, as no large ships-of-war were seen in the harbour. In the afternoon, however, one of his ships signalled

* According to Bourrienne, Brueys dreaded to find himself face to face with a fleet even inferior in number of vessels to his own.

the presence of a number of men-of-war at anchor in the bay of Aboukir, from twelve to fifteen miles east of Alexandria.

Notwithstanding the inferiority of his force and the lateness of the hour, for it was about sunset,* Nelson engaged the enemy. With singular daring he forced a passage with one half of his ships between a small island, defended by a battery of guns and mortars † and the French line of battle, while the rest of his ships engaged the enemy on the other flank. The French suffered a crushing defeat; only two of De Brueys' line-of-battle ships—the *Guillaume Tell* and the *Généreux*,‡ with the frigates *Diane* and *Justice*—escaped, to be captured, however, at a later period.

The despondency which the news caused in the ranks of the French expeditionary force is of itself sufficient proof of the importance attached to Nelson's victory. It had, however, other results.

* Nelson states that he attacked the French at sunset. The Rev. Cooper Willyams, who was present in the *Swiftsure*, says that the battle commenced at a quarter past six in the evening.

† In his account to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Nelson writes: "The island I have taken possession of, and brought off the two thirteen-inch mortars, all the brass guns, and destroyed the iron ones."

‡ On the 18th of August the *Leander*, Captain Thompson, having on board Captain Berry, of the *Vanguard*, with despatches for Earl St. Vincent, was captured by the *Généreux* off the west end of Goza, near the island of Candia. The colours were hauled down when the ship had been so punished that she was scarcely able to float.

Notwithstanding all the assurances of the Directory that the expedition had been simply undertaken against the Beys of the Mamelukes, who deserved punishment for their insolent demeanour towards the subjects of the French Republic, Turkey had viewed the occupation of Egypt with displeasure. The news of the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir decided the Sultan, who very shortly after declared war against France.

In the following words Monsieur Poussielgue, administrator-general of the army in Egypt, recapitulates the unfortunate results of the battle of the 1st of August, 1798.* “. . . but the fatal engagement of Aboukir ruined all our hopes; it prevented us from receiving the remainder of the forces which were destined for us; it left the field free for the English to persuade the Porte to declare war against us; it rekindled that which was hardly extinguished with the Emperor of Germany; it opened the Mediterranean to the Russians, and planted them on our frontiers; it occasioned the loss of Italy, and the invaluable possessions of the Adriatic, which we owed to the successful campaigns of Bonaparte; and, finally, it at once rendered abortive all our projects, since it was no longer possible for us to dream of giving the English any further uneasiness in India.”

So thoroughly did the battle of the Nile cut off the communications between Bonaparte's army and

* “Voyage up the Mediterranean,” Cooper Willyams, p. 87.

By a strange coincidence, the very day that the French Government, having received official intimation of Bonaparte's disembarkation in Egypt, was decreeing that he deserved well of his country, the news of the destruction of Brueys' fleet reached Paris.

The exact date when Bonaparte decided to desert his brothers-in-arms and to return to Europe is not quite known. The common story is that after the defeat of the Turks at Austerlitz on the 22nd of July, 1799, the general went to Switzerland, where

" - *There are no other persons in the household 'except a woman' of service, who is named as Anne, as being a woman of the free and honest and law-abiding race of good descent. The said female is named Jane Ann. I judge her to be a woman of the free and honest race. - Mr.*

Croix, a naval officer, and his *aide-de-camp* Merlin, under cover of a flag of truce, on board of the Turkish admiral's ship, on pretence of treating for an exchange of prisoners. Sir Sidney Smith had these officers sent to him. Some presents were exchanged, and Smith—possibly with the intention of disheartening the French army—included with these a bundle of newspapers with, amongst others, a number of the *Gazette Française de Francfort*, of the 10th of June, from which Bonaparte learnt much of what had occurred in Europe after he had sailed for the East. On this information he made up his mind to return to France.*

James, on the other hand, states that this resolution was taken some time before, and that Gantheaume arrived in Alexandria from Cairo on the 3rd of July, with orders to prepare for sea the *Muiron* and *Carrère*, in which Bonaparte intended to return to France at the first opportunity. This was in view of the critical state of France, and in compliance with the desire of the Directory, as expressed in a letter dated the 29th of May, which reached him shortly after his return to Cairo from the Syrian expedition.†

* "Eh bien ! s'est écrié Bonaparte en agitant les papiers qui lui ont été communiqués par Sidney Smith, l'Italie est perdue ! tout le fruit de nos victoires a disparu ! il faut que je parte !" — "Histoire de Napoléon," par Élias Regnault, vol. ii. p. 193.

† Gantheaume was on board of the *Orient* at the Battle of the Nile, but managed to quit it before it blew up. In his despatch to the Minister of Marine, Alexandria, 23rd August, he wrote :

Miot relates that Bonaparte received a letter from his brother Joseph, secretly sent to him through the agency of a Greek named Bourbaki, to urge his return. Other writers, amongst whom is Bourrienne, deny this; nevertheless, the letter is recorded in the "Memoirs of Joseph Bonaparte."

Bonaparte originally believed that three or four months would suffice to lay the foundation of a possession in Egypt, which any other general would afterwards be able to consolidate. In an intercepted letter from Cairo to his brother Joseph, dated the 25th of July, 1798, the General wrote that he might possibly be back in France in two months.

To keep his departure from being known to the British cruisers, to his generals, to his soldiers, and to the population, Bonaparte gave out, with other false news, that he intended to make an excursion in Upper Egypt, to attack the Mamelukes. He, however, repaired to Alexandria, and sailed for France on the 22nd of August.

For fear of falling in with the British cruisers, the two frigates which conveyed him and his select few* back to France, were enjoined to steer close

* It was by an accident, which I cannot yet comprehend, that I escaped from the midst of the flames, and was taken into a boat that was lying under the ship's counter. No being able to reach the vessel of General Villeneuve, I made for her place.

* Bonaparte took with him Launes, Mura, Berthier, Murmont, Andreassy, Duroc, Bessieres, Cavallette, most of the best officers of the army of Egypt.

to the coast of Africa, with the intention of running them ashore, and landing the troops should any British war-ships loom in sight. After leaving Ajaccio the two frigates, on nearing the French coast, only escaped being captured by a British squadron by the fortunate advent of night.*

It is a remarkable circumstance that in both Napoleon's first and last defeats he was overthrown by our countrymen; in the first by a sailor, in the last by a soldier. His brilliant campaign in Italy, and his defeat of the Mamelukes in Egypt, had accustomed him to look on victory as certain. The capture of the little fortress of St. Jean d'Acre did not appear to present any serious obstacle to French valour; nevertheless, it was under its walls that an energetic and determined sea captain taught the great conqueror of the age that his troops were not always invincible.

Sir Sidney Smith had somewhat fallen into disfavour, and was mistrusted on account of his exaggerated report of the total destruction of the French fleet when Toulon was evacuated. He was a prisoner-of-war in Paris for nearly two years, and escaped through the agency of a French Royalist officer of engineers, Phélippeaux, who went with him to Acre, and organized the defences of that place. It is related that, when at a later period the First Consul visited the prison of the *Temple*, he asked

* Bonaparte landed at Saint Raphaël near Fréjus on the 9th of October.

to see the apartment which Smith had occupied, and remarked, "If the fools had not let him escape, I would have taken St. Jean d'Acre."

In the campaign of 1801, in Egypt, Sir Sidney did good service ; at the landing at Aboukir he had charge of the launches which contained the field artillery, and was specially thanked by Sir Ralph Abercrombie. At St. Helena Napoleon said, with regard to him, "*Je suis fâché d'avoir dit du mal de Smith, on me dit qu'il est bon enfant. Son gouvernement ne sait pas apprécier ses services en Syrie et en Egypte.*"

In February, 1799, Bonaparte, at the head of twelve thousand men, began his march for Syria, determined by this move to anticipate an attack from the Ottoman army. Though it was known that the Turks were assembling troops to send over by sea to Egypt, this fact did not trouble him, as the experts were of opinion that for six or eight weeks any landing on the Egyptian coast was impracticable. On the 17th of March the French arrived before St. Jean d'Acre.

The place was held by Djezzar—the pacha of Acre—who had long been a rebellious subject of the Sultan.

The town at that time was surrounded by a wall flanked by strong towers, with a broad and deep ditch. The walls, however, were rotten and ruined, and it taxed all Phélippeaux's skill to put the defences in the best possible state to withstand an

attack. This officer, who was killed in the siege, had been a fellow-student of Bonaparte at the *École Militaire*.

The command of the sea played an important part in this siege, for it is doubtful if Djezzar would have made such a brave defence had it not been for Sir Sidney Smith, who revived the spirit of the Turkish garrison, and whose five hundred or six hundred seamen and marines showed them how to hold the fortress.

At Acre, Captain Sir Sidney Smith commanded the *Tigre* and Captain R. W. Miller the *Theseus*. The nature of the coast, and the fine anchorage of the bay, allowed the boats of the British squadron to approach the enemy's camp and cause them great annoyance. The British moreover captured the coasters conveying Bonaparte's siege train from Damietta, and the guns were used for arming the defences. A British floating battery enfiladed the besiegers' trenches, and the enemy was harassed by two sixty-eight pound carronades from the *Tigre*, mounted on flat boats. Near the lighthouse was a brass eighteen-pounder, under the direction of a midshipman of the *Theseus*, and in the north ravelin was a party of seamen from the *Tigre*. The gate of the town was held by the carpenter of the same ship, who had the command of two sixty-eight pounders.*

* Captain Wright, whose mysterious death in the Temple at Paris horrified all Europe, was a lieutenant in the *Tigre*, at Saint

Hassan Bey appeared before Acre on the fifty-first day of the siege. The approach of this reinforcement was the signal to Bonaparte for a most vigorous and determined assault, in the hope of gaining possession of the town before the troops could land for its relief. At a most critical moment, when the French had captured one of the towers, Sir Sidney Smith, judging that the Turks who had come from Rhodes would not be able to disembark in time, landed his boats' crews and held the breaches till the Turks could come up. Bonaparte had still to carry a second line of defence; but as the task, after the landing of the Turkish reinforcements, seemed hopeless, he raised the siege.

This had lasted sixty days, during which fourteen assaults were given, and twenty sorties made by the garrison. The loss of the French in killed, deaths through wounds, and from the plague is estimated at between two thousand and three thousand men.

The attack on St. Jean d'Acre was too precipitate, and a wrong estimate of its strength had been made by Colonel Sanson, who reconnoitred the place by night. The want of artillery of sufficient calibre, the scarcity of ammunition, and the co-operation of the

Jean d'Acre. In command of the British brig-sloop *Vincjo*, in 1804, he was watching the French coast. Whilst becalmed and labouring against a strong tide at the mouth of the river Morbihan, the *Vincjo* was attacked by seventeen armed vessels, and after two hours' fighting had to strike her colours. Wright, who was badly wounded in the groin, was conveyed as prisoner to Paris.

English ships did not justify the confidence the French felt in being able to reduce the town.

The withdrawal of the Republican forces from Acre marked a turning-point in Bonaparte's career. When we consider the natural inconstancy of human things, we realize that to be always successful is a heavy obligation for the strongest of men and governments. In war, possibly more than in anything else, the least incident may give an entirely new turn to the course of events. Repeatedly in subsequent years Napoleon said, "If Saint Jean d'Acre had fallen he would have changed the face of the world—he would have been the emperor of all the East."

The British expedition to Egypt in 1801 is a good illustration of the value of the empire of the seas. The conditions between the belligerents were strikingly different, for, whilst the British forces, with their ships, could obtain plenty of military stores, provisions, and reinforcements, the French were without means of communicating with their country, without hope of receiving adequate reinforcements, and fighting with the certainty that their capitulation was simply a matter of time.

The French were thoroughly isolated, for the blockade of Egypt and the vigilance shown by the British navy in the Mediterranean frustrated almost every attempt made by neutral or friendly vessels to reach that country. In the blockade of Malta, which lasted two years, from September, 1798, to

September, 1800, only five vessels succeeded in entering the harbour.

What but a decided inferiority at sea in the middle of the last century caused France to lose Canada? Was it not humiliating for the Minister of War to have to acknowledge that any reinforcements sent from France were sure to be intercepted on their way to the colony?

To possess the largest fleet of any nation does not of itself confer absolute mastery on the sea, for a combination of two or more hostile navies is always within the range of possibility. Our naval superiority in principle should consequently be equal to any combination of the fleets of the Great Powers.*

An expedition undertaken to thwart such a combination occurred in 1807. By a secret article of the treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Alexander undertook to place, not only the Russian fleet, but also that of Sweden and of Denmark, at Napoleon's disposal. Some French historians deny this: however, Canning, in a letter to Sir Arthur Paget, writes:—"I know you will approve of the operations of Copenhagen, by which a Northern Confederacy, an Invasion of Ireland, and the shutting of the Russian ports have been prevented. Russia trembled for Cronstadt, and has disavowed any secret articles

* The combination of the French and Spanish fleets against the British in 1805 was unsuccessful owing to the difference in skill and spirit of the officers who navigated the ships.

injurious to England—a disavowal which no amicable application has succeeded in procuring from her.”*

The British Cabinet naturally became alarmed, for the entrance to the Baltic Sea was commanded by Denmark, who had a large fleet in her harbours. An expedition was consequently fitted out in Yarmouth roads; seventeen sail of the line, twenty-one frigates and other small vessels, with three hundred and seventy-seven transports, carrying twenty-seven thousand troops—under the command of Lord Cathcart—sailed for the north on the 26th of July. The whole were safely anchored in the roads of Elsinore on the 9th of August, and negotiations were at once opened for the delivery of the Danish fleet, which the British Government undertook to restore to Denmark on the conclusion of peace with France.

On the rejection of this proposal the British fleet proceeded to Copenhagen, the troops were landed, and batteries constructed. On the third day of the bombardment the Danish commander capitulated and the city was occupied. Not only the whole of the Danish fleet—comprising eighteen sail-of-the-line, fifteen frigates, and several brigs—but a large

* Notwithstanding all the precautions taken to insure absolute privacy, whilst the Czar and the Emperor were discussing the fate of nations, a hidden listener heard Napoleon propose to Alexander, and Alexander accept the proposition, that France should take possession of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen.—H. G. Stapleton, “Canning’s Life and Times,” p. 125.

quantity of naval stores fell into the hands of the British, whose loss hardly amounted to two hundred men.

The Prince Regent of Denmark, having foreseen the probable capitulation of the city, had sent orders to General Peymann, the governor of Copenhagen, directing him to burn the fleet should he find himself compelled to surrender. The officer who carried this order was, however, taken prisoner by the English when he was a few miles from his destination.

The seizure of the Danish fleet, giving us the absolute command of the Baltic, and with it the power of holding safe the fleets of both Sweden and Russia, deprived Napoleon of all hope.

Lord Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown, 19th October, 1781, which proved the ruin of the British cause in America, was due to the want of an adequate naval force. Not only were the allied armies of France and the States more than double the effective force the British commander could dispose of, but the French fleet helped the Americans, and the British fleet was not strong enough to break the blockade of the York River.

Actual superiority at sea does not depend so much on the number of ships and on their armament, as on a correct knowledge of naval tactics and good seamanship. In 1588 the tactics followed by Lord Howard of Effingham, and by his able lieutenants, were of a higher order than those of the Spanish

commander, whilst the celerity in tacking and manœuvring their smaller battleships gave the English a considerable advantage over their opponents. In the battle of Cape St. Vincent, Sir John Jervis had only fifteen battleships to the twenty-seven of the Spaniards.

What made Great Britain so powerful at sea in the last war with France was not the number of her ships so much as the restless activity of her admirals, their energy and boldness, to which must be added the way in which they were seconded by their officers and seamen. Much of this must be attributed to the characteristics of the nation, and to the very high sense of duty which prevailed in those stirring times.

One of the advantages of possessing the mastery of the sea in operations conducted at a considerable distance from our shores was clearly demonstrated in the Crimean War. This proved the truth of the words written by Sir Walter Raleigh. "Transport by land and supply by land have never been able to compete on anything like equal terms with similar operations at sea." For whilst the allies were able to bring their reinforcements to the seat of war in good condition by sea, the Russian troops, drawn from the most remote districts of their vast empire, had to march many thousand versts, on bad roads during an unusually severe winter, before reaching the beleaguered city. The number of sick who dropped on

the way and the mortality this caused was very considerable. To give one instance, related by a Russian general: of thirty-five thousand excellent troops which quitted St. Petersburg, after having marched past the Emperor Nicholas, only fourteen thousand reached Sebastopol two days before the battle of Inkerman. The necessity for a constant renewal of the beleaguered garrison covered Russia with the corpses of her soldiers, to whom the march across the immense plains of the empire proved more deadly than all the fire and attack of the allies.*

In bringing war materials and provisions for the troops and in removing the sick and wounded to suitable hospitals, there was no parallel between the difficulties of the Russians and those of the French and English.

After Sedan the Government of the National Defence at Tours, or, more correctly speaking, Mons. Gambetta—for he it was who, by a display of superhuman activity, worked day and night at the difficult task of raising new armies in France—found no lack of men, but there were no weapons,

* Had the Russians in 1877 possessed the command of the sea, they would have been able to make use of a better line of operations in their advance on Constantinople. A shorter line by sea would have turned the principal lines of Turkish defence—the Danube and the Balkans. By the treaty of Paris (1870), however, they had been precluded from maintaining a fleet in the Black Sea, and their opponents had a considerable navy.

no ammunition, no saddlery, no harness for the newly-raised army-corps.

To the crowd which cheered him on his first entering the Prefecture at Tours, Gambetta replied with the single word *Travaillons*, and he certainly set the example; he did not spare himself, as can be seen by the many thousand men he gathered and armed in the brief space of a few weeks, to retrieve, if possible, the fortunes of his country. The latter part of his task would have been impossible if there had been an enemy to blockade the French coast, but at that period the Prussian fleet was small, and was kept in the Baltic and North Sea by the French squadrons of Admirals Bouët Willaumez and Fourichon. Consequently the Government of the National Defence was able to import from abroad arms, ammunition, saddlery, harness, and many other necessary articles, without fear of being intercepted.

There was one exception, referred to by H. W. Wilson in his account of "The Naval Events of the Franco-German War." "One ship, the *Augusta*, escaped from the Elbe during the blockade of the North Sea Coast, and, appearing in the Bay of Biscay, captured three French vessels, the *Max*, off Brest, the *St. Marc* and *Réné Adolphe*, off the Gironde. She ended by being blockaded at Vigo by two French ships, one of which lay in the harbour alongside her, whilst the other cruised off the port." *

* H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. i. p. 278.

Long before the year 1894 Japan had decided upon a war with China. The roads in China, such as they were, had all been mapped out by skilled topographers, and surveys of every port and inlet on the Korean and Chinese coasts had been made ; in fact, all was ready for a fight.

In the latter part of August and the beginning of September of that year, after the action off Asan, the Chinese fleet was not allowed to look for the Japanese but was kept inactive at Wei-hai-wei. Their adversaries, though engaged at that time in conveying as large a force as possible to Korea, had on several occasions reconnoitred that station.

Early in the month of September the Chinese Government decided to send a body of troops to Korea by sea, as being more expeditious than moving them overland. Well aware that the Japanese fleet was in the Gulf of Korea, the most rational course to have pursued would have been to go in search of it, to fight it, and thus open a way for the transports laden with troops. It is said that such was Admiral Ting's intention. However, the news of the defeat sustained by the Chinese land forces at Phyong-Yang soon made it very evident that all possible expedition was necessary. From four to five thousand men were consequently embarked in five transports at Talien Bay ; there the squadron joined them, and in the early morning of the 16th of September the fleet and convoy steamed together for Korea. The convoy kept

inshore, protected by Ting's squadron, which followed a parallel course, drawn up in line ahead. The whole reached the mouth of the Yalu the same evening, and the transports ascended the river. Thus far the object of the expedition had been attained.

The Japanese had four fleets in the Gulf of Korea. The first, under Admiral Ito, of seven ships; a flying squadron, under Rear-admiral Tsuboi, of four ships; a second flying squadron of four, and a third of six ships. These fleets had been convoying troops. Having apparently received some information of Admiral Ting's intended movements, Admiral Ito, leaving the second and third flying squadrons to co-operate with the Japanese land forces, quitted the convoy on the 14th of September with the two most powerful squadrons, and anchored off Cape Shoppeck. In the afternoon of the 16th he steered for the island of Haiyang-tao, which was reached on the morning of the 17th.

Finding no Chinese fleet there, he steamed east-north-east to Yalu island, and at 11.30 o'clock a.m., seeing the horizon covered with smoke, he concluded that this was raised by the Chinese war steamers, and steered in its direction at slow speed. The Chinese, about one and a half hours before—about 10 a.m.—had observed a dense cloud of smoke to the south-west, Ting ordered anchors to be weighed, and proceeded in a south-westerly

course. Both fleets approached cautiously. At about five minutes to 12 o'clock the Japanese could clearly make out their opponents, and soon after Admiral Ito signalled his instructions to his captains. The Chinese fleet, opened fire, ship after ship, to which their opponents did not reply till they were three thousand yards from the centre of the Chinese line.*

Lissa and Yalu are the only two naval battles which have been fought since the introduction of the ironclad. At Lissa the Austrians sunk two of the Italian ships and completely disabled a third; at Yalu the Japanese sunk five of the Chinese ships, and so injured another as to render it henceforward useless. In both instances, after a decided advantage had been gained, and when the enemy's fleet was within their grasp, the victors restrained from annihilating their opponents.

It is a remarkable coincidence that, in both of these recent sea battles, the fleets had been connected with the conveyance of a landing force; at the Yalu, however, the Chinese were not shackled by its presence. At Lissa it was still with the fleet, but, as Albini, who had eight large ships mounting four hundred and twenty guns, took no part in the action on the 20th of July, the transports ran no danger. In both cases it is surmised that it was a want of ammunition which brought the

* The details of this battle are fully described in chapter xxi. of Mr. H. W. Wilson's "Ironclads in Action."

contest to an abrupt end; this, however, is not a sufficient reason, for the defeated fleets were not likely to have been better off. The fight at the Yalu lasted till 5.30 in the evening, and possibly, with wearied crews and short ammunition, Admiral Ito may have considered a night action dangerous. Whatever reasons may have influenced his decision, the Chinese fleet was able to retire to Port Arthur unmolested.

Though by the battle of the Yalu the Japanese had asserted their mastery of the sea in Chinese waters, the five transports which had proceeded up the river and landed the troops, were able, four days after the action had been fought, to return to Taku in face of the victorious Japanese fleet.

When we compare the small size of the British Islands with the vast extent of our empire, we should be the first to recognize the great importance of the command of the sea. The Empire of Great Britain has been created by it, and, as there are British interests of one kind or another at every place where the sea touches land, the nation should not consider any effort to maintain the mastery on the sea too costly a sacrifice.

It is too evident that unless the British fleets are supreme at sea the Empire must crumble to pieces. The mastery on the sea means the possession of an invincible navy, of a navy which has either gained a decisive victory, or such a succession of victories as to render the prolongation or renewal

of a struggle hopeless. In default of these victories, for there are often long periods of peace, no effort should be spared in maintaining the thorough efficiency and spirit of the navy, so that the attained superiority of the nation on the seas may be generally acknowledged.

After all the British navy had accomplished, and with all its commanders trained in many years of war, the British in 1812 could not boast of the mastery on the seas. Certainly, in the war with the United States there were no large naval battles, but in the small engagements that occurred the Americans had the best of it. Possibly our past triumphs had made us careless, or it may have been the superior build and picked crews of the Americans that told. Anyhow, the fact remains that the United States ships always had the chances on their side in a combat. According to a naval writer, the American frigates—to which England refused that name—could throw nearly eight hundred pounds of iron in a broadside, the English frigates only five hundred; they had crews about one-third larger in number than those of the ships they captured; they were also of greater tonnage and had thicker walls.

The dominion of the Athenian Republic depended on her empire of the seas, and, though it is stated that the citizens of that small state of an age to bear arms did not average more than thirty thousand, as Creasy observes, Athens could only

have acquired her dominion "by devoting and zealously training all its sons to service in its fleets." The full value of the mastery on the sea was thoroughly understood by the ancient rulers of the world. In the words of their greatest orator, "*Qui mari potitur eum rerum potiri*"—Who is master of the sea is master of everything.

Referring to the multitude of transports gathered in the Gulf of Pechili, for the Chinese war of 1860, Lord Wolseley remarks: "No collection of men-of-war in one spot could impress foreigners with the fact of our power or greatness afloat nearly so much as that immense display of our mercantile marine in such an out-of-the-way place. Fleets of war exhibit the metal wrought up and finished for immediate use; but in our vast merchant service we have the inexhaustible mine from whence the ore is drawn. Other nations may have the former upon the breaking out of hostilities; but after a couple of years' war, and the losses consequent thereon, from whence can they recruit? Sailors cannot be made in one voyage, and until other nations can compete with us in their mercantile marine, we may rest assured of having ever our existing preponderance at sea." *

* "*Narrative of the War with China in 1860*," by Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. Wolseley, p. 85.

CHAPTER III.

PREPARATIONS.

Expeditions across the seas need thorough preparation—All captains have devoted attention to this—Waste in war—Distance from national base adds to other difficulties—Distinction between peace work and preparation for war not always observed—Want of preparation in 1854—Carrion Nizas on the plan for the campaign of 1796—Senior staff-officers not to be wasted on routine work—Plenty of leisure in peace to prepare for war—Former wars and expeditions contain a wealthy store of useful lessons—Standing army is an insurance for peace—Preparations for war must be continuous—Must possess finality—As little as possible should be left to chance—Preparations in expeditions across the seas are more necessary than in other cases—The French fleet unprepared for war in 1870—Preparations should include a study of the intended theatre of operations—Want of information about the Crimea—Our disdain to pry into the enemy's circumstances—Lord Raglan's letter on scantiness of information—Sir Edmund Lyons' conception of the expedition—Allies ignorant of the defences of Sebastopol—Sir E. Creasy's remarks on the perseverance of the Athenians—Preparation of reserves—Kinglake on the waste of the Ottoman forces in 1854.

An expedition across the seas differs from other military operations, inasmuch as an army does not step over a frontier or advance from a selected base of operations, but is thrown into a hostile

country, and all the combatants, materials, and stores have to be conveyed thereto from a distance in ships. Operations of this nature demand very thorough preparations, for, unless everything which relates to the number of troops, to the amount and assortment of war materials and stores, and to the quantity of provisions is carefully calculated, there is a risk of finding the means inadequate for the accomplishment of the object we have in view.

In former times the preparations for an expedition by sea occupied several months; such, however, is the rapidity imparted to all military operations in these days that they are now confined to a few weeks. This is largely due to the present state of readiness in which foreign armies are kept; which makes it ever more necessary to act expeditiously so as to forestall the enemy, once the decision is taken to land a force on his coast.

Preparation occupies the first place in all actions which lead most directly to success in any military undertaking. Notwithstanding the confidence which the greatest captains had in their own genius, one and all have paid the greatest attention to this point. They made a profound study of organization and of the requirements of an army in the field, and all alike recognized the incontestable truth that there is no success but for those who know how to prepare for it.

Preparation consists, firstly, in a sound organization of the combatant body, with its administrative

services and that mass of miscellaneous munitions required for commencing the operations ; secondly, in making adequate dispositions for meeting the waste which occurs in war.

This waste always occurs on a large scale, and as in a body of cavalry it is the last reserve which generally produces the most permanent effect, so, of two armies, the one which can best repair this waste by constant renewal in men, horses, and materials is the one which, in the long run, will obtain the mastery.

The Secession war in the States of America is an example of this ; it was not inferiority in tactical or strategical skill which caused the Confederates to succumb—it was that, after a four years' struggle, they had come to the end of their resources.

In twenty of the fifty actions of that war, which deserve the name of *battle*, the Federals gained the victory, in twenty more the advantage rested with the Confederates. The remaining ten may fairly be considered drawn. Alone and unaided the Confederacy struggled for four years against a foe, whose population out-numbered the South in the ratio of three and a half to one, and whose armies were swelled by thousands of recruits from the nations of Europe. As the war went on, the Confederate armies decreased in numbers, they were much smaller in 1864 than in 1862 or 1863, and in 1865 they were smaller still.

The progress in manufacturing enterprise made

by the South before the war had been inconsiderable, and, though it was able to supply its people with good food from its own resources, arms, ammunition, clothing, and the medicines for the sick, had to come from abroad. A vigorous blockade of their ports closed to the Confederates all the foreign markets.

Though the old maxim tells us that preparation for war is the best measure for the preservation of peace, a sufficient distinction is not always observed between purely peace work and preparation for war. When we are not troubled by the prospect of peace being broken, we are too prone to overlook the pre-eminence due to the latter, and to allow our entire attention to be absorbed by ordinary routine matters.

If we only prepare seriously for the field when the sound of distant thunder announces the coming storm, we shall learn to our cost that we have wasted most valuable time.

To illustrate the results of neglecting the preparations for war, we may take the war with Russia in 1854-55. The long period of peace which preceded the Crimean War had made us careless; the study of the art of war was neglected, and we had almost lost sight of the real purpose for which nations consent to bear the heavy burden of a standing army.

The result of the expedition was looked upon almost as a walk-over; no account was taken of the opposition which the Russian troops were likely to

offer, or of the reinforcements which would surely pour into the peninsula the moment the real object of the allies was established. In the certainty of an easy victory, no provision was made for a lengthy campaign, with the result that the troops found themselves exposed to the rigours of a severe winter without proper clothing.

A body of combatants, imbued with the highest courage and discipline, is a useless weapon in the field if it has not the administrative services necessary to attend to all its wants. A few years before this war, short-sighted economy had wiped out the last vestige of the Royal Waggon Train, and the British army was left without the nucleus of an organized transport. What transport was hurriedly gathered together at Varna, had to be left there for want of sufficient shipping, and the little that was landed near Eupatoria, added to what the Quarter-master-general managed to collect after landing, was inadequate to meet the wants of an army-corps.

The officers of the commissariat department were few, and had not the subordinates required to attend to the minor details.* The officers themselves had no personal experience of the difficulties which attend the provisioning of large masses of troops in the field.

* "The officers of that department were gentlemen taken from a branch of the Treasury; and although they could make requisitions on the military authorities with more or less hope of a result they had no force of their own with which to act."—Kinglake, *"Invasion of the Crimea,"* vol. ii. p. 183.

The first battle revealed the shortcomings of the medical department. After the battle of the Alma, the stretchers for removing the injured were so scarce that the sailors had to contrive some impromptu ones by lashing pieces of canvas on a couple of oars. No preparation had been made for the reception of a large number of wounded; there were no regular hospital-ships, and no hospital had been formed to which a large number of sick and wounded soldiers could be transferred.

Cholera followed the British army across the Euxine; about one hundred and fifty men were buried at sea, and three hundred infected had to be left on board when the landing occurred. Later on, the sick and wounded were transferred to the general hospital at Scutari; the voyage occupied thirty-six hours, but a great number of men died on the passage from inadequate preparations.

In the first months of the war, the system of feeding, of land transport, of clothing, of nursing, thoroughly broke down.

Alluding to the plan of campaign which Bonaparte drew up some time before he took over the command of the French army of Italy, Carrion Nizas makes the following apt observation:—"Without time and labour it is impossible to do anything truly great. And if in matters which rise above the level of the moment, it should appear that they are due to improvisation, then, in reality, this seeming improvisation is to be explained by the fact that some one has

thought of these things—that is, has carefully prepared for them—at a time when nobody else thought of them. So that when the moment arrives at which public opinion is directed towards them, those persons who thought of them earlier are found to be the best prepared for them. This is the secret of great doings. It consists in the persevering and prolonged working of the mind in a given direction. Perspicuity, intelligence, and genius consist in being able to foresee what is bound ultimately to attract the attention of every one, and in preparing for it carefully. It may be boldly affirmed that what has been thought out for a long time, and with perseverance, is already partially completed."

There is abundant leisure in peace to attend to the preparations for war, and the principal efforts of the general staff should be directed to this end. It is waste of power to burden the senior staff-officers with mere matters of routine. These are not of such a difficult nature as to demand any very high intellectual attainments. The preparations for war, on the other hand, require a very wide range of knowledge, and officers who, through experience or study, have become fully acquainted with the conditions and necessities of an army in the field.

A long period of peace with periodical calls for retrenchment, and lack of personal war experience in the officers, are against us when a war suddenly breaks out. From these causes it often has come to pass that, at a pressing and exciting time, many

things have been done in too great a hurry, and certain very useful precedents have been entirely overlooked.

It is not simply the training of the several arms which should occupy the attention of the principal staff-officers, but they should tabulate all that an army will require under different contingencies, they should know how far the arsenals and manufactories can supply the necessary equipment, stores, and war materials, and in what manner all that is to form part of the endowment of an expeditionary corps can be speedily replaced from the resources of the country. When a war appears imminent they would then be in a position to turn to their past labours, and no difficulty would be experienced in having everything ready.

The various services and departments should work in the same direction, as far as their special section is concerned, and the higher authorities should be responsible for bringing all these matters together as a whole.

There is much truth in the following passage :
"The arrangements for the management of the Army and Navy seem to have taken shape without reference to war, for which alone the army is maintained, or to the particular wars in which Great Britain might possibly become involved. It is as though the nation in its calculations had forgotten the possibility of war." *

* "Imperial Defence," p. 231.

Former wars and expeditions contain a rich store of useful lessons ; these should be studied with diligent attention to see what there is in them to be copied and what to be avoided. In doing this we should nevertheless abstain from a blind imitation, and always examine thoroughly their various circumstances, to judge how far the application of each lesson is compatible with our special conditions. All the alterations which new processes and inventions have introduced need a careful investigation to understand how far these would have affected the events of the past. All doubtful theories, all simple probabilities should be discarded, and each lesson should be looked at in a thoroughly practical manner.

Unfortunately, the state of preparation depends on whether the civil or military element has the preponderance in the councils of the nation. It fluctuates, and is often a contest between efficiency and parsimony. To neglect preparing for war, to rest satisfied with the state of the army in the normal times, is to forget the object for which a nation submits to heavy sacrifices in keeping a body of combatants for offensive and defensive purposes.

A standing army is an insurance which a nation pays for the preservation of peace, and to safeguard the many interests both at home and abroad on which the prosperity of the people depends. The nation, therefore, has every right to demand

an account of its state of readiness for war, fully aware as it is that neglect in this matter, if it does not lead to irretrievable disaster, will add immensely to the cost of military operations.

In July, 1870, the French nation was loud in its call for war; but the army was not prepared for it. Many of us may recall the boasted assertion of Marshal Leboeuf; but there was one voice to contradict it. That voice was General Trochu's, who protested against the war, and pointed out that the army was not in a condition to measure its strength with the more ready Prussians.

We ourselves are all earnest in our demands for preparations when disturbed by some real or imaginary evil; engrossed, however, in money-making pursuits, our attention is soon distracted from danger, and with the restoration of confidence we become careless as to whether all the necessary measures are taken or not.

An important part of the preparations for war is to form able commanders and competent staff-officers. The intellect cannot but be dulled from having for a series of years to attend to the same petty details. Officers must learn what will be of importance to them when they attain the higher ranks; it is for them to study new applications of science, new inventions in arms, new systems of fighting, and all that relates to the great questions of supply and transport. Our officers have much way to make up, for in the years of their life when

memory is at its best they apply themselves too little to their profession.

If we take men who are preparing for a legal or medical career, for the church, for any branch of engineering or any learned profession, we shall find them assiduously at work from the eighteenth to the twenty-fourth year of their life. Does the young officer do the same? Can any one conscientiously assert that he makes a serious study of his profession for the first few years after he joins?

It is hard to believe that our officers are so wanting in ambition as to be satisfied with acquiring a cheap reputation by overcoming badly-led, badly-armed, and undisciplined enemies.* A nation like ours, with so many interests to safeguard, may at any moment have to measure its strength with one of the great powers of Europe. Then it will be a real trial of skill, in which that side will win not in which the generals and staff-officers are covered with most decorations, but in which the officers know most of war, and display greatest ability in leading the combatants.

The difficulties which encompass the provisioning of an army in war are so great, that the supply of a considerable army in the field should form a special

* All right-thinking men must deprecate the hankering after short and remunerative expeditions. In these a few minutes of gallantry against an indifferent foe may push one on better than years of study and attention to the training and wants of the soldiers; but constant success in such enterprises may tell against us when called to encounter a foe worthy of the name.

study of all staff-officers, and above all of those officers who have to attend to commissariat duties. The system of provisioning followed in peace is of very little real service in war. To obtain a thorough grasp of the subject it is necessary to dive deeply into history, and to gain full familiarity with the methods followed by Louvois, by Frederick the Great, and by Napoleon. Our little wars offer too little to go upon, and the system of supplies drawn almost entirely from the base is obsolete.

The preparations for war should be continuous, and all the attention which the importance of the subject deserves should be given to see that everything is ready for such a contingency. The staff of an army will inspire the nation with confidence when it is known that the guiding principle of their efforts is to make ready for the field, and that their attention is more devoted to this than to watching over the ordinary routine of the service.

A temporary spurt in the preparations is not what is needed, but a system which has some degree of finality, and which is not dependent either on the state of our finances, or on the fluctuating measure of attention which differently-disposed officers are likely to bestow on them. The great speed of steamships, and the celerity of communication by means of the electric telegraph, certainly render any miscalculation of far less consequence than it was heretofore; nevertheless, as it is the duty of a prudent administration to occupy itself

during the leisure of peace in preparing for war, no possible excuse can ever be adduced to account for any gross misreckoning.

There are no doubt certain fortuitous incidents which cannot always be foreseen, and which at times derange the best-laid plans. It cannot be otherwise with the variety of combinations which occur in warfare, and which are a fertile source of errors of judgment. For all that, it should ever be our solicitude, by unremitting application, to leave as little as possible to chance.

It is because the matters that have to be provided for are many, that it is necessary to study beforehand every detail which will have to be attended to on mobilization. When the precaution has been taken to anticipate and think out everything beforehand, there will be a happy immunity from uncertainty and perplexity, which cannot but be fully appreciated by the staff-officers who are burdened with the arrangements.

What above all caused astonishment in Napoleon, and made a great impression on the mind of his subjects, was to see a man, whose gigantic plans seemed to absorb all his faculties, occupy himself with the most minute details. His activity of mind was really prodigious ; his preparations were made with singular foresight and exactitude ; everything was calculated to a nicety, and no measure which could secure success was neglected.

All the great powers alike must be kept in

suspense as to the actual time when they will be called upon to draw the sword, nevertheless, their great general staffs devote all their efforts to be in a position to mobilize and concentrate many army-corps in the very shortest period of time. With greater reason this state of things should apply to operations across the sea, for, as in these the objective lies far from our shores, it is of the utmost importance to secure the earliest possible sailing of the expeditionary corps.

When in the summer of 1870 war broke out between France and Germany, the French Cabinet contemplated sending 40,000 men, under General Bourbaki, to the north. This corps, it was hoped, would be strongly reinforced by the Danes. Though all the measures for an expedition to the Baltic had been studied, when the moment came nothing was found prepared. The ships were not ready, no naval commander had been appointed, the storehouses were empty, the seamen to man the fleet had not been collected. There were wanting 800 officers and 16,000 sailors. Soon the reverses at Wörth and Forbach drove every soldier to the eastern frontier, and there were none to spare for the Baltic.

It may be taken for granted that our arsenals and manufacturing establishments contain equipments, clothing, carriages, saddlery and harness, ammunition, and warlike stores in sufficient quantity to provide for the largest force we consider

ourselves able to place in the field. In anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities, activity in these places will greatly increase, and skilled and manual labour will have to be augmented to meet every possible demand that will be made, either at first starting or during the progress of the operations. At the same time contracts will have to be entered into for provisions, forage, medical comforts, etc. The reserve horses will have to be brought in, inspected, and allotted to the various corps according to their requirements.

The movements of armies have often been retarded by a deficiency of transport. In a campaign this soon vanishes into thin air. Such has ordinarily been the failure of the British army in this respect, that it appears necessary to inculcate that the creation of an efficient transport constitutes one of the most important parts of the preparations for war.

The difficulties increase in proportion to the distance the theatre of war lies from the home arsenals, from what may properly be called the national base. This point must be borne in mind when calculating the number of troops, ammunition, equipment, stores, and provisions that will be required. This calculation will, in any case, have to be most minute; we must foresee in time all the wants of an army in the first and subsequent periods of a campaign, and not leave the matter to be taken entirely in hand when hostilities are determined

upon. Kinglake, with good reason, accuses Lord Aberdeen of having wasted nine of the twelve months which the Russians gave him to prepare for war.*

In "A Short History of our own Times," Mr. Justin McCarthy declares that there were members in the Cabinet who disliked the idea of war. Of the Premier he states, "Lord Aberdeen detested war, and thought it so absurd a way of settling national disputes that, almost until the first cannon-shot had been fired, he could not bring himself to believe in the possibility of intelligent English people being drawn into it."

Our preparations must comprise the acquisition of information. A study of our wars will show that we have generally displayed very little aptitude in this essential point. It would almost appear that there exists amongst us a prejudice against prying into the enemy's circumstances, that this is not considered quite fair play.

In 1854 the Foreign Offices of France and England had collected some information regarding the Crimea. Little, however, was known of the defences of Sebastopol, or of the number of troops the Russians had in the Crimean Peninsula. None of the military or naval chiefs had taken pains to obtain trustworthy information. Kinglake principally blames the ambassadors, who should have attended to this when they saw that a war was

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 87.

impending. "The duty of gathering knowledge by clandestine means is one so repulsive to the feelings of an English gentleman that there is always a danger of his neglecting or performing it ill. Perhaps no two men could be less fit for the business of employing spies than Lord Stratford or Lord Raglan." *

This praise of the straightforward character of these two noblemen is very creditable to them; nevertheless in diplomacy and in war a certain delicacy of feeling must be set aside when there is no other way for ascertaining the actual state of things.

On the 19th of July we find Lord Raglan writing to the Duke of Newcastle, "It becomes my duty to acquaint you that it was more in deference to the views of the British Government as conveyed to me in Your Grace's despatch, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or their state of preparation, that the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was adopted.

"The fact must not be concealed that neither the English nor the French Admirals have been able to obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with respect to the army which the Russians may destine for operations in the field, or to the

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 98.

number of men allotted for the defence of Sebastopol; and Marshal St. Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in information upon these all-important questions, and there would seem to be no chance of acquiring it."*

However poorly informed about the country they were ordered to invade, and ignorant of the forces which the Russians could dispose of, the commanders of the allied armies could well foresee that between the point of landing and Sebastopol they would find the enemy in force. Moreover, they could not overlook the fact that the Russians, if led by a skilful commander, by one who would follow the correct principles of the art of war, were likely to attack their left flank and compel them to fight a battle with their backs to the sea.

It was their good fortune that Prince Mentschikoff threw away his best chance of success, believing that the allies would exhaust their strength in endeavouring to carry a position which he deemed himself able to hold for three weeks, and that there was time enough for reinforcements to come to him from Bessarabia by way of Perekop and Simpheropol.

According to Sir Edmund Lyons, Lord Raglan conceived "that the character of the whole expedition was that of a surprise, that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy or their resources, and that in great measure they (the allies) still remained ignorant on these

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 120.

points ; that all they knew positively was that the victory at the Alma had been a heavy blow to them . . .” *

From the above it is very clear that when the allies landed in the Crimea they did not anticipate a protracted siege. Still the object of the invasion was to destroy the fortifications of Sebastopol. Having marched to the south side and seized their bases, the two commanders still dreaded to hazard an assault ; for at this time they were rather disposed to overrate than to underrate the strength of the Russians. Their opponents fully turned to account the delay incurred by the invaders, in having to wait for the arrival of the heavy ordnance. Under their very eyes they threw up and armed earthworks of such strength as to defeat for eleven months all the efforts of the besiegers.

“ Though custom and foreseeing prudence,” writes Kinglake, “ have made it the practice of great European Powers to obtain in peace time full accounts and plans of the fortresses belonging to rival States, this (in common with many others of the warlike duties attaching upon her in peace time) England had neglected ; and it happened that, in the case of Sebastopol, there had been a like neglect on the part of the French War Office. Neither France nor England were authoritatively informed of the state of the land defences of Sebastopol.” †

* Kinglake, “ Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. iii. p. 14.

† Ibid., p. 52.

This was all the more necessary, for, as the writer shows, "For some time, it had been the policy of the Czar to withdraw Sebastopol from the eyes of Europe ; and in general, no traveller was suffered to enter the place."

In our preparations we must foresee all that may be necessary for the final attainment of the object we have proposed to ourselves. Creasy, speaking of the defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, observes, "But Athens had made it a rule never to let difficulties or disaster drive her from any enterprise once undertaken, so long as she possessed the means of making any effort, however desperate, for its accomplishment."*

As we have said, the second part of the preparations for war consists in making arrangements for meeting the waste which must necessarily occur. Naturally, the formation of a reserve is the principal point to be attended to. We may procure certain war materials, stores, and provisions in foreign countries, but the troops can only come from home. Conjointly with the fitting out of an expeditionary corps, we must therefore place on a war footing those troops which will be required to make good the casualties resulting from sickness or wounds, and for reinforcing, when the occasion demands it, the army in the field.

There must be a well-defined system for the mobilization of the auxiliary forces, so that as soon

* "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," p. 48.

as war is decided on, they may have an opportunity of gaining the stability of regular troops. By perfecting their training and practising on a larger scale, what they have been taught in an elementary way, they should be made to gain the necessary efficiency for taking the field. The auxiliary forces will by these means form a reserve on which we may draw if necessity demands it. The soldiers who fought at Talavera were for the most part so recently drafted from the militia that many of them still bore the distinctions of that force on their accoutrements.

The limit placed on the number of our effectives by the absence of a conscription, has often led to some hitch in this matter, and the difficulty has only been overcome by the employment of foreign mercenaries. Who does not blush in recalling the way in which soldiers were raised for the suppression of the American rebellion? Our people stood shamefully looking on whilst the subjects of foreign princes were sold to England to fight her battles.

In the last volume of the "*Peninsular War*," Napier shows that the British troops in April, 1814, at the close of the war, amounted to 62,471 of all ranks. A portion of this army was sent to America, and another portion was discharged. In March, 1815, the army of veterans with which Wellington had the previous year invaded the southern provinces of France was no longer available. Though the brunt of battle on the memorable field of

Waterloo was borne by the British, the Duke's forces were composed as follows :—

25,389	British.
6,793	King's German Legion.
10,995	Hanoverian Militia.
6,303	Brunswickers.
2,926	Nassauer's.
17,488	Netherlanders.

Total ... 69,894.

In this army the number of Peninsular veterans was small; the British section was made up of second battalions, or regiments full of recruits. A large proportion of the soldiers had never been under fire, and the behaviour of some of the foreign troops during the battle was extremely embarrassing.

Jurien de la Gravière makes the following remark :—" Like Wellington, Nelson, as a real Anglo-Saxon, did not dream of questioning the patriotism of a soldier well paid, well clothed, and well fed." The British soldier and sailor are not the only men who are likely to fight pluckily under these conditions, for solicitude for their well-being, when combined with good training, has ever made good soldiers of men who possess a martial spirit.

Kinglake makes some strictures on the "pedantic dislike of wild troops," "the hatred of undrilled warriors," which, he states, is so common amongst military men. He quotes the cases of the Peninsular War, of the Waterloo Campaign, and of the Indian Mutiny, in which the inadequacy of the British

regulars had to be made up by Portuguese, Germans, and the native soldiery of Hindostan. He blames Lord Raglan for not having taken advantage of the warlike men who abounded in the Ottoman Empire in 1854, and who, when properly officered, might have enabled him to take the field with a numerous army.

As in any expedition sent across the seas, the troops which Great Britain can put ashore must be limited by the number of vessels required, no one will contest the great advantage of adding to them a body of hardy and warlike auxiliaries led by officers who are born leaders of men, who can rule them, and restrain their often too impetuous and disorganized mode of action. For all that, a country with a population of thirty-nine millions should experience no difficulty in providing soldiers enough to fight its battles.

It is a questionable policy to detail a small force for a distant expedition with the intention of augmenting it by raising a number of native levies. In several instances where this was done, though the levies were taken from the most warlike tribes, they were raised in a hurry, and had not sufficient training and discipline to act alongside regular troops. Native levies under these circumstances are more a source of weakness than of strength; no effort, therefore, should be spared to send out a force of disciplined and trained troops in keeping with the resistance likely to be met with from the enemy.

To show with what thoroughness we should like to see an expeditionary force quit our shores, we borrow the words used by Sir Edward Creasy when reviewing the preparations made by the Athenians for the expedition against Syracuse, "The armament which the Athenians equipped against Syracuse was in every way worthy of the State which formed such projects of universal empire ; and it has been truly termed 'the noblest that ever yet had been sent forth by a free and civilized commonwealth.' . . . The zeal of individuals vied with that of the Republic in giving every galley the best possible crew, and every troop the most perfect armament."

CHAPTER IV.

SECRECY AN ELEMENT OF SUCCESS.

An intended landing in an enemy's country to be concealed—Difficulty in keeping preparations from leaking out—Well concealed in the expedition to Holland—Sang-ko-lin-sin disbelieves our boasted intentions—Bonaparte employs every artifice to conceal his expedition to Egypt—Rumour reaches the British Government—Nelson sent to the Mediterranean—Bonaparte sails from Toulon—Nelson is reinforced and goes in quest of the French armada—Outstrips the French and arrives at Alexandria—Bonaparte reaches Egypt—Nelson sails along the coast of Anatolia and reaches Syracuse—Bonaparte hastens the disembarkation—Kingleake shows how the expedition to the Crimea was dictated by our people—How England gave her plans to Russia—How the latter failed to turn our want of reticence to account—Difficulties in concealing movements and intentions have greatly increased—At Rochefort a French ship sails amongst the British fleet, escapes, and gives the alarm—Efficient measures observed in 1882.

THE fundamental source of success in all military operations lies in keeping our intentions thoroughly concealed from our adversary and from his allies. A disembarkation in the enemy's country is such a risky undertaking that every effort must be made to prevent an idea getting abroad of the purpose we have in view.

Whilst the arrangements for the mobilization

and concentration of the land forces as an ordinary and general measure of precaution will not cause any excessive uneasiness to the adjoining powers, those for an expedition by sea, being extraordinary, are liable to arouse greater suspicion. The preparations involved require to be made on such a large scale that it is almost impossible to prevent the news leaking out. At all periods, but more so in abnormal times, it is the business of diplomatists to ascertain all that is going on, and special shrewd agents are very largely employed in gleaning news.

James, in his account of the expedition to Holland, observes: "On account of the unshackled state of her press, on the activity and intelligence of her journalists, England, of all countries in the world, is the least adapted for carrying into effect a secret expedition. In this instance, nevertheless, the British Government had in a most surprising manner concealed its designs, until the expedition, which was on an immense scale, was on the eve of departure." * The same secrecy had been observed in the expedition against Rochefort in 1757. The ships had been a week at sea before the object of the undertaking was made known.

In our last war with China, Lord Wolseley† relates how some very interesting papers were found in the house of the Mandarin at Sinho. In one of these documents Sang-ko-lin-sin contended

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 307.

† "Narrative of the War with China in 1860," p. 122

that we never intended to carry out our proposed operations in China because we talked so much about them. He remarked, "Those who make war keep silent regarding their proposed movements; everything is talked over and done in secret, the drums are muffled, and no flags are shown." "In short," adds Wolseley, "he gave us credit for making war in a more systematic and a wiser manner than we English are ever able to do, owing to the extravagant freedom allowed to our press upon all subjects."

What a strange power there is in silence! In preparing for his expedition to Egypt, Bonaparte employed every possible artifice to keep his object from becoming known. Public attention had to be riveted to some other point, and while affecting, for this purpose, to enter into the views of the Directory regarding an invasion of England, the General was secretly engaged in organizing another army and assembling a fleet at Toulon. The project he proposed to put into execution had been for a long period the subject of his thoughts; it was one of seemingly easy attainment, which would gratify the national pride, and alarm England as endangering the stability of her East Indian possessions.

Bonaparte's craftiness was admirably seconded by the Directory, and the real object of the undertaking was kept so secret, that after the expedition had set sail the senior naval officer at Toulon

complained to the Minister of Marine that he had no knowledge of the movements of the squadron. For all that, as the preparations for this mysterious expedition, of which no one had yet been able to divine the object, were made in several places in and out of France, such as Marseilles, Toulon, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica, it was not possible to hide entirely the fact that some great enterprise was contemplated.

Rumour of the French preparations at Toulon reached the British Government, and it was with a view of ascertaining their precise object that the Admiralty directed Lord St. Vincent, who in April, 1798, was before Cadiz, to despatch from his fleet a few ships to cruise in the Mediterranean.

The British Consul at Leghorn wrote to Lord St. Vincent, that the French had collected four hundred vessels in the ports of Provence and of Italy, and that, escorted by war-ships, which were being got ready for sea with remarkable activity, these could easily convey forty thousand men to Sicily, or to Malta, possibly even to Egypt. "As to myself," he wrote, "I do not consider this last destination improbable." *

On the 2nd of May, Nelson, with three battle-ships, was sent to acquire information. On the 17th of that month he captured a French privateer in the vicinity of Cape Sicie, and learnt that, counting the Venetian ships, there were nineteen

* Jurien de la Gravière, "*Guerres Maritimes*," tom. 1, p. 202.

sail-of-the-line in Toulon, of which fifteen were ready for sea, and that Bonaparte, at the head of a large body of troops, was soon to embark. Nothing, however, could be ascertained with regard to the destination of the expedition ; several hypotheses were formed, but no one detected the real object the French Government had in view.

One point deserves here to be noticed, because it gave for a time an unfortunate turn to the course of events. When Nelson entered the Mediterranean, he had the frigates *Emerald* and *Terpsichore*, and the corvette *Bonne-Citoyenne*, with him. On the 20th of May he met with a gale of wind and got separated from his frigates, which never afterwards rejoined him.

On the 19th of May, Bonaparte sailed with the Toulon and Marseilles divisions of the expedition. On the way he was joined by the detachments coming from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita Vecchia. The French fleet and convoy numbered about four hundred sail. Vice-admiral Brueys was in command, with Rear-admiral Gantheaume as *Major Général de l'escadre*.

The convoying fleet consisted of thirteen sail-of-the-line—one of 120 guns, two of 80, and ten of 74—two Venetian sail-of-the-line of 64 guns ; eight French and six Venetian frigates ; and seventy-two brigs, corvettes, cutters, and *avisos*. Two hundred transports were to be joined on the way by a similar number ; Baraguay d'Hilliers was to start

from Genoa, Desaix from Civita Vecchia, and Vaubois from Corsica. The troops amounted to about thirty-six thousand men. Rear-admiral Blanquet Duchayla led the advanced guard with seven sail-of-the-line; Rear-admiral Decrès conducted the light squadron; and Rear-admiral Villeneuve, with three sail-of-the-line, formed the rear-guard.

Lord St. Vincent had meanwhile received orders from the ministry to send twelve ships-of-the-line to the Mediterranean to oppose the French armament. On the 24th of May, eight battleships sent from England joined the squadron before Cadiz, and made it possible for the admiral to send this detachment. Here also every care was taken to keep the sailing of this reinforcement for Nelson from becoming known in the town; the new ships were made to join the old ones out of sight of the port, and took up their positions in front of Cadiz at night.

Nelson's fleet consisted of thirteen 74-gun ships, one 50-gun ship, and one brig sloop, the *Mutine*;* he was allowed a complete free hand; his instructions were to pursue the French fleet, and to use every endeavour to *take, sink, burn, and destroy*.†

* This French brig had been captured the previous year by the boats of the *Lively* and *Minerve* at Teneriffe, when its commander and the greater part of the crew were on shore.

† Secret instructions from Earl St. Vincent to Nelson, Ville de Paris, off Cadiz, May 21, 1798.

When the people at Toulon and Paris, after the sailing of the expedition, heard that Nelson was in the Mediterranean, they were filled with apprehension. This knowledge kept in port a convoy of twenty-six large ships quite ready for sea, in spite of Bonaparte's reiterated demands for their speedy departure.

About the 31st of May, Nelson heard of the sailing of the French expedition, still nothing had transpired with regard to its destination. On the 14th of June, off Civita Vecchia, he learnt that some ten days before the French had been seen about the south-west point of Sicily, steering eastwards.

Sir William Hamilton, at Naples suggested that probably the French had gone to Malta, and on the 20th of June, Nelson was apprised by the British Consul at Messina of the capture of that island by the French.

At about twelve leagues south-east of Cape Passaro, in Sicily, the *Mutine* fell in with a Genoese brig, and learnt that the French expedition had quitted Malta on the 18th and 19th, with a north-westerly wind, sailing with the wind aft. At daylight on the same day, the 22nd of June, two frigates, supposed to be French, were seen by Nelson, and, according to the *Vanguard's* log, the *Leander* was sent in pursuit of them, but was recalled on the information obtained from the Genoese merchant-ship.

It certainly appears strange that, having sighted some of the French ships, Nelson, who was deploring that he could gain no news of the French, should not have followed in their wake. This is what he writes on this point.* "I cannot find, or to this moment learn, beyond vague conjecture, where the French fleet are gone. All my ill-fortune hitherto has proceeded from a want of frigates. Off Cape Passaro, on the 22nd of June, at daylight I saw two frigates, which were supposed to be French, and it has been said that a line-of-battle ship was to leeward of them with the riches of Malta on board, but it was the destruction of the enemy, not riches for myself, that I was seeking."†

Alexandria now seemed the most probable destination of the enemy, and the British fleet steered south-east under all sail. Only three vessels were spoken with from the 22nd to the 28th—two coming from the Archipelago and one from Alexandria; but they could furnish no information whatever of the French.

To prevent any merchant-vessel giving tidings to the English, Rear-admiral Brueys had taken the precaution of making every ship he came across proceed with the armada, and kept a good watch

* Letter to H. E. Sir William Hamilton, *Vanguard*, Syracuse, 20th July, 1798; Nelson's Despatches, vol. iii. p. 42.

† The frigate *La Sensible*, on which was Baraguay d'Hilliers with Bonaparte's despatches on the capture of Malta, the flag of the Knights, and other trophies, was captured on its way to France, on the 27th of June, after a feeble resistance.

so that they should not evade him. Nevertheless, even with the greatest vigilance, accidents will occur; the Genoese brig, by whose report Nelson learnt the course the enemy's fleet had taken, had passed unnoticed through the mass of the French vessels.

Bonaparte's secrecy was otherwise maintained throughout. On the 26th of May, in the latitude of Cape Bonara, he had heard that Nelson was in the Mediterranean with three ships and expected ten more. The news must have caused him a certain uneasiness, and made him anxious to prosecute his purpose. On leaving Malta on the 18th of June he steered for Candia, which was anything but the most direct course for Egypt. When in sight of Cape Durazzo the armada altered its course, made for the African coast, and on the 1st of July came in view of Alexandria, about the creek of Marabout. Nelson had appeared before Alexandria on the 28th of June, and had left for the north in search of the enemy. Some say that the sails of the departing British and arriving French were seen from Alexandria on the same day.

The two fleets had crossed at a distance of sixty miles. The atmosphere was hazy, the British squadron was sailing in close order, and had no frigates or light vessels to spread out as scouts.

Amongst the many strokes of good luck which Napoleon experienced in his eventful career may be counted his fortunate escape from the British

fleet and its determined Admiral in this expedition. On what small things often hangs the destiny of nations! In referring to Mahomet's flight from Mecca to Medina, Gibbon remarks, "In this eventful moment the lance of an Arab might have changed the history of the world."* Had Nelson steered a few knots more to the east, or had his eagerness been less, the series of battles which marked the commencement of the present century might never have been fought.

So tormented was Bonaparte by the dread of seeing the return of the British fleet, that, in spite of a heavy sea, a coast studded with dangerous rocks, and the remonstrances of his naval officers, he decided not to delay the landing. With great exertions 3600 men, belonging to the divisions of Menou, Bon, and Kléber, were lowered by ropes at night into boats and put ashore, at a spot about nine miles from Alexandria. These troops were formed into three columns, and in the early hours of the morning, without cavalry or artillery, the General moved on the town, which he captured with a loss of about forty killed.

The time chosen for the expedition to Egypt was propitious, for in the previous year, with the exception of one or two cruisers, no British man-of-war had entered the Mediterranean. British commerce there was of small account, and the

* Gibbon, "The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," vol. vii. chap. i.

British admirals in 1798 were busy watching the Spanish and French fleets in Cadiz and Brest.

The difficulty which Nelson experienced in finding the French is a matter of history. Not falling in with them at Alexandria, and omitting to take into account how his more handy fleet might have outstripped them, in his feverish anxiety he set sail on a northerly course and made for the coast of Anatolia. He then turned back, sailed along the coast of Candia, and on the 19th of July reached Syracuse. On the 24th of that month his squadron sailed again for Egypt, and arrived before Alexandria on the 1st of August.

Bonaparte's landing in Egypt is a striking illustration of the advantages which can be reaped by observing great secrecy in an expedition across the sea. Notwithstanding all his activity and enterprise, Nelson did not succeed in fathoming the General's intentions and movements. The lesson he taught us was forgotten in our last war with Russia.

In his "Invasion of the Crimea," Kinglake, having admitted that the gallant stand made by the Turks on the Danube and the retreat of the Russians had to all intents and purposes removed any just grounds for war between the Western Powers and Russia, remarks, "England, however, was craving for adventure, and the French Emperor was but too willing to acquire the confidence of his people through some glorious achievement."

In the following words the historian of the war shows how, in 1854, it was the country, through the *Times*, that dictated to the ministers the course to pursue.* "On the morning of the 15th of June, the great newspaper declared and said that, 'The grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in existence, but that if the central position of the Russian power in the south of the empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground; and, moreover, it declared that the taking of Sebastopol and the occupation of the Crimea were objects which would repay all the costs of the war, and would permanently settle in our favour the principal questions in dispute,† and that it was equally clear that those objects were to be accomplished by no other means, because a peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to recommence the war at her pleasure.'‡

* Referring to Sir John Moore's advance on Salamanca, Napier writes—"It was the will of the people of England and the orders of the Government that he should push forward to the assistance of the Spaniards."—"Peninsular War," book iv. chap. 3.

† The question was far from permanently settled by all the blood and money spent in the siege of Sebastopol. In 1870, when France was overwhelmed by crushing defeats, the Czar deemed that the time had come to repudiate the treaty of 1856.

‡ Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 86.

"The same power which dictated the expedition precluded its concealment. It was in the council of the whole people that England had resolved upon the enterprise ; and what advantage there is in knowledge of an enemy's plans, that she freely gave to Russia." *

Kinglake clearly demonstrates the futility of trying to deceive the enemy. "With this view they tried to induce a belief that Odessa was the first object of attack . . . To deceive the enemy by the mere spreading of a report, the first step for a General to take would be that of uttering the false word to some of his own people. That would be a difficult service for Lord Raglan to perform ; and I do not believe that he ever could or did perform it." †

If we turn to his colleague, Marshal St. Arnaud, we find that he took so little care to disguise the object of the allies, that, on the 25th of August, he gave out in a general order that the allies were going to the Crimea and would not conclude peace but within the walls of Sebastopol.

What is so surprising in this instance is that, when England, through her press, showed so evidently her intention of invading the Crimea as early as the month of June, 1854, so few preparations should have been made by the Russians to meet the invaders as they landed.

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 131.

† Ibid.

In September, 1854, the coast of the Crimea north of Sebastopol was totally unprotected, the Russian fleet lay inactive in the harbour of Sebastopol, and, according to Kinglake, Prince Mentschikoff—the General and High Admiral commanding in the Crimea—"would not see the coming invasion. From the first, he had withheld his belief in the rumour which foreshadowed the armada, and the lateness of the season was added now to the grounds on which he rested his disbelief. It was too late, he said, for an invasion that year, and before summer there would be peace." * It was to apprise him of the intention of the allies that Prince Gortschakoff wrote to him, and the bearer of the letter, Colonel de Todleben, reached Sebastopol on the 22nd of August, but he remained obdurate, and rejected the warnings of his more alert and foreseeing comrade.

The rapidity with which news travels prevents our intentions being kept as close as was possible in past times. There can be no question that the spread of telegraphic agencies, the present swiftness of communication by post, and the vast number of daily newspapers in circulation all contribute to render the concealment of the numbers, dispositions, and movements of an army a very difficult matter. Such is the general greed for early intelligence of passing events, and such is the competition for pre-eminence amongst newspaper editors, that the

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 178.

greatest exertions are made to acquire news, and thus certain facts become public property too soon.

The post speedily transmits the newspapers to neutral states, where every relevant item can be picked out and wired to the enemy. The employment of confidential agents to acquire information as to the enemy's doings is by no means an innovation, but the completion of their task has now been rendered far easier by the great extension of the electric telegraph. It will be made easier still if the greatest possible diligence is not observed in keeping relevant information from falling prematurely into their hands in time of war. True enough, direct telegraphic communication between two states preparing for war may be severed, but it is impossible to prevent news being conveyed in a roundabout way over other wires.

Even in the old times it was impossible to keep hostile intentions from becoming known. In alluding to the measures taken in Holland in 1688, Macaulay writes: "No art could prevent intelligent men from perceiving that William was making great naval and military preparations, and from suspecting the objects with which those preparations were made."* In the expedition to Rochefort in 1757, Vice-admiral Knowles was directed to effect a reconnaissance with his division between the islands of Rhé and Oléron, with the object of ascertaining what anchorage there was for the fleet. Wolfe

* Macaulay, "History of England," chap. ix.

writes: "A large French man-of-war bore down into the middle of the fleet—a ship supposed to be homeward bound from the East or West Indies—upon which three ships of his division were directed to chase. They did so, and drove the French ship in with the shore above the river of Bordeaux, and there our great ships were obliged to leave her. . . . The inhabitants are alarmed; they fired guns all along the coast last night, and we now see smoke rising upon the sea-shore, as a sign, no doubt, of our appearance."* By this unwonted occurrence the purpose of the expedition was detected.

In some of the narratives of the Waterloo campaign it is made to appear that, behind the triple line of strong fortresses which France possessed on the Belgian frontier, Napoleon in 1815 rapidly concentrated the bulk of his troops; and that with a suddenness and secrecy which defied all effective counter-preparations, he crossed the frontier in the hope of taking the British and Prussians at a disadvantage. This statement has been well refuted by General von Ollech,† who clearly shows how for several days before the 14th of June the Prussians and British received information of the massing of the French in their front. Many of the reports contained the number of troops and the villages they occupied.

* Letter to his father, dated 21st September, 1757.

† "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815, nach archivalisehen quellen," von Von Ollech, General der Infanterie. Pp. 87, 88.

As an example of the good results obtained by concealing our plans, we may take the expedition to Egypt in 1882. Nothing was allowed to transpire relating to any contemplated operations in the direction of the Suez Canal. On the 18th of August the armada anchored in the bay of Aboukir, seemingly as the prelude to a landing; after darkness had set in it steamed quietly eastwards and made for Port Said, a hundred and twenty miles off.

It is stated in the official account of the war that this ruse answered, and that, when the report of the intended attack at Aboukir reached Cairo, three thousand Egyptian troops were immediately despatched to strengthen the garrison.

The occupation of Port Said was conducted with such secrecy and silence that the French warship, the *Galissonière*, though moored to the same buoy as H.M.S. *Monarch*, which furnished the landing-party, had no idea that a landing was contemplated. The men were only warned at 11 p.m. to be ready to go on shore at three o'clock in the morning. At Ismalia, forty-two miles beyond Port Said, a party of 565 men landed in perfect silence in the early hours of the morning, and speedily overcame Arabi's garrison. The first party was reinforced the same evening by six hundred men, put on board of two small crafts. Every dredger and *gare* was occupied, and the telegraph-office at Kantara was seized.

CHAPTER V.

THE COMMAND.

Success depends on the ability and knowledge of the naval and military commanders—Much must be left to the mutual understanding and common sense of the two—Examples of happy combination of generals and admirals—Naval commanders anxious for the safety of their ships—Expedition to Algeria—Duperré's over-anxiety—He lies inactive in the Bay of Palma—His want of knowledge of the African coast—French advance delayed through want of provisions and stores—Selection of a leader—Should possess the love of his troops—Duke of Medina Sidonia—Blake—Captain Dupetit—Thouars and the Dauphin—Military qualities of Generals Lee and Jackson—A commander should have the confidence of his Government—He needs sound judgment and promptitude in changing his plans—He must venture something—Pitt's selection of officers for command—Sir John Mordaunt—Pitt selects Amherst for the command of the forces sent to Cape Breton—Pitt's selection of Wolfe—Wolfe's services—Bonaparte's early promotion—Wolfe allowed to choose his officers—Difficulties in getting Carleton nominated Quartermaster-General—Cases of commanders who have distinguished themselves at an advanced age—Kinglake on Lord Raglan—The power of commanding can be acquired—Unity of command—Marlborough hampered in his first campaigns—Lord Raglan and St. Arnaud in the Crimea—Sir Hope Grant and de Montauban in China—The French fortunately refuse to co-operate with the British in Egypt in 1882.

IN all cases of military expeditions beyond the seas there are three distinct phases, viz. the voyage, the disembarkation, and the subsequent operations. The direction of the movements of a large number of ships and of the squadron detailed to convoy them, requires the technical knowledge and experience of the admiral commanding. The second phase is a combined effort of the army and the navy, in which the general and the admiral are equally concerned; and, though in the third the former acquires the supreme direction of the operations, still he is very often dependent on the co-operation and assistance of his naval comrade.

In expeditions of this nature, much will always depend on the ability, professional knowledge, and determination of the admiral and general to whom the undertaking is intrusted. Where the task of the two services requires a great unity of ideas is in settling the most suitable locality for the landing, and in laying down the order in which it is to be effected.

If it is only a question of the best spot where the troops can be put ashore, the opinion of the naval commander may be allowed to carry most weight, for there are many points, such as the nature of the coast, the prevalence of certain winds and currents, the depth of water for anchoring a large number of ships, etc., which are essentially nautical. As there are, nevertheless, other matters to be

taken into account with regard to the military operations which will follow the landing, no hard and fast rule can be laid down on this point. It appears more reasonable, once every care has been taken to appoint two able and enterprising officers who are likely to pull well together, to rely on their mutual understanding and common sense.

There was a time when the officers of the sea and land forces cherished little love for one another, and joint expeditions often failed from want of a similarity of views and perfect concord between the commanding officers of the two services.

A glaring case, in which a disagreement between the naval and military commanders marred an operation which promised a fair measure of success, is given by Professor Laughton in his "*Studies in Naval History*." After having cruised with success on the coast of England and Scotland, Thurot was given six warships, with which he was directed to make a diversion in the north. The ships weighed from Dunkerque on the 15th of October, 1759. The crews were smaller than was usual in French ships, but these carried a number of soldiers for service on shore ; in all about 1200 men, under the command of Brigadier-General de Flobert.

Thurot had been a privateer, smuggler, or pirate, possibly a little of each ; nevertheless, he was a bold seaman and a daring adventurer. De Flobert's resentment at having to serve under him soon led to

a quarrel which was for the time smoothed over by Thurot producing the orders of the King, in proof that he was absolutely the commander-in-chief of the expedition. The breach was widened through want of provisions, and there was mutiny amongst the officers of the land and naval forces. De Flobert wanted to return to France ; Thurot was loath to do so without having first attempted to do something for the honour of his country.

After having touched at several places, on the 20th of February, about midnight, Thurot entered Belfast Lough. He then urged de Flobert to attack Belfast in the first instance, and by threatening to set fire to the town to get the inhabitants to furnish stores and provisions quickly, and pay down a large contribution. After that Carrickfergus should be attacked, and the French prisoners detained there set free. The place being small, little money could be got out of it. The thing was to be done speedily, so as to re-embark before the English ships could receive notice of the French having landed.

De Flobert insisted on attacking the smaller place first ; by noon on the 21st of February he landed six hundred men at Kilroot, two or three miles from Carrickfergus. Carrickfergus had a ruinous castle and a garrison of two hundred recruits ; the opposition was feeble, and the place soon capitulated. In return for good treatment, the town as ransom agreed to supply the squadron with provisions.

Thurot vainly pressed de Flobert to move the next day on Belfast, which was weakly protected; on the following day he reiterated his demand, stating that he would not re-embark the troops, as it would be better that they should remain prisoners in Ireland than die of starvation on board. Mons. de Cavenae had succeeded de Flobert, who had been wounded; he wrote that the enemy was mustering in force, and it was absolutely necessary to take the troops on board. Seeing that the officers would not lead the troops on Belfast, Thurot re-embarked them on the evening of the 25th. Anxious as he was to get out of the bay, he could not weigh anchor till midnight of the 27th, being held back by a contrary wind. This delay had permitted the English Government to bring up a small squadron from the south of Ireland, which eventually proved the ruin of Thurot's expedition.

Professor Laughton remarks, "In point of fact this quarrel between Flobert and Thurot was an extreme instance of a case which, in the last century, and in England more than in France, rendered futile so very many expeditions in which sea and land forces were required to act in conjunction. Of these Vernon's failure at Carthagera in 1741 was perhaps the most marked and the most disastrous; but there were scores of others; and the constant recurrence of difficulties seems to point to a radically false system, and an honest misunderstanding, rather

than to mere captiousness and personal dislike. At the same time, it is too true that there was, between soldiers and sailors, a very mutual feeling of jealousy and contempt, which the officers in no small degree shared with their men. This was strong enough, no doubt, on the part of the soldiers, but was perhaps even stronger amongst the sailors, who saw their favoured and courtly rivals sea-sick and helpless on board ship, but had no opportunity of seeing them in their own sphere of duty and distinction. The pipe-clay, the powdered head, the stiff clothing and etiquette of the soldier were all repulsive to the 'tar' of the olden time. Had he been versed in Shakespeare he would probably have described the object of his scorn in the words of Hotspur, as 'neat and finely dressed—fresh as a bridegroom—perfumed like a milliner'; as it was he drew a table of precedence which continued in vogue till not very many years ago. I have myself heard it said, and meant too, 'a messmate before a shipmate, a shipmate before a stranger, a stranger before a dog, but—a dog before a soldier.'"*

In our annals there are many instances of a want of unanimity in the two commanders. In 1695 a squadron under Commodore Wilmot sailed for America; with it were twelve vessels conveying a regiment 1200 strong, commanded by Colonel Luke Lillingston. Their orders were to co-operate with

* "Studies in Naval History," by John Knox Laughton, M.A., p. 346.

the Spaniards in Hispaniola against the French. The commodore and the colonel did not hit it off; and Wilmot, who was only bent on enriching himself, was accused not only of disobeying the King's orders, but of having attempted to wreck the enterprise by giving warning to the enemy and divulging the purpose of the expedition. In the operations which followed, Smollett relates, "In a word, the sea and land officers lived in a state of perpetual dissension; and both became exceedingly disagreeable to the Spaniards, who renounced all connection with them or their designs."

Fortunately the jealousy between the two services is a thing of old date, and no cabinet now would allow operations to be put in jeopardy by want of unanimity between the two chiefs. As examples of a happy combination of naval and military commanders, we have Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst in 1758, Sir John Jervis and Sir Charles Grey in 1793,* Lord Keith and Sir Ralph Abercrombie in 1801, Sir Edmund Lyons and Lord Raglan in 1854-55. Referring to the two last, Kinglake states that there was a silent understanding between them—an understanding that no lukewarmness of others, no shortcomings, no evasions, no tardy prudence, overgrown respect

* So successful was the expedition against the West India Islands, that, although the French were well prepared, and fought desperately, every island in succession fell into the hands of the British.

for difficulty or peril should hinder the landing of the Queen's troops on the coast of the Crimea.* Further on, the historian shows how the want of personal intercourse between Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas did harm to the public service.†

The naval commander will naturally have far more interest in the safety of the ships than the military; nevertheless this point has also a great importance for the latter, for an army thrown on a hostile shore cannot, at all events for a time, dispense with assistance from its ships.

If there is any real danger for the shipping, the apprehensions of the admiral may have some influence on the general's plans. In the expedition against Lorient, 1746, noticed in Chapter I., as the time of the year was badly chosen, heavy weather was to be expected. The expedition sailed from Plymouth on the 14th of September; it consisted of sixteen sail of the line, eight frigates, bomb-ketches, store ships, and thirty transports, carrying six battalions and artillery, in all five thousand eight hundred men. After a battery had been thrown up to fire on Lorient, Admiral Lestock represented to General Sinclair that the fleet lay in a most exposed position, where in the event of a gale from either the west or south-west there was great risk of the ships going ashore. This remonstrance had the effect of inducing the General to order the re-embarkation

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 127.

† Ibid., vol. iii. p. 319.

of the troops and the abandonment of the enterprise.*

Theodore Mommsen, in his "History of Rome," makes the following observation on the subject of the command : " The arrangement was, however, still worse, by which the chief command of the fleet was treated as an appanage to the chief command of the land army, and any one who chanced to be president of the city thought himself able to act the part not of general only, but of admiral too. The worst disasters which Rome suffered in this war † were due, not to the storms, and still less to the Carthaginians, but to the presumptuous folly of its citizen admirals." ‡

The miserable collapse of Hoche's expedition to Ireland in 1796 is a good illustration of the folly of permitting an officer of the land forces to override the objections of the naval experts. Hoche had a poor idea of his country's navy ; until he came personally face to face with them, he made light of the risks the French naval officers dreaded incurring ; and, possibly, he was much irritated by their total want of enterprise. By his arrogance he got rid of one admiral who stood in his way, and the one who

* An action off Toulon, in February, 1744, against the fleets of France and Spain was lost by the bad feeling between the admirals. West, the Captain of the *Warwick*, was cashiered, but Lestock, his vice-admiral, was acquitted.

† The first Punic War.

‡ "The History of Rome," by Theodore Mommsen, translated by the Rev. W. P. Dickson, vol. ii. p. 76.

was appointed next appears to have been too ready to submit to his dictation.

In some more recent cases, in the Crimea and in the China war of 1860, the French made the general virtually supreme over the two services. General Sir Hope Grant, who commanded the British troops in the last of these wars, writes—“The French regulations differ from our own with regard to command when the sea and land forces co-operate. The military officer, if he happens to be senior, is empowered to employ the navy as he thinks fit, and *vice versa*.”* It may well be questioned if in this arrangement the advantage of having a sole arbiter is not secured at the cost of serious inconveniences.

In old times, in England, the two services were not kept thoroughly distinct. During the reign of Elizabeth there were gentlemen captains who commanded fleets or ships and had little naval experience. It is strange to learn that the captains were not expert in gunnery or practised in naval tactics. In the time of the Commonwealth, men were appointed from the shore as commissaries with the rank of general at sea. Monk went to and fro between the two services. Pepys, referring to the navy during the reign of James II., says that the patrician sailors, who in that age rose to the highest naval commands without a regular naval training, were at once flag officers on the sea and

* Sir Hope Grant, “Incidents in the China War of 1860,” p. 6.

colonels of infantry on shore. At one time the Chief Commander of every expedition, whether fitted out by the Government or by private individuals, was styled Admiral or General.

The admiral and the general have different duties and responsibilities. The duty of the first, in military expeditions, is to land, in the safest manner and in the shortest space of time, the army and all that belongs to it. Rapidity, however, is a secondary condition, the safety of his vessels being the first; and until the disembarkation is completed, the responsibility of the operation rests with the naval chief. The land forces, impatient to begin their *rôle*, seldom take any account of the difficulties of the sea.

This care of the ships, this anxiety for their safety, can nevertheless be overdone. An instance of this occurred in the expedition to Algeria in 1830, in which General de Bourmont was to a certain extent irritated by the over-cautiousness of his naval comrade.

From the very beginning Vice-admiral Duperré had regarded the undertaking—the naval direction of which had been confided to him—from a pessimist's point of view. He had been particularly struck by its difficulties, and had even come to the conclusion that it was impossible to carry it into effect that year. An officer who entertains such a belief has naturally a predisposition to exaggerate its obstacles and unfavourable chances, and is more likely to retard than advance the enterprise.

Notwithstanding his remarkable talents, Duperré, in this instance, showed signs that this high charge was somewhat beyond his powers, and that by nature he was prone to be easily borne down by the weight of responsibilities. This fact explains much of the over-prudence and the tardiness of several of his actions.

Arrived in view of the African coast, and dismayed by the threatening aspect of the weather, he decided to make a retrograde movement and to seek shelter in the Bay of Palma. There he purposed to gather the ships of war and the transports, and to wait for a more favourable moment to approach the shores of Algeria. This decision provoked great discontent amongst the land forces.

Admiral Duperré may have been disturbed by the recollection of the disaster which befell the expedition led by Charles V., but the season of the year in this case was not so far advanced. General de Bourmont, in a letter to the Minister of War, wrote : " It is much to be regretted that the naval service, in place of making a backward step, did not wait under sail until the return of moderate weather rendered the disembarkation practicable." That such a course might have been pursued was soon shown, for, whilst Duperré, labouring under his apprehension, was inactive at Palma, two French war-ships bearing from the south, reported that the weather had been uniformly fine on the coast of Africa.

There appears to have been much indecision in the orders. On the 28th of May bad weather being expected, instructions were issued for the convoy to put into the Bay of Palma; but, on the wind falling, this order was cancelled. The disembarkation flotilla had sailed on the 29th from that anchorage, and had remained on the African coast till the 4th of June, when it was recalled and reached Palma on the 6th.

It has been adduced in his defence, that the admiral was led into error by a wrong interpretation given to a despatch of Mons. Massieu de Clairval, the officer who commanded the blockade. Duperré had sent to him to ask from what quarter the wind was blowing. The officer replied that it was blowing fresh from the east, and that he had been compelled to navigate under double reef. The admiral, who was not familiar with the coast, was not aware that such weather was excellent for landing in the western bay of Sidi-Ferruch, where the sea, being sheltered from this wind, was as smooth as possible as long as it continued to blow from the east.

Baron d'Haussez writes in his notes: "Arrived in the Bay of Palma, Admiral Duperré was again assailed by his habitual hesitation. . . . I personally experienced boundless impatience; but I was encouraged by the full powers given at the instance of the Dauphin to Mons. de Bourmont. It had been arranged between Count de Bourmont and myself

that he should only make use of these powers in case of absolute necessity. Nevertheless, I felt certain that he would not hesitate to use them if the interest of the service called for it." *

After the battle of Staoueli, 19th of June, there was an irritating pause in the operations. The general reports: "But notwithstanding my demands, Mons. the Admiral never would consent to let the entire convoy sail with the squadron, or even with an interval of twenty-four hours. Thus after eight days we halt to wait for provisions, in default of which prudence forbids us to advance in a broken and unknown country, which positively offers no resources whatsoever." It was Duperré's overstrained cautiousness which compelled the French troops to remain immovable for a period. This gave the Algerian army time to gather its reinforcements, and by this their confidence was restored. The admiral had evidently forgotten Boutin's words, "Quickness and boldness should be the motto of the expedition."

The small number of carriages and mules at that time at the disposal of the administrative services prevented the army getting far from its magazines. Baron Denniée, the chief of the *Intendance*, states that he had on land only from forty to fifty two-wheeled carts, and sixty pack-mules. The transports with the horses for the siege artillery, provisions, and stores were to leave the Bay of Palma on the

* "Papiers politiques du Baron d'Haussez."

13th of June, but the favourable moment had been lost, and they were kept there by a south-westerly wind till the 18th. Their disembarkation at Sidi-Ferruch did not commence until the 25th of June.

One of the most important parts of the preparations for war lies in the selection of the officers intrusted with the direction of the operations, with the command of divisions and brigades, and of the principal staff-officers.

The fittest general must be selected, and to him the cabinet should intrust the planning and the execution. When, in 1798, Nelson was named to command the squadron sent to the Mediterranean, some admirals senior to him remonstrated on a junior officer being preferred to them. Lord St. Vincent justly replied that "he considered those who were responsible for measures had a right to choose their men."

In casting about for the fittest leader it is necessary not to overlook the fact that, besides skill and great knowledge of his profession, a general should possess the confidence and devotion of his troops. He must be such a man as can breathe into them his own energy and ardour; he must be one who is ready to share all their hardships and make himself one of them. Monk had the gift of securing the attachment of the soldiers; of all the officers of the army he was the most beloved by them. It was the affection and confidence of his men that gave such a

stimulus to their efforts. When the troops knew that Wolfe was ill, their spirits sank ; as he recovered, a feeling of great relief spread through the whole of his forces.

When, on the demise of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, Philip II. ordered the Duke of Medina Sidonia to take command of the expedition against England, the Duke replied that, "the business was so great, so important, that he could not conscientiously undertake it, being as he was altogether without experience or knowledge of either the sea or war." Professor Laughton adds, "His objections were, however, overruled ; and in an evil hour for his reputation, he consented." The Spanish king was courting defeat in intrusting such an important expedition to a man who could evidently not command the confidence of his subordinates.

In 1649, Blake, who began his career as a soldier in the civil war, was appointed general of the sea. Though he soon exhibited transcendent ability in naval warfare, still it does not appear that he indicated in any way that the sea was his true sphere. Blake had nevertheless given proofs of no mean military skill, and at that period in England the two services were not as distinct as they are now. The appointment was a happy one ; for, more than any one else, he contributed to render England mistress of the sea, whilst he roused that spirit of intrepidity and enterprise which has been ever since a marked feature of the British navy.

At the time when the question of invading Algeria was being considered in France, the Dauphin asked Captain Dupetit-Thouars, "Were you Minister of Marine, to whom would you give the command of the expedition?" The captain replied that, though too junior and low in rank to offer an opinion on such a point, still it was his conviction that any general officer was capable of conducting the enterprise to a successful issue, seeing that there was no difficulty in it at all. "That is not what I asked," resumed his Royal Highness. "I have put to you a precise question, and demand a precise answer. Were you Minister of Marine, who would you name to command the fleet? I order you to reply." Captain Dupetit-Thouars, having reflected an instant, replied, "I would name Admiral Duperré." At the mention of this name a look of displeasure was visible on the face of the Dauphin, for Duperré was hostile to the Government, and all his connections were with men belonging to the opposition.

His Royal Highness soon recovered himself, and asked the reasons which had induced the captain to name Duperré. "The first," replied Dupetit-Thouars, "is, that he has had the most noteworthy fights at sea in the late wars; the second is that, amongst all the admirals, he is the one who would inspire most confidence in the navy."

When Lord Howe fell, before General Abercrombie's unsuccessful attack on Ticonderoga, Wolfe

wrote that "by his death there was an end to the expedition, for he was the spirit of the army, and the very best officer in the King's service." He thus expressed his ideas on the value of the leader.

In the secession war in America there were some very distinguished commanders. What was really astonishing was that these officers, without experience in subordinate positions, were able to assume the direction of large masses of troops in intricate operations. The serious wound which General Johnston received at the battle of Seven Pines brought to the front the most able man, the most noble leader of the war, General Robert E. Lee. "Few men in the old United States army had been more beloved and respected than General Lee; his character was said to resemble that of Washington. Of an old Virginian family, possessed of worth and position, he had embraced the profession of arms and had served with distinction in Mexico. When the secession of Virginia took place, he unwillingly resigned his commission in the army; but convinced that his primary duty lay with his State, he without hesitation threw himself heart and soul into her cause. His property and family residence lying close to Washington became the spoil of his enemies, and both were rendered valueless. From a rich man he was reduced to comparative poverty; but, 'not excelling in this respect many of his fellow-countrymen,' he willingly resigned all, seeking for no compensation, for the

sake of the cause he fought for. Both in mind and person he seemed especially qualified to become the leader and to win the affections of the Southern army. Free from all selfishness, he attached to himself by sentiments of personal affection the generals under his command; of simple habits, and singularly unostentatious in manner, he set an example to the army and to the senior officers of self-denial, of patience under hardships, and of a disregard for all state. He also gave a tone to the army in other and higher qualities. A deeply religious man, he checked the licentiousness too common in camps, whilst in respect of his conduct towards his enemies, he lessened as far as possible the horrors of war, and in the subsequent campaigns waged in the enemy's country afforded an example of forbearance which many of the Federal generals would have done well to have imitated. His willingness to share privations with his men, and the cool courage he displayed in action, endeared him to the private soldiers; and if such men as Generals Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart may be said to have been the arms of the army, General Lee may truly be accounted as its head. Such was the man now in command of the army for the defence of Richmond." *

Another of the generals who acquired a well-merited reputation in the same war was General

* "History of the American War," by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, vol. ii. p. 31.

Thomas Jonathan Jackson, who from holding his position so obstinately at Bull Run, received the name of Stonewall Jackson. Of this officer Fletcher writes: "His campaign in the Shenandoah Valley was one of the most brilliant of the war. With a small force of at most fifteen thousand men, he had defeated in detail Generals Banks, Fremont, and Shields, and had so completely paralyzed the action of General McDowell that he had prevented any reinforcements from reaching the army of the Potomac. The results of the campaign were even more important than could have been anticipated; and in returning to the armies before Richmond we shall see how greatly subsequent events were influenced by the operations in Shenandoah Valley. The reputation gained by General Jackson in this campaign was not confined to America, but elicited the admiration of European nations. Not only had he shown the greatest talents as a strategist, but he had also evinced the possession of that important qualification for a general—the power of inspiring his men with his own enthusiasm, and enlisting their support by imparting to each individual officer and soldier—what may be almost termed—a fanaticism for the cause in which they were engaged. Added to these qualities, General Jackson had acquired during the earlier operations of the war a thorough knowledge of the country in and around the Shenandoah Valley, and also the support of the inhabitants, who were as eager to afford information to

the Confederates as to withhold it from the Federals." *

In this sketch of the military qualities of these two distinguished generals, which we have borrowed from Fletcher's account of the war, we have, in a small compass, what are the qualifications which the Government should look for in a commander.

The chief of an army must be bold, and the originality of his measures, when carried out with due rapidity, will often reward his daring with success. He should try to attain the calmness of Marlborough and of Wellington in the most trying moments. This can be done by practising a habit of self-control.

A commander must be an officer who, from his character and antecedents, can be trusted to carry the enterprise through. Besides ability, he should possess great enterprise, neglecting no means which may secure the end in view. The more difficult the enterprise the greater must be the care which a commander must bestow on the arrangements, and the attention he must give to the details, however minute. The great captains, on whom officers should model their conduct, have shown a restless energy, and have left nothing to chance for which they could personally provide.

A broad knowledge of administration is essential for an officer who has such interest in the

* "History of the American War," by Lieut-Colonel Fletcher, vol. ii. p. 70.

maintenance of his army. Wellington possessed it, but few of Napoleon's generals ; the exceptions were Davout, Suchet, Saint-Cyr, and Soult. As a consequence Suchet's troops in Spain were well clothed, well fed, and disciplined ; they had a reserve of supplies for a year. In 1812 Davout's corps was the best organized ; everything was regulated with the greatest care. After Smolensk the Marshal reduced the soldiers' kit to the strictest necessary, so that each man could carry fifteen days' bread.

A skilful and practical general, who has acquired a good knowledge of the business he has in hand, can generally be trusted to make suitable dispositions. In the expedition to Abyssinia, Sir Robert Napier was allowed a free hand, and the success of that undertaking shows how the confidence of the Government in his military knowledge and experience was not misplaced.

An able commander has every right to claim the confidence of the Government. The Roman Senate was never friendly to Scipio ; before the battle of Zama it attempted to supersede him, but, when the matter was referred to the burgesses, they showed more common sense, and rejected the measure. The only accusation brought against Scipio was that he had offered too favourable conditions to the enemy, lest he might be obliged to hand over to a successor, along with his command, the glory of terminating the most severe war which Rome had waged.

There is a proverb which condemns changing horses in the middle of the stream, and there can be no doubt that, without some very strong reason, it is not prudent to change the commander during the progress of the operations.

*Bis peccare in bello non licet** was a saying of the Romans, which we have seen applied to our armies. In India we have seen Sir Charles Napier sent out to replace Lord Gough, and in South Africa we have seen Sir Garnet Wolseley sent to supersede Lord Chelmsford. In either case there was no opportunity to judge of the wisdom of the measure, as in both the final battle of the campaign was fought before the arrival of the new commander-in-chief.

On coming to power, Pitt endeavoured to stem the tide of disasters which England had experienced in the early part of the Seven Years' War. With that admirable perception which is one of the most useful faculties of superior minds, he readily discerned in others the qualities requisite for his purpose. It was his boast that he "sought for merit wherever he could find it." According to him none but soldiers of recognized ability and bravery were to control the forces of England. He needed men of Admiral Boscawen's stamp, of whom he said that he never turned his face from dangers, was always full of expedients, and knew not the meaning of the word failure.

* "To blunder twice is not allowed in war."

Pitt, above all English statesmen, had the gift of inspiring every individual he called to aid him with his own indomitable spirit.

In expeditions in which there is a great amount of responsibility, what is principally needed is boldness; but, unfortunately, boldness, generally speaking, slackens with age. Sir John Mordaunt, the officer selected to command the unsuccessful expedition to Rochefort in 1757, notwithstanding his former gallant deeds, was unwilling, as events proved, to incur serious responsibilities.

Sir John had seen much service. He entered the army in 1721; in 1745 he attained the rank of Brigadier, led a division at Culloden, and signalized himself by his intrepidity at Laffeldt. He was promoted lieutenant-general in 1754, and, though deficient in the higher qualities of a military commander, had been remarkable for alertness and bravery. In 1757 he was infirm in body and mind.*

His incapacity in the expedition to Rochefort elicits the following remark from Wright: "There were in all ten infantry regiments, with fifty light horse, and a large train of artillery, besides draught horses, platforms for batteries, abundant stores, and, in brief, nothing was wanting to insure success but a general!" †

* In the expedition to the East in 1854, the Emperor Napoleon III. gave the command of his forces to an officer who was prostrated by serious illness, and was troubled by grievous bodily suffering.

† Wright, "Life of Wolfe," p. 378.

When Pitt looked about for a competent leader for the expedition to Cape Breton in 1758, finding none of the higher officers up to the mark, he called to him Colonel Amherst, who had distinguished himself in Germany, made him a general, and appointed him to command the land forces.

Wright justly attributes the successful result of the operations to the selection of the senior officers. "Thus by a happy combination of commanders, was Louisbourg won with an armament considerably inferior to that which had retired from before it the previous year. The harmony which subsisted between the land and sea forces—now, perhaps for the first time in our history, really an "United Service"—may safely be assigned as the principal cause of the unwonted success. Though the warlike characteristics of the *three* leaders—for Whitmore and Lawrence acted no prominent part—were widely dissimilar, all were influenced by the same motive, their duty to their country; and this was the tie that bound together Boscawen, full of expedients; Amherst, careful and prudent; and Wolfe, prompt, adventurous, and untiring."*

Pitt's attention was first drawn to Wolfe in the expedition to Rochefort. Having detected in him an officer who could be intrusted with difficult enterprises, the Minister confided to him the direction of the operations for the capture of Quebec.

* Wright, "Life of Wolfe," p. 458.

James Wolfe received his first commission as an ensign in the 12th foot at the early age of fifteen. He soon saw active service, having taken part in the memorable battle of Dettingen. After that event, his battalion having been brought home for the suppression of the rebellion in Scotland, Wolfe was present at the battles of Falkirk and Culloden. It is related that after the last fight, as he was crossing the battlefield with the Duke of Cumberland, they came upon a wounded highlander, his head resting on one arm, and in his eyes the bitter smile of the vanquished. "Wolfe," called out the pitiless Duke, "blow out the brains of that fellow who dares show such insolence!" to which order Wolfe replied that he was not an executioner. These words are said to have stood in the way of his promotion. In 1747 he distinguished himself, and was wounded at Laffeldt.

His services in Scotland had gained the young officer a well-merited reputation, which, singularly enough, was enhanced in the mismanaged expedition against Rochefort. Wolfe acted as Quarter-master-General of the expeditionary force, and it was universally admitted that the results of the operations would have been different had his counsels received the attention they deserved. After his return to England on the 21st of October, 1757, he received the brevet rank of colonel. The little value he set on his claims is shown in a letter

written to his uncle Walter, 12th of January, 1757. "I am," Wolfe wrote, "to act a greater part in this business than I wished or desired. The backwardness of some of the older officers has in some measure forced the Government to come down so low."

His bearing at the capture of Louisbourg, mainly due to his activity and boldness, gained him the appellation of the hero of Louisbourg.

His promotion to the rank of major-general, though only local in America, at the early age of thirty-two, at a time when the army was a hot-bed of corruption, was owing to the high estimate formed of his talents and military virtues. When Audry, in lowering Bonaparte's valuable services, adduced his youthfulness as a reason, the young general retorted in the following words, "One ages rapidly on the battlefield, and I have just come from it." The same may well be said of Wolfe, for he had seen much service.

A general specially selected as the leader of an army must be a man who can fully assert his authority, for he will have to control and direct a number of officers who possess a certain amount of experience and ability. From the very first he must convince them of the justness of his selection. We have an example of this in Bonaparte. He was not quite seven-and-twenty years old when he was given the command of the army of Italy, and was placed over the heads of many veteran generals, who were highly mortified by their

supercession. However, Bonaparte, on his first reception, showed to them who was the master, and the brilliant exploits which soon followed secured for him ready obedience and the general admission of his genius.

Wolfe was given by Pitt an unusual privilege, inasmuch as he was granted the choice of most of his subordinates. Though he wrote of the senior officers, "Three brigadiers under me—all men of great spirit," he never liked Townsend, who was forced on him as a brigadier, and only consented to take him at the last moment. His estimate was correct. Townsend owed his promotion to powerful family influence (his brother Charles was a Minister of State), and brought ridicule on himself by trying to rob Wolfe, after his death, of part of his credit. "The capitulation of Quebec was received by Townsend," writes Bancroft, "as though the achievement had been his own, and his narrative of the battle left out the name of Wolfe, whom he indirectly censured. He had himself come over for a single summer's campaign, to be afterwards gloried about and rewarded." *

The risky nature of war operations is sufficient of itself to show that a very daring and determined leader is needed. The first condition towards success, therefore, is to select an officer who thoroughly understands the nature of the task, and to leave him, as far as it is possible, a free hand

* Bancroft, "History of the United States," vol. iv. chap. xv.

in the conception of his plans and in the choice of his chief subordinates.

Count Moltke remarks, "A general staff cannot be improvised on the outbreak of war. It must have been prepared long before, during peace, and must be in practical working and in constant touch with the troops. But that is not enough. The general staff must know who its future commander will be, must be in close touch with him, and acquire his confidence, without which its position is untenable."

Every general who has to carry out an arduous enterprise will naturally seek as his helpmates those amongst his comrades on whom he can confidently rely. It is for him to push them on when he has discovered their worth. This was a point which Wolfe thoroughly understood. To Captain Martin of the Royal Artillery he wrote: "Nothing pleases me so much as to do justice to those gentlemen who have distinguished themselves under my command; and if it were easy to reward as to praise, they should have no reason to complain."

For his Adjutant-General, Wolfe selected Isaac Barré, an old associate of Louisbourg, and, knowing Carleton's ability, he wished to have him as Quartermaster-General. He was very firm on this point, even against the King's personal prejudices. Guy Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester, had incurred the royal disfavour by reason of some remarks,

unfavourable to the Hanoverian guards, which he was reported to have made. Wolfe at last got his way ; but Pitt had to press the matter in person, persuading his Majesty that if a general was not allowed to select those who were to serve immediately under him he could hardly be held fully responsible in case of failure. As the King had given in to him in his selection of his intimate friend Carleton, Wolfe, after repeated refusals, consented to take the Honourable George Townshend as his second brigadier.

Infirmities, which often have their origin in years of rough service and exposure to all kinds of climate, get more acute with advancing age. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is a very incontestable saying, and absence of enterprise with an excess of prudence is often the result of a debilitated state of health. Though, as a general rule, dash abates with age, still there have been notable instances of officers who, notwithstanding their years, have shown great ability and enterprise as military commanders. Suvorof was seventy-one years old when he drove the French out of Italy in 1799. Sir Ralph Abercrombie was in his sixty-eighth year when he directed the daring landing at Aboukir, and fought the battle of Alexandria. Radetsky had reached his eighty-third year when he crushed Piedmont in the campaign of Novara. He, in fact, may be said to have acquired his European reputation when he

had passed his eightieth year. Moltke was a few months under seventy when the war between France and Germany broke out. Sir Thomas Graham (afterwards Lord Lynedoch) only began his military career at the age of forty-six ; and in the expedition to Algeria (1830) the first man to jump out of the boats and wade ashore was Colonel d'Armaillé, who commanded the 14th regiment of the line, a brisk officer sixty-eight years old.

Marshal Saxe, the general who, according to the great Frederick of Prussia, could teach all the generals of Europe, was so feeble from long dissipation that he was unable either to mount a horse or to wear uniform. In the campaign of 1745, though only fifty-one years old, he accompanied the army carried in a litter. At the most critical period of the battle of Fontenoy he quitted his litter and mounted on horseback, but had to be supported by a trooper on either side.

Kinglake makes the following observations with reference to the commander of the British army in the Crimea. "An armed force is a means to an end. The end is victory over enemies, and this is to be achieved, partly indeed by a due use of discipline and method, but partly also by keeping alive in those who may come to have command a knowledge and love of war, and by cherishing that unlabelled, undocketed state of mind which shall enable a man to encounter the unknown.

"But for more than thirty years of his life,* Lord Raglan had been administering the current business of military offices in peace time, and this is a kind of experience which, if it be very long protracted, is far from being a good preparative for the command of an army in the field; because a military officer in time of peace is impelled by its very constitution to aim at uniformity; and, on the other hand, the genius of war abhors uniformity, and tramples upon forms and regulations." †

An officer who took part in the siege, and whose opinions were generally just, wrote: "I think Lord Raglan's greatest fault was his excessive good nature, and his wish to please everybody who was in personal communication with him; he was no doubt a man of considerable talent, but his proper sphere was an office (either the Horse Guards or the Ordnance)." ‡ As can be seen by his letters to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan had no special liking for the proposed invasion of the Crimea; in his loyalty, however, he was prepared to carry out in a steadfast manner the orders he received.

The power of command is not in every one a natural gift, but it can be acquired; it needs, however, opportunities. Many officers who for years

* Lord Raglan was then sixty-six years old.

† Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 17.

‡ "Letters from Camp," by Colin Frederick Campbell, p. 266.

are kept back by the slowness of regimental promotion, and who, by force of circumstances, are simply bound to carry out strictly the orders of their superiors, lose all initiative and self-reliance ; any power of command on a large scale which may be in them is crushed. Kept in leading-strings for years, they are not allowed to originate anything, or to show what power lies hidden under their zealous attention to their duty. Brigadier Sydney Cotton, who displayed such energy and decision at Peshawur when the Indian Mutiny broke out, after forty-three years in the army had not succeeded to the command of a battalion. When comparatively young men have had the good fortune of being placed in responsible positions, they have known how to inspire confidence, and have been able to enforce obedience. After the annexation of the Punjab many young officers—Herbert Edwardes, Nicholson, Neville Chamberlain—having been given a responsible charge, soon developed into first-rate political and military officers ; this might not have been the case had they continued doing purely regimental duty with their sepoy battalions.

War is an exceptional state, and field service, which brings men rapidly to the front, is not given to all to see. How often does not an officer lose an opportunity because he cannot or *will not* be spared, because he is considered too useful where he is ? The officers who have had the good luck of gaining the confidence of powerful superiors, or who have

had opportunities for early advancement, too often forget this, and make little allowance for their less fortunate but equally able comrades.

The system of selection for the higher ranks should be extended to the lower, for many officers of ability are modest, and, unless their immediate superiors bring them to notice, may pass their best years in the lower ranks, which will tell against them in these days in which age is made the standard of retirement. Special promotion should not be almost exclusively reserved as a reward for field service. Our army is so scattered that many ambitious and excellent officers, who may have passed through the staff college, are debarred from seeing service in the field, when an opportunity occurs, by the simple fact of their holding a staff appointment in some station far away from the seat of war.

Any rigid measure which drives officers from active employment on the simple ground of age, without any clause for retaining such as possess experience, ability, mental and bodily energy, is bad for the country. Retirement by age is a costly way of hastening promotion ; some bolder scheme, with less fear of apprehending charges of favouritism and affection, is much to be desired. With a free press the days of nepotism may well be said to have passed.

It is generally held that the individual who knows how to make the most of his openings will

generally push himself to the front. Perseverance without opportunity will, nevertheless, have little chance, and opportunities are not meted out to every one alike. Nelson wrote, "Thus may be exemplified by my life that perseverance in any profession will most probably meet its reward. Without having any inheritance, or having been fortunate in prize money, I have received all the honours of my profession, been created a peer of Great Britain, etc., etc., as set forth in the annexed paper, and I may say to the reader, 'Go thou and do likewise.'" We recommend the reader to do so, but not to forget that our greatest naval hero made use of the words *most probably*.

If in the unity of direction lies the essence of good management, it is especially so in all military operations. As indispensable conditions of success we must have unity of command and unity of plan. In Sir William Napier's words, "The first element of success in war is, that everything should emanate from a single head." It is on this account that disunion and tardiness are always characteristic of an army of mixed nationalities.

A war directed by a council is always badly conducted. Marlborough in his first campaigns on the Continent experienced very considerable difficulty in obtaining the consent and cheerful co-operation of the allies, especially the Dutch. We gather from the following passage taken from one of his

letters, written just before the battle of Blenheim, how seriously this must have interfered with his plans. "I have great reason," the Duke wrote, "to hope that everything will go well, for I have the pleasure to find all the officers willing to obey, without knowing any other reason than that it is my desire, which is very different from what it was in Flanders, where I was obliged to have the consent of a council of war for everything I undertook."

The experience of the Crimean War and our last expedition to China have yielded other proofs of the friction and drawbacks which naturally result from a divided command. Not only is there, generally speaking, a certain amount of national prejudice, but the individuality of the two commanders is prone to make them view things in a different light. Lord Raglan had to display considerable tact in dealing with Marshal St. Arnaud, both in crossing the Black Sea and in selecting a spot for the disembarkation of the allied armies in the Crimea. His colleague, suffering as he was from serious illness, was fretful and undecided, and this alone must have seriously hampered the actions of the British general.

In the China War there was a marked difference of opinion between General Montauban and Sir Hope Grant with regard to the works of the Taku defences to be attacked. The French commander urged strongly that the forts on the right bank of

the Peiho should be attacked first, on the ground that their fall would cut off the retreat of the Tartar troops by the broad road to Tien-sin. Sir Hope Grant, supported by Sir Robert Napier, for more pertinent reasons, argued in favour of an attack on the northern forts, situated on the left bank. It had been ascertained that not only were the defences of these weaker than those of the southern forts, but that the great northern fort looked into and enfiladed the whole length of the great southern fort, and took all the defences on the right bank of the river in reverse. Independently of this consideration, in an attack of the southern forts the allied troops would have had to operate on the right bank of the Peiho, thus weakening the force required to guard the communications with Peh-tang and the fleet. Sir Hope Grant held that in operating against the northern forts the allies would attack the weakest of the enemy's forts, and that their entire forces would remain on the left bank of the Peiho. Though the reasoning of the British generals was incontestable, nevertheless, the French commander only yielded to their arguments under protest.* The results of the attack on the 21st of

* The last paragraph of General de Montauban's reply to Sir Hope Grant's memorandum on the proposed attack of the northern forts, runs as follows :—*Mes observations ont surtout pour but de dégager ma responsabilité militaire vis-à-vis de mon gouvernement dans le cas où il jugerait la question sous le point de vue où je l'envisage moi-même.*"

August proved the correctness of Sir Hope Grant's views.

"General de Montauban was so strongly opposed to the projected plan of attack," writes Sir Hope Grant, "that he declined to give any countenance to the undertaking beyond assisting with a single battalion of four hundred men of all ranks, with a feeble force of artillery—our own force so employed amounting to two thousand five hundred men. Moreover, in order to mark still further his disapproval, he did not appear on the scene of conflict—as I am informed by English staff-officers who were eye-witnesses—until after the fight for the north fort had been brought to a successful conclusion. He was then unprovided with his sword."*

If the lack of military knowledge and the neglect of ordinary precautions on the part of Arabi in 1882, were fortunate circumstances, more fortunate still was the refusal of the French Government to co-operate with England in stamping out the revolt of the Khedivial army. Had the French joined in this undertaking, there is little doubt that the want of unanimity which marked the direction of the operations in China in 1860 would have likewise characterized this expedition.

It is not intended by this to cast any reflection on the country whose soldiers fought gallantly

* "Incidents in the China War of 1860," Sir Hope Grant's private journals, compiled by Colonel H. Knollys, R.A., p. 96.

alongside of ours in the Crimea and in China. For it is more than probable that a want of unanimity will occur, to whatever nation the allies belong. This is not so much due to national pride or to professional jealousy, as to the fact that the officers have been reared in different schools, and have to obey the dictates of two distinct cabinets.

CHAPTER VI.

THE OLD AND THE NEW.

Alterations of the present age—Changes in the war establishments of land forces—Steam alters the conditions of expeditions by sea—Lord Wolseley's remarks on the British gunboats in the China War—Anglo-Indian contingents in the expedition to Egypt in 1801 and 1882—The Romans conceive the idea of using wheels in their war-galleys—Efforts to apply steam to navigation—Steam navigation employed at sea from 1818—Invention of the screw—Substitution of iron for wood in ship-building—Steamships facilitate the maintenance of an army in the field—Preservation of food keeps the health of the troops at sea—Sea transport runs less risk of being captured—Effects of present armament may prevent a vigorous pursuit—Ships in our days depend on machinery—Lissa and Yalu the only instances of naval warfare under the new condition of things—Both unsatisfactory as a standard—Some inventions have not yet been fully tested—First employment of the ram in action—Bombardment of the forts of Alexandria—Effect of the fire of the British ships—Losses of the Egyptians—Attack of coast batteries by ships—Improvement in small arms—The telegraph favours the combined action of two forces—Slowness in transmitting news between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea in 1798 and 1801—Lissa saved through the telegraph—Lessons of the past are still the best teachers—Napoleon inculcates the study of past campaigns.

IN examining all that affects military expeditions by sea, our attention is naturally drawn to the

immense difference which exists between the past and present order of things. In our last undertaking of this nature against a great power—in the invasion of the Crimea—the majority of battleships and transports were still dependent on the winds. Of the changes and improvements, which have been such a marked feature of the latter half of this century, many were then still in their infancy, whilst a great number of the latest inventions had not so much as been thought of.

Since then, matters have changed considerably, not only at sea, but also on land. The enormous number of combatants which most nations can put in the field, the facilities which railways afford for their rapid concentration, the improvements in firearms, the accuracy of range-finders, the rapidity with which news travels, the greater attention paid to the study of naval and military subjects, to the collection of information by the great general staffs, and the working out of military problems, the more thorough preparation for war, and the higher standard of education of the officers, all combine to make a military expedition by sea a more arduous enterprise now than it was of yore.

With reference to the present military strength of foreign powers, an opinion prevails abroad that, with a widely-scattered empire, with numerous exposed and isolated points to guard, no force which Great Britain could employ far away from her

shores would be capable of resisting the numbers brought against her.

The almost total substitution of steam as a propelling agent for large ships alone, has introduced a remarkable alteration in the condition of expeditions by sea. Nearly all those of the past have been conducted under the old system, when ships were dependent on wind and tides, and when they were of much smaller tonnage and less numerous than they are now. The progress down the Channel of the fleet which conveyed the troops to Cape Breton in 1758 was hindered by heavy gales, and the ships were driven into Plymouth harbour by a storm. It took the fleet nearly three months—from the 19th of February to the 10th of May—to reach Halifax. Many of the transports did not register above two hundred tons.

In his interesting book, "The Subaltern," the Rev. G. R. Gleig gives a description of a voyage under sail in the early part of this century. In May, 1813, the 85th Light Infantry embarked at Dover for the Peninsula. After stating that, for a period of a week, the ship had to anchor for shelter near the headland of Dungeness, he writes, "At last the gale moderated, and we once more put to sea ; but only to be driven hither and thither by the most provokingly adverse weather to which men thirsting for military glory were ever exposed. Brighton, Worthing, Hastings, Eastbourne, all made their appearance in succession, and all remained so

long in sight that we cordially wished them engulfed in the ocean. At the same tedious rate we moved onwards, till Plymouth harbour lay before us ; into which we were obliged to put, for the purpose of renewing our fresh provisions and water. In this place nearly another precious week was wasted ; consequently, July was far advanced ere we could be said to have commenced our voyage in earnest ; nor was it till the 13th day of August that the bold outline of the Spanish coast became discernible. In crossing the Bay of Biscay we had been baffled by continuous calms, and tossed about by the swell which usually prevails there." What an enormous progress has been made since those days in the speed and size of ships !

Notwithstanding all Nelson's eagerness to come up with Villeneuve, when the latter went to the West Indies and back, his average rate of going was only ninety-three miles a day. This is shown by the following extract from his private dairy : " Our run from Barbuda, day by day, was 3459 miles ; our run from Cape St. Vincent to Barbadoes was 3227 miles ; so that our run back was only 232 miles more than our run out—allowance being made for the difference of the latitude and longitude of Barbadoes and Barbuda ; average per day, thirty-four leagues, wanting nine miles."

In 1830, the French navy estimated that the longest passage from France to the Algerian coast would cover thirty days. At present, the passage

to Algeria occupies as many hours as it did days in former times.

Now ships carry their own motive power, and are no longer compelled to seek it from the winds. Lord Wolseley, in his narrative of the war with China in 1860, referring to the British gunboats, observes: "The more we saw of such an expedition, the more thoroughly one appreciated the difficulties which our forefathers had to contend with in similar instances; when, unaided by steam, weeks, or more probably months, must have passed away ere they accomplished what we did in a few days." For all that, we should not forget, on the other hand, that coal has become the very life of a ship, and that the necessity for re-coaling often produces difficulties which were not known in past times; also that many of the repairs cannot be executed without the aid of machinery.

Coal is not simply required for propulsion, but also for lighting the ship by electricity, for distilling sea water for drinking and washing purposes, for making good losses of boiler feed, for pumping sea water for cleaning purposes, for ventilation, steering the ship, etc.

Fighting ships have room for but a limited quantity of coal, in comparison with what first-rate commercial ships carry, and the coal expenditure for auxiliary purposes in a war-ship comes to a very considerable item. If we only take cruisers, we shall find that their power is affected by the

necessity of refilling their bunkers, and, as this can only be done in the coaling stations of their country, or in neutral ports, it becomes easier to overtake them.

In the expeditions to Egypt in 1801 and in 1882 an Anglo-Indian force was detailed to co-operate with the troops coming from the Mediterranean, but under essentially different conditions. A portion of the 86th regiment sailed from Bombay on the 28th of December, 1800, with Rear-admiral Blanket. The admiral arrived at Jedda in the beginning of February, 1801, from which port his ships were nearly three months attempting to beat up to Suez. General Baird had also sailed from India in December; the first part of his force landed at Kosseir on the 14th of May, 1800, but he did not land till the 8th of June. In 1882, the first transport left Bombay on the 21st of July, and reached Suez on the 8th of August, having been at sea eighteen days. The other parts of the division, which sailed almost every day up to the 26th of August, had all reached Suez by the 7th of September. The *Hydaspes*, with the general commanding the Anglo-Indian contingent* on board, quitted Bombay on the 9th of August, and anchored at Suez thirteen days after, on the 22nd of that month.

At the opening of the present century the Red Sea was mainly frequented by coasting vessels;

* Major-General Sir H. Macpherson.

it was not till long after that it became the high road to India, China, Japan, and Australasia. Since then the great extension of trade, the increase in shipping, and the introduction of steam have made us acquainted with many difficult seas, and have rendered navigation much safer.

The war-ships of the ancients were generally of small draught, and were beached every winter. Before the commencement of the present era the Romans had conceived the idea of replacing the oars in their galleys by wheels moved by manual labour. Several propellers of this kind were proposed; but when their application was put to the test, all proved defective. Much advance in navigation was made with the introduction of the compass; nevertheless, until the beginning of this century, ships continued to borrow their motive power from the winds, and, in fighting, the great aim was to get the wind off one another.

About the last improvement in sailing ships was the clipper. This stamp of ship was specially built for a quick passage, having the bow sharp and long, with raking masts. A combination of the greatest carrying capacity with the form best adapted for speed was aimed at in their construction. Clippers made very fast runs; in a voyage from Melbourne to Liverpool the *Lightning* ran 2550 miles in one week, or at the rate of fifteen and a half miles an hour during the whole week.

When, in 1857, large reinforcements were sent to

India for the suppression of the mutiny, some fine clippers—the *Champion of the Seas*, the *James Baines*, the *Whirlwind*, and others—were chartered. In point of speed they did not quite come up to expectation, but this was due to the very light trade winds which blew that year. Owing to the progress made in steam navigation, the clipper ship has declined.

The originator of steam navigation was the Marquis Jouffroy d'Abbans. That French nobleman, aided by a mechanic named Périer, laboured from the year 1770 to 1781 to find some way of applying Watt's steam engine to navigation. After much toil he succeeded in constructing a vessel forty-six metres in length, which was first tried on the Saone. The Academy of Sciences would place no trust in the results he had attained, and shortly after the Revolution drove him into exile.

All the efforts made by William Henry, John Fitch, Burlington, Rumsey, Samuel Morey, Nathan, Read, and Ormsby in the United States proved inadequate. In England, Patrick Miller, James Taylor, and Symington had been trying to solve the problem with assiduous perseverance; and the last, in 1802, built a steamboat, the *Charlotte Dundas*, to tow vessels on the Clyde canal.*

Fulton, who had been studying the subject in France, in 1802 constructed on the Seine a steam-

* The *Charlotte Dundas* was given up on account of the injury the wash of the water caused to the banks of the canal.

ship which realized a speed of three knots per hour. The propositions he subsequently made to Bonaparte's Government not having been favourably entertained, he returned to the United States in 1806, having first obtained the drawings of the machinery of the *Charlotte Dundas*. There he mounted on the *Clermont* one of Watt's steam engines of twenty horse-power, which yielded sufficient results. In the following year the *Clermont* performed the voyage from New York to Albany, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles, in twenty-four hours, and shortly afterwards a regular service was established on the waters of the Hudson between the two cities.

It may appear somewhat strange that, though Watt's steam engine had worked satisfactorily in many manufactories for some time, such a long period as thirty years should have been necessary to apply it to ships. There were, however, many difficulties to overcome. The location of a massive engine on board, the discovery of the right mechanism for transmitting the force to the propellers, the room needed for the fuel, had all to be considered; account had also to be taken of the space required for the proper navigation of the vessel, for the accommodation of the passengers, and for the stowage of the cargo.

In 1812, Bell* and Thomson constructed a

* Henry Bell, of Glasgow, had accompanied Robert Fulton on the latter's visit to the *Charlotte Dundas*.

steamship on the Clyde, called the *Comet*. In the year 1815 a steamboat made a passage from Glasgow to London, and in 1818 one plied from New York to Orleans. From this date steam navigation came to be regularly used at sea.

At first paddle-wheels were employed, a wheel being placed on each side of the ship at the extremity of a cross axle. This had several drawbacks, one being that when the ship rolled one of the wheels left the water, whilst the other met with an abnormal resistance, causing the engines to work irregularly.

From a military point of view, paddle steamers possessed several disadvantages; their large wheels and their boxes were a conspicuous mark for the enemy's guns, part of the machinery, being above the water-line, was not sufficiently protected from the adversary's fire, and the paddle-boxes prevented the best disposition of the guns.

These disadvantages were very apparent when F. P. Smith and Ericsson * solved the difficulty by the invention of a better propeller, the screw. The first attempt was made in England, where a steamship with the new propeller was constructed and tried on the Thames in 1837. In 1840 was built the *Archimedes*, of two hundred and thirty-two tons and eighty horse-power. Notwithstanding very boisterous weather, this ship made the voyage from Gravesend to Portsmouth in twenty hours. About

* It was Ericsson who designed the *Monitor* for the Federal Government in 1861.

this time Ericsson went to the United States in the *Robert Stockton*, a steamer built by Messrs. Laird for an American gentleman. This steamboat was propelled by a screw, and his invention was readily adopted.

The advantages of the screw for war-ships are very patent; the propeller is placed entirely under water, and its axle is sufficiently low to keep the machinery from the enemy's fire. The elimination of the paddle-boxes permits to be mounted guns amidship, where it is found most convenient.

In this last half-century the development of ship-building has steadily progressed, and there is no reason to believe that it has reached its acme.* The progress hitherto made, as can be seen by the comparison already drawn between our two expeditions to Egypt, has very considerably facilitated the transport of an army by sea.

The original conception of some recent appliances goes far back. It appears certain that the first experiments with a submarine boat were made in the reign of James I., by a Dutchman named Cornelius Drebbel. Bushnell also studied how it was possible to destroy, by some similar contrivance, the British ships anchored on the coast during the War of Independence. It is said that Johnson, an American captain, had conceived

* The steamers *Cyclops* and *Gorgon* were engaged at the bombardment of Acre in 1850. The first was only of 300 and the second of 320 horse-power.

a plan for Napoleon's escape from St. Helena by the aid of a submarine boat ; a perilous enterprise which was rendered unnecessary by the Emperor's death. Fulton gave his attention to the subject, and in 1801 produced a submarine boat to be used in naval warfare. The *Nautilus* could move above and below water, a brass globe full of compressed air supplied what was needed for respiration. Several trials were made with this boat in the harbour of Brest, but the French Government declined to accept it.

Steam navigation was greatly advanced by the substitution of iron for wood in the construction of ships.* The weight of an iron ship is only two-thirds that of a wooden ship of the same size, and being lighter than a wooden one has more buoyancy. The great increase in the speed of steamships has been brought about by the improvements which have been gradually made in the marine engine, so that greater economy of fuel has been attained. In navigation steam has shortened time immensely, has reduced the chapter of accidents, and substituted certainty for uncertainty. In war, on the one hand, it has made surprise more easy ; on the other, it has rendered certain operations hazardous, owing to the quickness with which they can be interrupted by the advent of a hostile force.

* Forty acres of oak forest were required to yield the two thousand or three thousand tons of timber employed in building one 74-gun ship. Its estimated cost was £1000 per gun.

In comparing the advantages of the present steam vessels with the sailing ships of former days, we cannot omit to note the swiftness with which it is possible to render aid to the forces in the field. This extends, not only to the despatch of reinforcements, but also to the supply of war materials, necessities, and provisions; for, given that we have the mastery at sea, there will be no obstacle to hinder fast steamers being sent to the nearest neutral ports to purchase what articles the expeditionary corps may be in need of.

Not the least service which the electric telegraph renders in war is the rapid and constant intercourse which it maintains between the commander of an army in the field and the war minister. Thanks to its agency, the latter is kept well posted up with the wants of the army, and can take the necessary steps for furnishing, without loss of time, anything which may be demanded. The articles can be sent direct from home, or ordered through the agency of our consuls or local firms, from some locality more favourably situated with respect to the theatre of war, thus ensuring economy of time and money.

The condition in which the troops and animals are put ashore is a point which should always engage our attention. The improvements in the construction of vessels to-day, and the greater number of people who journey by sea, have led to considerable care being bestowed on the preservation of

food, and on the compression of forage, material advantages when large masses of men and animals have to be conveyed a long distance by sea. Many of the provisions shipped in our days are more nutritious than the old, occupy less space, and can be kept for long periods without fear of their deteriorating. The need of storing a large quantity of water no longer exists now that steamers are furnished with a condensing apparatus.

The soldier is no longer exposed in long voyages through the tropics to contract certain diseases which result from a continual use of salted provisions and a scanty allowance of water. Greater pains are taken, through generous nourishment, better ventilation, and a plentiful supply of water, to secure the health of both men and horses, so that at the conclusion of the voyage they may be as far as possible in a fair condition to bear the hardships of the campaign.

Nelson looked after his fleet with such a paternal care that scurvy was not known in it. After sixteen months of constant cruising between Cape St. Sebastian and Sardinia, out of six thousand sailors in his fleet there was not a man sick.

Transports, being no longer dependent on favourable winds, can start, when we have the absolute command of the sea, from different ports and assemble in any appointed locality with great certainty. And even when an adversary's power at sea has not been overcome, they will run less

risk of being captured than they did heretofore. In those days frigates and other fast sailing ships were used as scouts to find out the whereabouts and doings of the enemy's fleet. We have seen how Nelson crossed Bonaparte's track in 1798, owing to the want of such light vessels. Now, with fast cruisers, the scouting can be carried ever so much further, whilst the dense cloud of smoke raised by a fleet under steam, visible from a long distance, will give the scouting ships some indication of the enemy's position.

In the event of the convoying squadron being defeated the convoy should have no difficulty in steaming speedily out of reach of the victorious fleet. Independently of the fact that many trading steamers are faster than steamers of war, a battle fought with great determination on both sides will cause such damages to the war-ships that at its conclusion the best of the two fleets will be in a condition not much more favourable than the other, and it may be considered doubtful if after a serious engagement the conqueror will be in a position to undertake a vigorous pursuit.

Independently of the damage done to the ships, the explosion of huge shells, the slaughter, and the turmoil will try the courage of the boldest, and after an engagement which has lasted for a few hours the crews will be so wearied as to need a period of rest.

The naval combats between Blake and Van

Tromp were fought with great determination. In the history of England the victory is claimed for the British, in that of Holland for the Dutch ; it has been said that the engagements were so obstinate that in each case they were both well beaten.

The battle of the Nile is another case in point. In the afternoon of the 2nd of August the British with their dismantled ships were not able to prevent Admiral Villeneuve escaping from Aboukir Bay with two line-of-battle ships and two frigates. Nelson could only send Hood in the *Zealous* in pursuit, and then he soon recalled him from what promised to be an unequal contest.

The destructive power of the guns of the present day, when compared with those of former times, is enormous. Each penetrating projectile, besides the terrible destruction which it may cause in the confined space on board, may injure the engines or the steering-gear, thereby rendering the ship useless or unmanageable. It may open a rent in its side, which, if it has no more serious consequences, will cause much uneasiness until it has been temporarily repaired. No doubt in action the watertight doors will be kept closed, and this will prevent the water from getting any further into the ship ; yet a ship in this state cannot be capable of a long effort.

“ When ships were propelled by the wind, Nature constantly stepped in to confound the designs of art, and to put into the hands of one side advan-

tages which were as unlooked for as to the other side they were prohibitive." * Are we to believe that such strokes of good fortune have disappeared with the introduction of steam?

The war-ships which we have now are entirely dependent on their machinery. Almost all that has to be done on board is done by machinery of some kind, which, as we all know, can be put out of gear by the slightest injury. Some conception of what this means can be gathered from a work lately published by Fleet Engineer Reginald C. Oldknow,† in which he states that in H.M.S. *Vulcan* there are no less than ninety-eight separate steam engines, with one hundred and ninety-four cylinders; besides which there are thirty torpedoes with ninety cylinders, making a total of one hundred and twenty-eight engines with two hundred and eighty-four cylinders. The *Vulcan* being a special ship, a torpedo dépôt ship, may not be taken as a fair representative; still all line-of-battle ships have on board many small engines or auxiliary machines.

The student who desires to form some idea of the probable course of future naval battles will find the subject ably treated in Chapter XXIII. of H. W. Wilson's "Ironclads in Action."

The battle of Lissa in 1866, and the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95, are the only instances of naval warfare under the new order of things.

* "Naval Warfare," Rear-admiral Colomb, p. 204.

† "Mechanism of Men-of-War," R. C. Oldknow, R.N.

Beyond showing the value of armour in saving life, the advantage of having an enterprising and resolute commander, and the necessity for constantly manœuvring the ships at sea and practising gunnery, the first of these battles yielded no standard of judgment for the future. Tegetthoff, the Austrian admiral, attained his object and saved Lissa; still he knew that his fleet was inferior to the Italian, that his guns were useless against armoured ships, and that his rams were not so easy of employment as he expected. He could not pursue owing to the inferior speed of his ships, and, ready as he was to meet his opponent once more, he abstained from provoking another engagement. The Italians, on the other hand, had expended most of their ammunition in the bombardment and naval action, and as their fuel was running low, they abandoned all idea of making a fresh effort to overcome their adversaries and made their way back to Ancona.

Lissa was fought thirty years ago, and since those days the changes in the construction of ships of war and in *matériel* have been immense. The wooden line-of-battle ships, of which Ruskin wrote, "Take it all in all, a ship of the line is the most honourable thing that man, as a gregarious animal, has ever produced," were driven out of navies by shell fire, and a more formidable type had to be created. On the 5th of September, 1854, Napoleon III. ordered the construction of five floating batteries

which were to carry armour, and in these we have the original armour-plated steamers. The *Victoria*, the last of the wooden three-deckers, was completed and put in commission in 1860, and in the same year were commenced the two ironclads the *Warrior* and the *Black Prince*.

Since the first ironclad was built a contest has been going on between the cannon-maker and the ship-builder; one endeavouring to make his shot capable of piercing the strongest defensive armour of ships, the other adding inch after inch to the thickness of the plates, and improving the quality of steel to render his ship invulnerable.

The improvements in ship-building continue to progress. The largest steamer launched in the United Kingdom during 1896 was the *Pennsylvania*, of 11,330 tons gross. In January, 1897, the new British commerce-protecting cruiser *Terrible*, of 14,200 tons measurement—consort of the *Powerful*—completed its trials, and in a four hours' run attained a mean speed of 22·14 knots an hour. Both ships may steam to New York and back at twenty knots without refuelling, or may go for ten thousand miles at fourteen knots.

Not much in the way of conclusions can be gathered by an action against such a badly-formed, badly-trained, and badly-commanded force as that of the Chinese at Yalu. Its inferiority to the Japanese was too great: one half of the crew consisted of raw recruits, the ships were badly handled, and

masked each other's fire, and the gunnery was extremely indifferent and slow. There was no leading; the first discharge fired by the *Ting Yuen's* 12-inch guns caused such a concussion that the Chinese officers, who were on the bridge, were thrown down, and Admiral Ting and his chief of the staff, Major Von Hanneken, were so shaken and injured that they had to be taken below.

At Yalu, as at Lissa, the main loss was from men drowned as the injured ships went down.

There are several novel contrivances which have not yet undergone a thorough trial in war. Amongst these we may reckon the torpedo * boat, the locomotive torpedo, the submarine and contact mines, the submarine gun, and the search-light. The saying that there is nothing new under the sun is well borne out in the case of the ram; after a period of over two thousand years the ram was, in 1862, brought again to the fore as an instrument of offence in naval warfare. Though rendered more powerful by the great impetus which steam gives to modern ships, the value of the ram is much contested, and the question will remain unsolved until the arguments in favour and against it are

* The word was first applied to an invention of Fulton and other Americans, used in the war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812-1814. They employed a boat which was propelled under water and made to explode beneath the bottom of a ship. The Russians used the torpedo in the Baltic in 1854, and the Americans used it largely, and often successfully, in the Secession War.

convincingly proved in a battle fought by two powerful fleets.

The first occasion on which it was used in recent times was in the action in Hampton Roads, on the 8th of March, 1862, on which occasion the *Merrimac* rammed the *Cumberland*. The shock sent the Federal ship heeling over, but so badly had the ram been attached to the bows of the *Merrimac*, that it parted with the blow. The gap thus made had to be covered with planking before the ship could try issue with the *Monitor* next day.

In attempting to ram, it is difficult to foretell which of the two ships is going to be damaged most; in any case the rammer is not free from considerable danger. In approaching a ship which has a torpedo ready to be discharged, it is plain that before the attacker gets within ramming distance of his opponent he has a fair chance of being blown up. A captain may ram with a reasonable prospect of success when the enemy's ship has been disabled by gun-fire; but, besides the risk of damaging his own ship, in running his opponent down, he loses all chance of effecting a desirable capture.

The future of the ram in naval warfare is very uncertain, and very probably it will be used only as a last resource.

With respect to the effect of an attack on fortifications by a fleet, we are better able to form definite conclusions, and as it may be necessary to

resort to such a measure with the object of obtaining a secure base of operations, it will be instructive to look at what occurred in 1882.

Before that, however, we have the case of the bombardment of Lissa, but at that time artillery had not attained its present development, and the gunnery of the Italian fleet was wretched. The more effective implements of destruction introduced since 1866 have not made war more terrible, for it can be truly said that owing to them the struggles are shorter and more decisive, and therefore the total loss of life is less. The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was the first occasion on which a fleet of the new kind, protected by armour, and carrying heavy rifled guns of the most powerful description, had attacked shore batteries armed with the mighty ordnance of our days.

The fortifications of Alexandria had recently been re-armed by the Khedive Ismail; on them were mounted, on the 11th of June, 1882, thirty-seven heavy rifled guns, one hundred and eighty-two smooth-bore guns, and thirty-one mortars: the British fleet had a total of eighty-seven heavy rifled guns. Not only in the number of heavy guns were the British superior, but fully fifty of their guns were more powerful than the most potent guns mounted in the forts. To the heavy guns of the fleet was added a powerful fire of Gatling and Nordenfelt guns.

The Egyptian defences were so constructed that

of all the forts no two could support each other, and were built of inferior masonry. For all that, according to Sir Beauchamp Seymour's report, it took ten and a half hours to silence the batteries. The sea was on that day more than ordinarily smooth, and the British ships were at such a distance from the shore as to be exposed to little danger.

The Egyptian guns were served without determination, and their practice was bad. Captain Walford, in the following passage, shows what may have led to this : " It would seem that, as a rule, no filled cartridges were kept in the magazines, since in Fort Ras-el-tin only were any metal-lined cases found. From the appearance of the magazines it is probable that the cartridges were filled during the action, and the process must have been much delayed by the small size of the weights and scales. It is possible that this fact may account for many faults in the fire of the Egyptians, since it is not unlikely that the charge was frequently below the regulation weight." *

Out of a total of 3198 rounds fired by the fleet, the effect of 144 distinct hits were noted ; adding an equal number for others which could not be distinctly traced, it will be seen that no more than eight per cent. of the rounds fired took effect. " Speaking

* " The effects of the Bombardment of the Forts of Alexandria, July 11, 1882." Lecture delivered by Captain N. L. Walford, R.A., *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxix. p. 150.

roughly," says Captain Walford, "of the shots which have hit the forts, fifty per cent. have passed over the parapet, thirty-three per cent. have struck the escarp, and about seventeen per cent. the parapet." The percentage of the hits would have been smaller had the sea been agitated, as a swell would have marred considerably the accuracy of the fire.

"With regard to the Gatling guns (which fired during the action 7100 rounds), it will be sufficient to say that, after a most careful search in all the forts and batteries, no sign whatever could be found of their effect. Of the shot of the Nordenfelt guns (which fired 16,233 rounds) five marks were found."

"There were no visible marks of projectiles from either of these weapons on any of the scarps and parapets, but it was reported that a considerable number of Nordenfelt bullets were picked up in Fort Meks. The effects of shrapnel were far more frequent and more marked than those of the machine guns."

"It is naturally difficult to arrive at any certainty with regard to the loss of the Egyptians in killed and wounded. They themselves placed it at 280, while the officers of the navy estimate it at five hundred. From what I have seen I should feel inclined to believe that the former number might represent the total of those who fell in the batteries, while the latter might include the losses of the infantry who are said to have been drawn up in rear of the forts. The

number of men working at the guns did not probably exceed two thousand ; it is said, on good authority, that these gunners were for the most part Nubians, and were the best troops in the Egyptian army." The losses were chiefly caused by splinters from the revetments. The British fleet had five killed and twenty-eight wounded, and the ships received about ninety hits on their hulls.

Walford furnishes a table of the effects of the bombardment on the ordnance, and shows that of a total of 250 rifled and smooth-bore guns and mortars, twenty-one were dismounted and ten rendered otherwise unserviceable. Consequently at the end of the ten and a half hours of firing there were still 219 pieces which a determined garrison could have worked.

To dismount a few guns and to put a fair number of gunners out of action is not all that is aimed at. A fort on land, built of such materials as offer the best resistance to artillery fire, armed with guns of great power, worked by highly-trained gunners, with a practically unlimited supply of ammunition, will always have the advantage over ships of war ; the defence would continue as long as a gun remained fit to fire. There was much truth in the following observation, made in the *United Service Gazette* at the time : " If the forts of Alexandria had been armed with more efficient guns, like those to be met on the French and German coasts, and had these guns been served by French

or German gunners, the result of the struggle would have been far different. We should, in all probability, have had at least a third of our fleet, if not sunk, at any rate put out of action, and for all practical purposes lost to us."

The bombardment of Algiers, Acre, Sfax, and Alexandria were conducted against enemies inferior in every respect, and deficient in knowledge of the higher branches of the artillery art. At Alexandria the odds were too much on one side to arrive at a proper conclusion. This bombardment, however, seems to have shown that the effect of the fire of the heaviest armed ships at moderate ranges, firing even against indifferent batteries, was much less than they were usually credited with.

The success of ships against forts is much a question of distance. To silence the forts it is necessary to have a sufficient number of ships and to open fire at close quarters. Protected as they are now by armour, ships should engage as close as possible, taking full advantage of their protection. The naval bombardment of the Sebastopol sea forts on the 17th of October, 1854—the ships firing at ranges varying from sixteen hundred to eighteen hundred yards—failed to make any impression. However, three British ships on the left, firing at ranges from eight hundred to twelve hundred yards, cleared the whole of the open-air batteries attacked.

In the final struggle for the possession of the city of Algiers, in 1830, Vice-admiral Duperré was

invited by General de Bourmont to co-operate with the land forces and to deliver a false attack from the side of the sea. The admiral did not wish to compromise his ships, and alleged that they were on a peace footing, owing to the reduction of the crews, to make more room for the troops on the voyage. Nevertheless, the fleet made a demonstration on the 1st and 3rd of July, but at such a distance from the batteries that almost every shot fell into the sea. The only loss the fleet sustained was ten men killed and fourteen wounded by the bursting of one of its thirty-six pounders. General Valazé and the officers who inspected the forts after the capture of Algiers could only count from twelve to fifteen shot-marks, and the General contemptuously declared that he would undertake to make good the damage inflicted by the fleet to the fortifications for a sum of seven francs and fifty centimes.*

* Mons. Alfred Nettement, in page 455 of his "*History of the Conquest of Algeria*," states: "The vice-admiral fulfilled his duty in not exposing uselessly to a disaster the fleet which had been confided to him by the King. His only error was to have given, in some rather pompous passages of his report, the proportions of a serious attack to what was only a demonstration. The brave seaman who had in his life some brilliant pages, like those of the engagement of the 3rd of July, 1815, against the *Windham*, the *Ceylon*, and the *Asell*, and that of the light near Grand Port (23rd and 24th of August of the same year) in the Indian ocean, had no need of this borrowed glory to add brilliancy to his career."

His countryman was not the only person to find fault with the gallant admiral on this score. James, whose history is free

The naval attacks on Charleston are the most instructive examples we have. Charleston, on the capture of which city the Union Government set such value, held out for four years. Admiral Dupont's monitors, in the attack on the 7th of April, 1863, were seriously damaged; their fire—in the case of the *Keokuk* delivered at a distance of five hundred and fifty yards—made no impression, and inflicted the most trivial damage to the Confederate forts. The admiral recalled his monitors a little after an hour; he and the commanders of ships were of opinion that nothing was to be gained by a further attack.* Dupont's successor, Rear-admiral Dahlgren, was not more successful in his attacks of the 10th of July and 17th of August. He had tried to achieve the impossible, and after his last attempt no ironclad engagement of any importance took place before Charleston.

When ships approach beyond a reasonable distance, they must expect to be severely punished.

from partiality, writes: "If ever Rear-admiral le baron Duperré, as he now is, should honour these pages with a perusal, he will, we are sure, regret that he was induced to write so unfair an account of the victory which the shoals and rocks of Grand Port, rather than the prowess of the French seamen, or the cannon of the French ships, gained him."—"Naval History," vol. v. p. 427.

* When the Government at Washington insisted on Admiral Dupont attacking Charleston, Ericsson expressed himself against the undertaking. "A single shot," he said, "will sink a ship, while a hundred rounds cannot silence a fort, as you have proved. The immutable laws of force and resistance do not favour your enterprise."

In the attack of the forts of Lissa in July, 1866, the *Formidabile*, one of the most powerful ships of the Italian fleet, engaged the Madonna casemated battery at Port St. Giorgio singly at a distance of about three hundred yards; she was hulled ninety times, and though handled with skill, had to retire, having effected nothing.

A fort can stand much battering, and a shot striking the revetment or parapet of a work will never cause as much damage as a penetrating hit to a ship. There is no comparison, besides, between the value of a war-ship and of a battery on land.* Ships' guns firing at a distance will not only have considerable difficulty in seeing the object they are firing at, but, what is quite as great a drawback, they will be unable to ascertain the real damage they are doing. Moreover, as long-distance engagements tend to lessen the morale of the combatants, there is every reason against holding back beyond such a distance as will give the guns and gunners the best chance.

It is to prevent war-ships approaching too close, that shore batteries are often purposely placed near shoal water or other obstacles. In any case they must never allow the enemy's ships to take the initiative, or to come within short ranges, for by so doing they throw away the superiority which a steady platform confers. There should be plenty

* A battleship of the *Nile*-class costs £28,000 per gun; a cruiser such as the *Australia*, £12,000.

of traverses to shelter the gun detachments and mantlets, to protect them against the fire of machine guns, which have now become a powerful auxiliary to the armament of war-ships.

An opinion prevails that the chances of a successful attack from the sea on coast batteries which have been properly designed and constructed, have been lessened rather than increased by modern improvements and appliances of war.

The gunners on shore have very accurate instruments for ascertaining the ranges and directing their fire, whilst the ships firing from a platform which is more or less unstable, according to the swell, have less accurate means for getting their ranges. It may be said in favour of the ships that their fire is directed against a fixed target, and that by keeping in motion, they can bewilder their adversaries; still it is questionable whether this does not interfere with the accuracy of their own fire.

The few examples we have of a landing effected in the face of the enemy, occurred when the limit of effective range for the old flint lock was one hundred yards. What a different weapon the magazine rifle of our days is from the clumsy and heavy flint lock of 1758 and 1801! Now the range of our rifle (Lee-Metford) is two thousand nine hundred, and that of the field gun five thousand yards. In the period of a few decades also the size, range, and penetration of heavy guns have developed to an incredible extent.

Not only have great improvements been made to obtain rapidity of loading and discharging firearms, but considerable pains are now taken to secure accuracy in firing by careful gunnery and musketry training.* Constant practice in judging distance, in firing at vanishing targets, and in field-firing, have made the infantry marksman a very redoubtable opponent.

The power of the offence, and more so of the defence, has been much augmented by the adoption of quick-firing and machine guns, and the capacity of covering a given space with man-disabling means is now very great.

Of the many applications of modern science to war, none is more precious than the electric telegraph. Amongst the most important services it renders may be reckoned the rapidity with which relevant information can reach head-quarters, thus enabling a commander to use his forces in the most

* Admiral Farragut had a great contempt for guns, and used to quote the following case to show what led him not to be afraid of them. During the war with Great Britain, he was midshipman on board of Commodore Downes' ship, the *Essex Junior*. At that time no vessel was allowed to enter New York harbour at night without making certain signals. Downes, who was rather a reckless officer, was quite aware of this order, but one evening not having the signal, ventured to pass in. As he came within range of the batteries on shore, the guns opened on his ship, and so warmly too, that the commodore was obliged to lay-to and send a boat ashore to explain matters. For some reason or other the boat was delayed, and the *Essex Junior* remained under fire for half an hour within easy range, yet no one was hurt.

advantageous manner; the speedy transmission of exact orders and instructions in every direction; and the remarkable degree of precision which it imparts to the execution of combined movements in the theatre of war.

With its introduction the difficulties which attended the united action of two forces operating from opposite points ceased to exist. Impracticable as it may be to establish direct communication through a country occupied by the enemy, nevertheless, such is the present ramification of wires and cables, that it is possible to work round him and establish a telegraphic connection between two forces operating from opposite points. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 telegraphic messages between Constantinople and other European capitals were wired down the Persian Gulf, and thence to Europe *via* Aden.

In 1798 communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea was somewhat established. After the battle of the Nile, Nelson sent a lieutenant of the Royal Navy, overland to Bombay, by way of Alexandretta, Aleppo, and Bagdad, and thence down the Persian Gulf, with despatches to the Government of India. The voyage was accomplished in sixty-five days. At the time of the British expedition to Egypt, Sir Robert Wilson states: "A constant communication had been maintained with Admiral Blanket; and a naval officer twice passed from Lord Keith to Suez.

The first letter written by the admiral to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, but which General Hutchinson received at Rosetta, was in cypher, the key of which was lost, and therefore could not be translated." * This manner of communicating by means of personal messengers, who had to observe every precaution to avoid capture, was necessarily very slow, and not of any great value for mutual co-operation.

To show the difference between the old methods and the new, we may take a case which occurred in England in 1685. Monmouth landed at Lyme in the forenoon of the 11th of June. The Mayor of Lyme, a staunch Tory, fled to Honiton, whence he despatched a messenger to the Privy Council. The courier reached London (156 miles distant from Honiton) at five o'clock on the morning of the 13th. With the present means of communication, a telegram would have been in the hands of the Privy Council before the Mayor had proceeded many miles from Lyme.

After Aboukir, H.M.S. *Leander* sailed with despatches for Earl St. Vincent, and the Hon. Capt. Capel, of the *Mutine*, was sent home overland. The latter left the mouths of the Nile on the 7th of August, but only reached the Admiralty on the 2nd of October. Travelling has much improved since those days.

In the early days of the present century news

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 161.

travelled slowly. In 1805 Mack had reached Ulm before he received any news of Napoleon's movements, or even knew that the grand army had left the coast.

We have seen in a former chapter, when referring to the attack on Lissa, the very opportune assistance which the telegraph can render in war. The delay on the part of the Austrian fleet on that occasion is explained by the uncertainty its admiral experienced as to the real object of the Italian fleet. A telegram sent by the Governor of Dalmatia on the 19th of July, however, informed Tegetthoff that the attack had commenced, and he lost no time in putting his fleet in motion.

It might at first sight appear that the great changes which have been made in latter years have rendered the lessons of the past of little worth. Men, however, have not changed, and the fundamental principles of the art of war continue to be the same; the necessity for modelling our actions on the experience of the past, therefore, still holds good. Real ability consists in turning these lessons to profitable account, in avoiding a repetition of the errors and shortcomings of former campaigns. In war, as one never knows exactly all that should be known, so it is rarely that one attempts all that might be done; and in the new order of things, through the absence of any war conducted *secundum artem*, there are many problems which have not yet received a satisfactory solution. Officers hold

different views on many essential points, and, as there has been no opportunity yet to show which of these are correct, we can only seek for a guide amongst the analogous cases which have occurred, not omitting, however, to take into consideration how the difference between the means of those days and of the present have altered the circumstances.

What has been said of a poet, *nascitur non fit*, does not apply to a leader of men. Aristotle, anxious to inspire his pupil, Alexander the Great, with military ardour, recommended him to study the "Iliad." Napoleon inculcated the study of the wars of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of Cæsar, and urged all officers to take the deeds of these famous captains as models. He himself acted according to the advice he gave; nevertheless there was as much difference between the organization, armament, and tactics of the troops he led, and those of antiquity, as there is now between the armies of the First Empire and those of the present period.

With us, unfortunately, the study of military history is neglected. That the study of our own history should be overlooked in our schools is bad enough, but what is infinitely worse for the country is that the importance which attaches to the study of military history is not sufficiently recognized, and that the subject does not constitute any part of our service examinations.

CHAPTER VII.

PROVISION OF TRANSPORTS.

Principal expeditions across the seas in this century—Troops not generally conveyed in men-of-war—The Armada crossing the Black Sea in 1854—Advantages of steam transports—On tonnage—Amount of it required—Transport imposes a limit to the number of troops employed—Units on the war establishment—Tonnage required for the various units—Arrangements made by Sir William Mends in 1882—Surveying merchant ships—First-class ships only to be chartered—Comparison in the number of ships employed in the Algerian, Abyssinian, and Egyptian (1882) expeditions—Russia, in 1878, compelled to borrow transports from other countries.

MANY expeditions across the seas have been carried out since the close of the Napoleonic wars, but only in four instances has the number of troops employed been considerable. These were the expedition to Algeria in 1830, in which the French force amounted to thirty-seven thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and a proportionate number of guns; the invasion of the Crimea in 1854, in which the forces of the Allies, according to Kinglake, numbered about sixty-three thousand men; the transfer of the army of the Potomac from Washington to Fortress Monroe in 1861, and the expedition to Egypt in

1882, in which the troops landed at Alexandria, Ismailia, and Suez amounted to 35,702 officers and men.

As the presence of a large number of soldiers would considerably interfere with the economy and discipline of a war-ship, would hamper its action in a naval engagement, and the crowded state of the decks would lead to a great loss of life, troops are, as a rule, conveyed in special transports, and only exceptionally in war-vessels.

According to Professor Laughton, the Spanish Armada appears to have been an exception to the general rule. "The seamen," he says, "habitually gave place to the soldiers, and soldiers commanded ; the seamen did the drudgery, and not one was borne in excess of what their soldier-masters thought necessary."

Mahan, referring to Hoche's expedition to Ireland in 1796, states : "Each ship-of-the-line carried six hundred soldiers, making with her crew a ship's company of thirteen hundred souls. The frigates received about two hundred and fifty each. Although in this particular instance the arguments in favour of transporting the army in ships-of-war out-weighed those against, there is always a grave disadvantage to the handling and fighting of vessels encumbered by so many useless and generally sea-sick men."

Much unjust reproach was heaped on Gantheaume for having retired to Toulon in February,

1801, but, though he may have had one or two ships more than Admiral Warren, he could not well accept battle with his ships damaged, and full of soldiers and war materials. There was not the ghost of a chance of his getting the best of the unencumbered British fleet, known to be better both in ships and seamen. Gantheaume, as a brave and able sailor, justly recognized that the odds were too much against him. A single ship, as in the case of the *Régénérée*, could succeed in evading the enemy, but not so a large convoy. The impotence of the French navy had always a very irritating effect on Napoleon. The Emperor, who made no allowance for the state which the Republic had allowed the naval service to fall into, was unjust, for he held the officers accountable for the inferiority of his navy.*

In former days when mercantile ships were of no very great dimensions, particularly when no obstacle from the enemy at sea was to be expected, there may have been an advantage in embarking troops on board men-of-war. Writing on the departure from Malta of Abercrombie's expedition to Egypt, Captain Walsh says, "Our division

* Napoleon showed himself little satisfied with de Missiessy. That officer, the senior rear-admiral at the time, having taken his fleet to the West Indies and back without losing a single ship (rather an exceptional case in those days), having inflicted considerable damage on the British possessions and made several captures, ineffectively urged his claim to advancement to the rank of vice-admiral.

consisted of thirty-eight large ships, chiefly men-of-war, prepared and fitted for the accommodation of troops. These have every advantage over common transports, being in general very roomy and fast sailers." *

In 1830 Captain Dupetit-Thouars was strongly of opinion that the French troops for the expedition to Algiers should be embarked on board men-of-war. He argued that these ships could hold many more men, and could better contend with currents and rough weather. He recommended that half a regiment (on a war footing two thousand strong) should be embarked in each ship-of-war. At this rate twelve ships would have held twelve thousand men, which, once landed on the peninsula of Sidi-Fer-ruch, would have been able to hold their own against all the forces of the Regency. The two-deckers or three-deckers were to carry only the lower tier of guns and three hundred and fifty sailors all told, making room for a thousand soldiers with their quota of field artillery, camp equipment, ammunition, and from two to three months' provisions ; so that, once the regiment was ashore, the two ships could furnish it with all that it would require to take the field.

To these twelve ships he proposed adding twelve frigates, also armed *en flûte*, with a crew of from

* "Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt," by Thomas Walsh, Captain in his Majesty's 93rd Regiment of Foot, Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Sir Eyre Coote, K.B., p. 42.

a hundred and eighty to two hundred men. On each of these could be embarked four hundred men, with all that they needed to take the field after landing. These two divisions, with a total of from seventeen thousand to eighteen thousand men, could be put ashore the first day, because the twenty-four ships which conveyed them could anchor in the bay of Sidi-Ferruch, without confusion, in a single line. A small fleet of this dimension could keep the sea, and move in better order should the weather prevent immediate action.

Captain Dupetit-Thouars calculated that a ship anchored at eight o'clock a.m., one or, at the most, two miles from the shore, could easily land a thousand men in five hours, calculating two hundred men for each barge, and one hour's voyage. According to this calculation, by two p.m. all the eighteen thousand men would have been landed from the line-of-battle ships and frigates. These ships, therefore, would have had at their disposal the time which remained from two p.m. to eight p.m. for putting the artillery and the provisions on shore in the peninsula.

His advice was closely followed, as regarded the conveyance of the troops. Of three hundred and fifty-seven transports which were hired especially for the expedition, only a hundred and twenty were furnished by the French mercantile marine, the remaining two hundred and thirty-seven were

foreign. Their total tonnage is said to have amounted to seventy-one thousand tons,* and the hire to have ranged between sixteen francs and sixteen francs fifty centimes per ton per month.

In the autumn of 1854 the French and the Turks made use of their war-ships to convey their troops to the Crimea; the British, on the other hand, chartered special transports for that purpose. In that expedition the proportion of cavalry with regard to the other arms was very small. The French embarked only a hundred cavalry for orderly duties, and reduced the number of horses for each gun from six to four.† The British, who were better provided in the matter of sea transport, took to the Crimea the full complement of artillery horses and a body of a thousand cavalry.‡

The allied flotilla numbered about four hundred vessels. The British alone had a convoying squadron in a proper state to protect the sailing of the invaders across the Black Sea, for the French and Turkish men-of-war, crowded as they were with troops, were not in a condition to take part in a naval engagement had the Russian fleet issued from the harbour of Sebastopol to attack the allies on their way.

* Some of the hired ships must have been very small, as the average tonnage just came to two hundred.

† The want of cavalry was probably one of the reasons why Marshal St. Arnaud would not follow up the victory of the Alma, and pursue the defeated Russians.

‡ The brigade of heavy cavalry remained in Turkey.

The French fleet carried more than twenty thousand men. The decks of some of their ships were covered with troops as thickly packed as they could stand. All the line-of-battle ships and war-steamers had full cargoes of troops; * the *Montebello* carried upwards of fourteen hundred men, in addition to her crew, while the *Valmy* had on board three thousand men in all. The other ships were laden with soldiers in proportion. This close packing added to the sickness and mortality during the passage across the Black Sea. The Turks had six line-of-battle ships, one three-decker, and five two-deckers, with a couple of frigates; these carried about six thousand men.

The British force, consisting of a total of 33,452 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, with 3349 horses,† and fifty-four guns, was conveyed across the Black Sea with more comfort. Arrangements had been made to hire for that purpose twenty-four steam and sixty-four sailing transports.

In addition to the hired transports, there were four screw steam and one sailing commissioned troop-ships, and several coal-depôt vessels for the

* In evacuating the Crimea a large portion of the British forces was conveyed home in line-of-battle ships. I embarked at Kamiesh in H.M.S. *Queen* with two companies of my regiment, the 42nd Royal Highlanders; there were on board also a battery of artillery and the whole of the 77th and 90th Regiments.

† For guns, 1624; cavalry, 1530; staff, 65; regimental staff, 130; total, 3349.

supply of the steamers. This last was a very necessary precaution, for, according to Sir William Russell, when the armada had crossed the Black Sea many of the ships were so short of coal that they would have had some difficulty in steaming to Sebastopol had it been resolved to go there.

The convoying squadron consisted of ten ships of the line, of which two were screw-steamers; four frigates, of which one was a screw-steamer; eleven steamers of war, nine paddle and two screw; one commissioned paddle-steamer for the service of the general commanding and despatch; five tugs, and two river passenger-steamers.

In future expeditions by sea, steamers only will be employed as transports, so that steamers will not have to tow sailing vessels, as obtained in the invasion of the Crimea and in the last China war.* At all times towing is an unpleasant operation, the details for which are especially difficult to arrange. It is not surprising that in the narrative of the first of these expeditions we find the special correspondent of the *Times* writing, "The execution of the plan by no means equalled the accuracy with which it had been set forth upon paper." As the towing powers of the steamers employed are not equal, it is difficult to keep the order assigned; notwithstanding the greatest

* Thirteen transports conveyed the cavalry from India. These were towed to Hong Kong by ten steamers which had infantry on board.

care the stronger will get ahead and the weaker ones will tail off. The introduction of steam as a propelling power has rendered an expedition of this description a much swifter and easier operation than it was in the past. Not only are we no longer dependent on the caprices of the weather, nor thwarted by the inconstancy of the winds, but the larger tonnage of the present ships favours the embarkation of complete units, with their field equipment, ammunition, regimental transport and stores, whilst it reduces the number of vessels in a convoy—a matter of considerable importance whenever there is a probability of meeting the enemy on the way. What is also a great advantage is that the whole mass of ships, under steam, can keep more together during the voyage than was ever possible under the old conditions of sailing.

In chartering ships for the conveyance of troops, an estimate must be made to start with, of the amount of tonnage required. Tonnage, in regard to ships, is the measure of capacity, the ton being one not of weight, but of cubic content, or forty cubic feet.

Ships are registered at so many tons gross. The principle upon which the present system of measurement was established in 1835 is, that the total cubic contents of a ship below deck and of the closed spaces above deck are taken as the gross tonnage, from which all the non-freight-earning spaces, and spaces required for propelling power,

are deducted in order to arrive at the net register tonnage.

To determine the amount of tonnage required for the conveyance of a body of troops, account must be taken of the length of the voyage and the season of the year. For very short voyages there will be little inconvenience experienced in putting a large number of men and horses on board of each ship ; but for long voyages, particularly through the tropics, overcrowding must be carefully avoided, as it might produce sickness. The amount of tonnage, for example, which was deemed sufficient in the case of McClellan's expedition down Chesapeake Bay would not have been adequate for our troops going to India for the suppression of the Mutiny, or to Natal for the Zulu War.

Crossing the British Channel may be considered a very short voyage, in which case it is reckoned that a minimum tonnage of about one and a half tons per man and two and a half tons per horse would suffice.* Should the voyage comprise the best part of a week, we at once require more space and should not calculate less than two tons per man and six tons per horse. It is

* In the contemplated invasion of England, Napoleon entertained the idea of using small vessels propelled by oars, which might evade the British war-ships whilst they were compelled to lay inert through want of wind, and which might have been beached on reaching the coast of England.—Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," vol. ii. p. 112.

not considered prudent ever to base the calculations on short voyages, for the alertness of the enemy, or unfavourable weather for landing, might keep the troops on board a longer time than was anticipated, or might make it necessary to steam away to attempt the landing in some place other than the one originally contemplated.

In what follows, we have taken the most difficult case of all—that is, of an expedition to any part of the world, in which the voyage extends over some weeks. The tonnage required for voyages of this length is estimated at two and a half tons for each man and seven tons for each horse. As most ships have to carry waggon and carts, a small amount of tonnage must be added to the total. This includes arms, ammunition, equipment and stores, with provisions and forage for three months. In calculating the nominal tonnage needed, it is deemed advisable to add seventy per cent. to the net tonnage actually required for each man and horse to admit for loss of space, coals, etc.

In an undertaking of this nature the large number of transports required of itself imposes a limit to the number of troops employed. The composition and strength of an expeditionary force being subject to a variety of conditions, the amount of transports can only be estimated as each case actually arises; nevertheless, as a matter of study we shall assume that an expeditionary force is to comprise one army corps, one division of

cavalry, and the troops deemed necessary for keeping the communications open. Taking the totals from the present field army establishments—service abroad—we find that, independently of warlike materials, stores, and provisions, sea transport would be required for—

	Officers and men.	Horses and pack animals.	Carriages.
An Army Corps	35,087	10,121	1,736
A Division of Cavalry	6,700	6,677	454
For the Lines of Communication	11,959	3,278	401
Total	53,746	20,076	2,591

The ships required for the conveyance of such an army will be a sufficiently heavy demand on the mercantile marine. The first army corps may be reinforced by a second, and, if the seat of war is not too far distant from our shores, the same transports may return for it. In any case, the provision of suitable ships for the first part of the expeditionary force alone will tax all the energies of the Transport Department of the Admiralty.

A calculation was lately made to ascertain the sea transport required for the above force, with the following result—

		Ships.	Tons.
For the 1st Division	19	65,455
" " 2nd "	19	61,828
" " 3rd "	18	63,451
" " Corps troops	21	69,313
" " Cavalry division	30	121,575
" " Lines of communication	...	27	75,490
Total	134	457,112	

The number of transports for each large unit cannot be set down definitely, for much depends on the size of the ships that can be hired at a given time. The above Admiralty estimate was made by taking the ships which would have been available at the time the calculation was gone into.

The units, on full war establishment, for which sea transport will be required, are—

	Officers and men.	Horses.	Guns.	Waggons and carts.	Pack ani- mals.
Royal Artillery—					
Horse battery	184	201	6	13	0
Light field battery	175	139	6	13	0
Royal Engineers—					
Mounted detachment	118	120	0	9	0
Pontoon troop	214	188	0	28	0
Head-quarters and four sec- tions of telegraph battalion	245	171	0	22	0
Field company... ..	216	63	0	13	6
Field park	45	51	0	12	0
Regiment of cavalry	667	613	0	20	5
Battalion of infantry	1097	66	0	16	3
Battalion of mounted infantry ...	1101	1093	0	29	1
Ammunition Columns—					
Corps troops ammunition column	190	220	0	33	0
Infantry divisional ammunition column	202	232	0	39	0
Cavalry divisional ammunition column	170	189	0	33	0
Ammunition park, 1st, 2nd and 3rd sections	156	185	0	26	0
Ammunition park, 4th section	136	156	0	22	0
Ammunition park, 5th section	112	120	0	16	0
Bearer company with army ser- vice corps transport attached...	105	67	0	16	0
Field hospital with army service corps transport attached ...	71	45	0	11	0
Company army service corps with field bakery	305	251	0	56	0
Company army service corps transport and supply ...	197	233	0	30	0

On the assumption that a distant expedition is

contemplated, a Horse Battery Royal Artillery, on the war establishment, will require—

For 154 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	385
... 200 horses .. 7 ..	1,400
... 4 guns, with limber and 12 waggons ..	50
Net freight ..	1,835
Add 70 per cent. ...	3,119
Gross tonnage ..	3,513

A LIGHT FIELD BATTERY ROYAL ARTILLERY.

For 175 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ..	438
.. 150 horses .. 7 ..	1,400
.. 6 guns, with limber and 12 waggons ..	50
Net freight ..	1,900
Add 70 per cent. ...	3,230
Gross tonnage ..	3,541

A MOUNTED DETACHMENT ROYAL ENGINEERS.

For 118 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ..	295
.. 120 horses .. 7 ..	1,400
.. 9 carts and waggons ..	40
Net freight ..	1,735
Add 70 per cent. ...	2,950
Gross tonnage ..	3,097

A PONTOON TROOP ROYAL ENGINEERS.

For 214 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ..	535
.. 188 horses .. 7 ..	1,310
.. 16 pontoons	100
.. 12 waggons	50
Net freight ..	2,000
Add 70 per cent. ...	3,400
Gross tonnage ..	3,441

212 *MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.*

HEAD-QUARTERS AND FOUR SECTIONS OF TELEGRAPH BATTALION.

	Tons.
For 245 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	613
„ 171 horses „ 7 „ ...	1,197
„ 12 waggons, air-line ...	168
„ 10 general service waggons ...	44
Net freight	2,022
Add 70 per cent. ...	1,415
Gross tonnage	3,437

FIELD COMPANY ROYAL ENGINEERS.

For 216 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	540
„ 63 horses and 6 pack animals, at 7 tons ...	483
„ 13 carts and waggons ...	52
Net freight	1,075
Add 70 per cent. ...	752
Gross tonnage	1,827

FIELD PARK ROYAL ENGINEERS.

For 45 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ...	113
„ 51 horses „ 7 „ ...	357
„ 12 waggons and carts ...	59
Net freight	529
Add 70 per cent. ...	370
Gross tonnage	899

REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.

For 667 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	1,668
„ 613 horses and 5 pack animals, at 7 tons ...	4,326
„ 20 waggons and carts ...	71
Net freight	6,065
Add 70 per cent. ...	4,245
Gross tonnage	10,310

BATTALION OF INFANTRY.

	Tons.
For 1,097 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{3}$ tons ...	2,743
„ 66 horses and 3 pack animals, at 7 tons ...	483
„ 16 waggons and carts ...	51
Net freight	3,277
Add 70 per cent. ...	2,293
Gross tonnage	5,570

BATTALION OF MOUNTED INFANTRY.

For 1,101 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{3}$ tons ...	2,753
„ 1,093 horses and 1 pack animal, at 7 tons...	7,658
„ 29 waggons ...	102
Net freight	10,513
Add 70 per cent. ...	7,359
Gross tonnage	17,872

A CORPS TROOP'S AMMUNITION COLUMN.

For 190 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{3}$ tons...	475
„ 220 horses ...	1,540
„ 33 waggons and carts ...	146
Net freight	2,161
Add 70 per cent. ...	1,512
Gross tonnage	3,673

AN INFANTRY DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN.

For 202 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{3}$ tons...	505
„ 232 horses „ 7 „ ...	1,624
„ 39 waggons and carts ...	155
Net freight	2,284
Add 70 per cent. ...	1,599
Gross tonnage	3,883

A CAVALRY DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN.

			Tons.
For 170 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	425
„ 189 horses „ 7 „	1,323
„ 33 waggons and carts	119
		Net freight	1,867
Add 70 per cent.	1,306
		Gross tonnage	3,173

AMMUNITION PARK, 1ST (2ND AND 3RD) SECTIONS.

For 156 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons	390
„ 185 horses „ 7 „	1,295
„ 26 waggons	117
		Net freight	1,802
Add 70 per cent.	1,260
		Gross tonnage	3,062

AMMUNITION PARK, 4TH SECTION.

For 136 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	340
„ 156 horses „ 7 „	1,092
„ 22 waggons	103
		Net freight	1,535
Add 70 per cent.	1,074
		Gross tonnage	2,609

AMMUNITION PARK, 5TH SECTION.

For 112 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	280
„ 120 horses „ 7 „	840
„ 16 waggons	70
		Net freight	1,190
Add 70 per cent.	833
		Gross tonnage	2,023

BEARER COMPANY, WITH ARMY SERVICE CORPS
TRANSPORT ATTACHED.

	Tons.
For 105 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	263
„ 67 horses	469
„ 16 waggons, ambulances, and carts ...	55
Net freight	787
Add 70 per cent.	551
Gross tonnage	1,338

FIELD HOSPITAL, WITH ARMY SERVICE CORPS TRANSPORT
ATTACHED.

For 71 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ...	178
„ 45 horses	315
„ 11 waggons and carts	44
Net freight	537
Add 70 per cent.	376
Gross tonnage	913

A COMPANY ARMY SERVICE CORPS WITH FIELD BAKERY.

For 305 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons ...	763
„ 251 horses „ 7 „	1,757
„ 56 waggons and carts	233
Net freight	2,753
Add 70 per cent.	1,927
Gross tonnage	4,680

A COMPANY ARMY SERVICE CORPS, TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY
EMPLOYED WITH AN INFANTRY BRIGADE.*

For 197 officers and men, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons...	493
„ 233 horses „ 7 „	1,631
„ 30 waggons and carts	101
Net freight	2,225
Add 70 per cent.	1,558
Gross tonnage	3,783

* This company horses one Bearer Company and one Field Hospital. The companies of the Army Service Corps, attached to the several units, have not a uniform establishment.

In the last expedition which left our shores, in 1882, the arrangements for the conveyance of the troops from England and the Mediterranean stations rested in the hands of Admiral Sir William Mends, the officer who, together with Lord Lyons, planned the transport and disembarkation of the British Army in the Crimea. The rapid and creditable manner in which the expeditionary corps, with all its equipment, war materials, and provisions, left for the seat of war, was in great part due to the talent and experience of the officer who for many years so ably administered the transport branch of our Admiralty.

The advantages conferred by experience in such a complicated undertaking are many. In the five years which preceded our expedition to Egypt, the probability of a war with Russia had caused a good deal of attention to be paid to our preparations for war, and much experience in embarking and despatching troops by sea had been gained in sending troops to Cyprus, and a considerable force of all arms to South Africa for the Zulu war. During those years reinforcements were also sent to India, after the arrival of the news of the defeat at Maiwand, and to Natal, for operations against the Boers.

The reports at the conclusion of these voyages contained practical suggestions on many matters connected with the embarkation of the troops, the construction of the horse fittings, the ventilation of

the horse decks, the economical stowage of the war materials, etc., all of which led to considerable improvements.

To expedite the departure of an expedition from our shores, Sir William Mends had adopted a system of surveying merchant ships—with the consent of their owners—and recording their capabilities for the transport service in office books. It was considered that by this measure the Director of Transports could at a pressing moment come to a ready decision as to the best vessels to hire. An opportunity soon occurred to test the value of this very practical idea. The work of hiring the transports required to convey the army-corps to Egypt only commenced on the 21st of July, and thirty days later, on the 19th of August, the last transport left our ports.

This measure is profitable both in point of time and in the interest of economy, for, whilst it expedites the departure of the troops, it renders it possible to keep the prices down—an important consideration in fitting out a large expedition. This has not always been kept in view; referring to the end of the last century, Brenton writes: "The transport service became, in the course of the war, one of the most extravagant branches of public expenditure; the hire of these vessels being paid for at a rate very far exceeding the profits which the owners would have obtained by freight in commercial employment; and ships that have

lain ten months in port have cost £5000 per annum. The rate of hiring them per ton, per month, was, for coppered ships, £1 6s."*

An analysis of the cost of the Abyssinian expedition revealed that insufficient attention had been paid to the rate of hire fixed by the Indian Government, so much so that more than the original cost of some steamers was paid to the owners for eleven months' hire.

When an occasion arises for chartering transports abroad, it will never be possible to hire a large number of trading vessels at as cheap a rate as at home, or to make the same selection, nevertheless the public interest demands that some stand should be made against paying exorbitant prices.

From figures extracted from the Mercantile Navy List for 1895, we have endeavoured to classify to a certain extent the registered steamers of the United Kingdom. The following is the number according to their tonnage :—

Steamers of over	4000	tons net	19
" " between	3000 and 4000	" "	121
" " "	2500 " 3000	" "	175
" " "	2000 " 2500	" "	358
" " "	1500 " 2000	" "	820
" " "	1000 " 1500	" "	1277
" " "	500 " 1000	" "	1289
Total			4059

* "The Naval History of Great Britain," by Edward Pelham Brenton, Capt. R.N., vol. i. p. 46.

One third of this number (1353) may be assumed to be in the home ports in ordinary times. On any alarm of war, as trading operations are always liable to be seriously affected, very probably a larger number might be found remaining idle. If we leave on one side all steamers of less than fifteen hundred tons net tonnage, as being too small for the conveyance of troops in the best condition, we shall still have 1493 remaining. The third of this would be four hundred and ninety-eight, so we may say that there would be in round numbers five hundred first-class ships available for hire. It has been shown above that 53,746 men with their horses and carriages would require no more than one hundred and thirty-four ships.

Ships chartered as transports are contracted for at a monthly rate per ton ; a definite number of months is specified in the charter-party, the Admiralty having the option of retaining them by the month after the stated term has expired.

A sudden demand for shipping will be taken advantage of by the owners, and, where no option is left to the Government but to hire a large number of vessels as expeditiously as possible, prices are sure to rise considerably. After all, this is nothing more than the ordinary law by which to meet a sudden emergency, the buyer must get the article he wants quite independent of its cost. It appears, however, but reasonable that, if in the country's interest a system of requisition for the land carriage

and for saddle and draught animals recommends itself, that the same should be made to apply to ships required for military purposes.* Without question, there is no other method for getting so surely a supply of the best ships at short notice.

As to the transports themselves, whatever the cost may be, only first-class ships should be employed. Hiring one large ship is more economical than hiring two of only moderate size, as in large ships there is more room in the hold for stowing away baggage and military stores.

It is very desirable to reduce the period the troops have to remain on board, and this can only be done by engaging first-class large steamers, which have a higher rate of speed than small ones and greater capacity for stowage of coals. In roomy steamers not only are the sanitary conditions good, but the men and the horses suffer less discomfort at sea. The voyage for the troops is a period of rest, they experience no personal fatigue, and, as a general rule, the nausea caused by the motion of the ship is soon overcome. Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said of the horses, for they suffer much more from sea-sickness, whilst on long voyages, through being unable to lie down, their

* At the time of the expedition to Madagascar, the French raised a great outcry because in the interest of economy the Minister of Marine had chartered English ships for the carriage of stores and materials. The English owners had tendered at a low rate and had been accepted.

limbs become so stiff that on landing they need careful management and gentle exercise before they can regain their working condition.

Small vessels, in which the motion is great, are not as well adapted for the conveyance of horses as larger ones, which progress with more steadiness. Both with regard to their health on board and their condition on getting ashore, the length of the voyage becomes a matter of consideration. However well adapted sailing ships—towed by powerful steamers—are for the conveyance of horses, experience has shown that the animals can be carried in large numbers in steamers, as long as proper attention is paid to the ventilation of the horse-decks, and cleanliness.

The tendency for some years past has been to build ships of large tonnage, the result being that a smaller number are now required for the conveyance of a body of troops. In the expedition to Algeria in 1830 the French had a fleet of a hundred men-of-war, and three hundred and fifty-seven transports. The hired vessels employed in connection with the Abyssinian expedition amounted to seventy-five steam and two hundred and five sailing transports. When to these are added eight tugs and barges, and three small steamers purposely purchased, we reach a total of two hundred and ninety-one vessels. This fleet, whose collective tonnage was 304,193 tons, was none too large; for though the number of combatants was small—

13,167 of all ranks*—still they were accompanied by 15,334 followers, and many thousands of transport animals had to be brought to the base from distant countries.

The land transport in this instance was on a very large scale. One statement shows the grand total of animals—mules, ponies, camels, draught-bullocks, pack-bullocks, and donkeys received in the transport train from the beginning to the end of the expedition—to have amounted to 41,723 animals.† Of these barely one-sixth were purchased locally.

The smaller number of ships needed for the conveyance of the troops, stores, and provisions from England, the Mediterranean stations, and India to Egypt in 1882—a hundred and twenty-five—(sixty-nine from the former,‡ and fifty-six from the latter ports) shows how advantageous, in a military point of view, has been the construction of large steamers. Some of the ships chartered in England were of very large size; the *Orient*, for example, with a gross tonnage of 5385 tons, had full accommodation for fifty-one officers, one warrant-officer, eight hundred and fifty men, and a hundred and ten horses; the *Catalonia*, with a gross tonnage

* These figures have been taken from the re-embarkation returns.

† "Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia," vol. ii. p. 259.

‡ Forty-four conveyed troops, sixteen conveyed stores, three were distil-ships, two were tugs, one was a coal depôt, three were for mules purchased abroad; total, sixty-nine.

of 4841 tons, could accommodate fifty-one officers, one warrant-officer, nine hundred and twenty men, and a hundred and seven horses.

Not every country can command the same amount of shipping. In 1878 the Russians, wishing to take back the troops from Turkey by sea, entered into a contract with the Russian Steam Navigation Company. The Company could only provide fourteen vessels, with a gross tonnage of 22,000 tons; but, as this was considered inadequate, it was empowered to acquire additional vessels. This was done by hiring twenty-two foreign steamers, with a total tonnage of 30,580 tons.

It is not possible to carry out the work of engaging and fitting a large number of ships as troop transports entirely at headquarters. To supervise the work, and to see that the directions emanating from the Admiralty and War Office are carried out, it will be necessary to appoint a joint naval and military committee in each of the mercantile ports. The hygienic conditions of the ships must be supervised by a medical officer, whilst those which are taken up for the conveyance of horses and transport animals require the professional advice of a veterinary surgeon. Should the troops embark at any of these ports, the military staff-officer on the committee would act as the embarking staff-officer. Each committee should have the quota of clerks, subordinate staff, and messengers required

to attend to the correspondence, compilation of returns, checking stores, etc.

The specifications for the fittings of troop transports are laid down in the Transport Regulations, and, to expedite the work, it can be assigned to contractors under Government supervision. The stores, horse-stalls, water-tanks, horse-boats, canvas gear for horses, troop bedding, and hammocks are generally kept in hand, and can be despatched to the various ports in which the transports are fitted.

When preparing the ships for the conveyance of the troops, we should not neglect to provide for their speedy disembarkation. Sir William Mends recommended that each infantry transport should be fitted with six commodious accommodation ladders; three on each side, with a good landing at the bottom, fitted with three-inch man ropes to the side stanchion, and not to the rails.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EMBARKATION.

Part performed by the navy—The Admiralty furnish the moving power—The military staff must see to the order in which the troops embark—Must see that all parts go together—Principles which regulate the despatch of troops by sea for active service—Transport to be allotted to each distinct unit—Each unit to embark thoroughly complete—All demands for tonnage to be submitted through a responsible military officer—Stores for each department to go together—To be accompanied by an officer of the department concerned—Care taken in embarking reveals itself at the end of the voyage—Embarkation to be distributed over several ports—Examples of embarkation of cavalry—Several modes of shipping horses—Examples of embarkation of the other arms—Valuable assistance rendered by the navy in embarkations—Rendezvous, example of, in the China war—The movements of the armada supervised by an escorting squadron—A conveying squadron may be required for removing any obstacles in the way of the expedition.

THOUGH the conveyance of troops by sea is a branch of naval administration, it is an error to believe that, for that reason, the navy are principally concerned in all matters connected with the embarkation of a large mass of troops. In every respect the army has as great an interest in the process as the sister service.

What the navy have principally to do is—

(a) To provide transport for the conveyance of the troops, with all that they need.

(b) To look after them when on the high seas.

(c) To furnish what is required for putting them ashore.

(d) To pave the way for the disembarkation by the fire of its guns, and to prevent the enemy's fleet from interfering with the landing.

(e) To ensure the provisioning of the troops in the early stage of the operations.

In all this the army must be dependent on the navy.

The Admiralty furnish the moving power. They have to set about and hire from the mercantile marine the most suitable transports; they have to attend to the fittings required for the accommodation of the men and the animals; to see to the supply of all those necessities which are indispensable to insure health and comfort on the voyage. As the object in view, nevertheless, is to undertake military operations at the conclusion of the voyage—with a probability of the enemy disputing the landing, or having to be encountered soon after the expeditionary force has got ashore—it must be our endeavour to disembark the troops in the best possible array. The order, therefore, in which the troops are embarked has a special interest for the military staff. As they work out the tables of the expeditionary corps, it is their duty to furnish

the Admiralty with very complete details, so that the transports may be allotted in strict keeping with the intentions of the general commanding, and in accordance with the wants of the military, which we may reasonably presume they understand better than the naval authorities.

The military staff have not only to deliver at the port of embarkation the troops and all that the troops will need on shore, but must also see that all parts go together, and that the sequence in which everything is embarked is in strict keeping with the order of its necessity at the place of disembarkation.

Having accepted the principle referred to in the last chapter, that the most roomy and fastest ships are the most appropriate for the service, and also most economical in the long run, we come to certain rules which now govern the despatch of a large force of all arms by sea for active service abroad.

The units in an embarkation are the battery, the squadron,* the battalion, and to each of these units one or more transports should be allotted. Where there is an excess of accommodation, as often will happen, this excess should be filled up by small sections, and afterwards by details belonging to the same brigade or division.

To be in a position to act at once after landing,

* In a small embarkation of cavalry, a regiment can be accommodated in two ships. When, on the other hand, the body of cavalry is numerous, there may be few ships large enough to take more than a squadron.

each artillery, cavalry, and infantry unit should embark entire, and everything which will make the unit complete in itself, officers' chargers, regimental transport, camp equipment, supplies and ammunition, must be put on board with it. To secure the co-operation of the three arms, each large tactical formation should embark in transports which have approximately the same rate of speed, and which are detailed to sail at about the same date.

This latter point not only applies to the combatants but to the concomitant and administrative services, for what would be the good of hastening the departure of the troops were we to neglect to send with them those accessories which make an army a complete instrument? In this case, likewise, care must be taken that the *personnel* and *matériel* are embarked together; that is to say, that the officers and men of the Medical Staff Corps shall go in the ships which hold the equipment of the field hospitals and the conveyances required to insure their mobility; that the clerks and issuers of the Army Service Corps (with their implements, scales and weights, stationery, etc.) shall proceed with the supply officers they are attached to; that the telegraph and railway companies of the Royal Engineers shall not be separated from the materials on which their work depends.

Embarkations are sometimes conducted in haste, and, as long as the troops and their stores are sent out with all possible despatch, we do not trouble

ourselves to reflect on what must necessarily occur when we have omitted to keep in mind the order in which the latter were shipped.

Materials, stores, and provisions, other than those embarked with the troops, must be shipped in the order of their necessity at the base. The custom of allowing the several administrative departments to submit their demands for tonnage direct to the Admiralty shows a want of system. The reports at the end of most expeditions indicate that sufficient attention has not been paid to this point.

To avoid the confusion which often occurs at the base, the best plan is to have all these demands submitted through a responsible military officer, who, from being behind the scenes, can indicate to the transport branch of the Admiralty the sequence in which the various articles will be required at the conclusion of the voyage.

In shipping stores those to be consigned to the same department should, as far as possible, be embarked in distinct ships, for a mixture of stores can only engender confusion on landing.

A representative of the administrative department concerned should be on board of every ship conveying materials, stores, or provisions. His duty should be to take note of what articles are shipped, and of the locality in which these are stowed; thus on the arrival of a ship at the base there will be an officer to give any information that

may be required. Officers of the medical staff should proceed in charge of the medical stores, and should remain on board until all have been delivered. We should remember what came of a want of system in sending out the stores to the Crimea. Medical stores, which were greatly needed for the wounded at Scutari, were left to decay at Varna, or were discovered lying useless in the holds of vessels outside the harbour of Balaclava.

It is often said that the disembarkation of men, horses, materials, stores, and provisions is simply the reverse of what is done in putting them on board. This, nevertheless, is far from being true, for in most instances in disembarking in a hostile country, we have to contend with serious difficulties, we have a dearth of manual labour and appliances; whilst for obvious reasons we are driven to observe the greatest possible expeditiousness. It is a fact beyond dispute, that the attention paid in embarking the troops, war materials, and provisions for an expedition beyond the sea will always reveal itself when the hour of disembarkation arrives.

To devise the best system for all this, we are not perplexed by theories, for from the abundant experience of the past, from the lessons which previous undertakings of a similar nature have left us, it is easy to lay down a very practical and sure mode of procedure.

We will assume that the Admiralty have secured the number of transports calculated to be necessary

to convey a given force to the intended scene of operations, and that, with the object of expediting the embarkation and eliminating all possibility of confusion, these transports have been distributed between several ports. The necessary fittings being completed, and everything being ready for sea, the embarking must commence. That of the infantry is an easy matter, and the time required for its embarkation will be small in comparison with what will be needed for getting on board a large number of horses, guns, waggon, and army trains.

The following examples are taken from the diaries of the embarkation of the troops despatched to Natal in 1879, and to Egypt in 1882, and are given to show the time occupied in putting the various arms on board.

The hired transport *England* embarked at Southampton, on the 26th of February, 1879, the headquarters of the 17th Lancers, 15 officers, 302 non-commissioned officers and men, with 263 horses. First horse put on board at 9.5 a.m., the last at 3.10 p.m.; time taken in embarking the whole, six hours and five minutes.

The hired transport *Spain* embarked at Southampton, on the 27th of February, 1879, 13 officers, 311 non-commissioned officers and men, with 267 horses of the 1st Dragoon Guards. First horse put on board at 11.25 a.m., the last at 3.55 p.m.; time taken in embarking the whole, four hours and thirty minutes.

The hired transport *Egypt* embarked at Southampton, on the 28th of February, 1879, the headquarters of the 1st Dragoon Guards, 14 officers, 311 non-commissioned officers and men, with 270 horses. First horse put on board at 11.5 a.m., the last at 2.55 p.m.; time taken in embarking the whole, three hours and fifty minutes.

The rapidity in the embarkation of the horses in the last instance was in great part due to the exclusion of the public from the quays during the embarkation, a point which had not been observed in the two previous cases.

Now that a very prominent part is assigned to the cavalry in covering an army, in scouting, and in securing information, an expeditionary corps will be accompanied by a just proportion of horsemen. What commander would ever think of repeating the error committed in 1854, when, out of sixty-three thousand combatants the allies had on landing in the Crimea, only one thousand were cavalry?

In the programme for the embarkation, a given quantity of cavalry should be detailed to go with the first troops, as some mounted men will have to be put ashore early to undertake the scouting.

It appears taken for granted that the shipping of horses is a very tedious and long operation. This is not so when it is carried out in our ports, most of which have broad quays and suitable appliances. A study of the embarkations which took place in 1879 and in 1882, shows that under

ordinary favourable circumstances the time employed in shipping the horses is little more than a minute per horse on the average. This is quite fast enough, for it takes some time to berth a horse and make everything secure in his stall. Anything quicker would be sure to choke the decks with animals and men.

The embarkation is rendered longer and more tedious if the transports have to lie far out in the offing, when any motion of the sea and any swell may make it at any moment desirable to suspend the operation. Even unfavourable circumstances will not always prevent the embarkation being carried out with credit. To give an example: in 1860, a troop of the King's Dragoon Guards embarked in the steamship *Syrias*, at Madras, for the China war. The horses (forty-nine in number) and men were taken through the surf in massoola boats, and begun leaving at six a.m. By noon all the horses had been safely stalled on board.*

A wing of the 14th Hussars, two hundred and twenty strong, embarked at Durban in 1881. The horses were conveyed over the bar in lighters battened down, and were hoisted on board without a hitch between 7.30 a.m. and 3.15 p.m.

When H.M.S. *Assistance* is employed for the conveyance of mounted troops from England to and from Ireland, the horses walk on board over a

* The precaution had been taken of making fast the four legs of each animal.

special brow, and are thence led down an inclined plane to the horse deck. In the *Orontes*, the baggage port was used for walking the horses on board, and the same plan, though on a smaller scale, was adopted when embarking cavalry for South Africa, at Southampton and at the Albert Docks. In all these cases, however, it was found that the ports were not sufficiently high to allow the animals to walk through them erect; with the small ones alone there was no difficulty.

All transports engaged for the conveyance of horses might be required to have a commodious horse-port cut on each side of the ship, both forward and aft. The ships should moreover carry special brows to connect them with the horse boats or lighters provided for the disembarkation.

Whatever experiments may be conducted in time of peace with the object of determining the quickest way for embarking cavalry and artillery, they can seldom be considered conclusive, because everything is done then under the most favourable conditions. When we cannot embark at proper wharves or jetties, but out at sea with more or less motion, the shipping of horses, guns, waggons, and military carriages must always occupy a considerable time.

It is only the infantry, who carry on their backs and in their hands all that belongs to them, that can be embarked speedily.

In sending out the troops to Egypt in 1882, H.M.S. *Malabar* embarked at Portsmouth, on the

8th of July, two battalions for Gibraltar. The baggage arrived at nine a.m., in eighteen railway trucks; about nine thousand cubic feet. Commenced unloading and shipping at ten a.m., concluded by 3.30 p.m. The 1st Battalion North Lancashire Regiment arrived in two trains at 10.50 and 11.20 a.m.; all on board by noon. The 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment arrived in two trains at noon and 12.30 p.m.; all on board by one p.m. The second train brought two trucks of light baggage. Total on board of all ranks, 1808. None but the families of the staff-sergeants proceeded with the troops. Time employed on the embarkation, seven hours. The *Malabar* sailed at five p.m.

The hired transport *Palmyra* embarked at Portsmouth, on the 3rd of August, A Battery, 1st Brigade Royal Artillery, 5 officers, 104 non-commissioned officers and men, 153 horses, 6 guns, and 11 waggons. Commenced embarking at 9.45 a.m.; horses all on board at one p.m.; the embarkation was completed by four p.m. Time employed, six and a half hours.

The hired transport *Tower Hill* embarked at Southampton, on the 4th of August, N/A Battery Royal Horse Artillery, 6 officers, 175 non-commissioned officers and men, 175 horses, 6 guns, and 11 waggons. Commenced embarking the guns at 9.15 and the horses at 9.30 a.m.; all on board by 12.50 p.m. The embarkation was completed

at 2.30 p.m.; time employed, five and a quarter hours.*

The hired transport *Marathon* embarked at Portsmouth, on the 5th of August, a field hospital, with ten carts and two water-carts; a Bearer company, with six carts and two water-carts; the regimental transport of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, with ten carts and two water-carts. Commenced embarking 51 horses at 9.40 a.m., all on board by 10.10 a.m. Of the carts, twenty were put on board in one and a half hours.

The hired transport *France* embarked at Portsmouth, on the 7th of August, the 2nd Battalion of the Highland Light Infantry, 20 officers, 765 non-commissioned officers and men, with 8 officers' chargers, and regimental transport consisting of 30 horses, 5 ponies, 16 mules, and 12 carts. The battalion arrived at 9 a.m., all on board by 10.15 a.m. The animals walked on board and by means of ramp were led down to the horse deck. Commenced embarking them at eleven a.m., animals all on board by 11.45 a.m.; the shipment of the carts, which began at two p.m., was completed by three p.m. At four p.m. commenced embarking 850 boxes of small-arms ammunition, from a lighter brought alongside of the transport; this occupied one hour. Total time employed in the embarkation, eight hours.

The hired transport *British Prince* embarked

* The baggage was put on board by dockyard men.

at Portsmouth, on the 8th of August, D/1 Battery Royal Artillery, 5 officers, 104 non-commissioned officers and men, 151 horses, 6 guns, and 11 waggons; Ordnance Store Corps, 2 officers, 68 non-commissioned officers and men; Post Office Corps, 2 officers and 44 men. The train conveying the men, guns, and waggons drew up on the South Railway Jetty, alongside of the transport at about 8.30 a.m.; the horses were detrained at the Harbour station. Commenced embarking the horses at 11.10 a.m., all on board by 1.30 p.m. Began shipping the guns and waggons at 3.30 p.m., this completed the embarkation by six p.m. Time employed, nine and a half hours.

The hired transport *Persian Monarch* embarked at Portsmouth, on the 1st of September, cavalry drafts, 14 officers, 347 non-commissioned officers and men, and 266 horses. Commenced embarking the horses, 170 aft, at 8.45 a.m., all on board by 11.30 a.m.; 96 horses embarked forward took from 10.40 a.m. to 12.40 p.m. By 1.30 the embarkation had been completed; total time taken, five hours. The ship sailed at 2.30 p.m.

In one of the ordinary embarkations on H.M.S. *Assistance*, a note was taken of the time employed in embarking nine empty general service waggons; these were all put on board in one hour. The shafts, side rails, poles, and hoops were all taken out and placed in the waggon; the four ends of a sling were then made fast to the naves of the wheels; a

grapnel was inserted in the loop of the sling, and the waggon was hoisted by a boom, being kept from swinging by means of a guy rope. It was then brought over the hatchway adjusted parallel to the sides and lowered ; on reaching the deck the sling was removed and the waggon run along the deck to the place reserved for its reception.

The exertions of the officers, petty officers, and seamen, in getting everything on board and stowed away as methodically and speedily as possible, are of the greatest help to the troops. As the soldiers are strange to everything connected with a ship, the work of embarkation would absorb an undue period of time, without the willing and cheerful aid of the officers and crews.

Practice is required in everything. It would be desirable to practise the embarkation and disembarkation like any other manœuvre, but we much doubt if this can be done on a sufficiently large scale on account of the large expenditure involved. For an expeditious embarkation we require above all an experienced staff and a practical method. When these have been forthcoming, the operation has been conducted with credit.

The fitting of the transports and the embarkation can be carried out in the various ports of the kingdom. When circumstances make it necessary the transports can be convoyed to other ports or to the general rendezvous. The place where all are to concentrate for a simultaneous start may be

either on our own coast, or in some commodious bay abroad. For this purpose some place must be selected which has a sufficient acreage and deep water. It is calculated that ten ships 350 feet long and drawing 24 feet of water, moored by their own anchors and allowed to swing to the wind and tide, require one hundred and fifty acres.

A rendezvous of the transports abroad, somewhere close to the point selected for the final disembarkation, has the advantage that it often affords an opportunity for the temporary landing of the men and horses, so that by exercise on shore, after a long voyage, they may regain their proper working condition. This was more necessary in the past, when we could not count on the ships, dependent as they were on the winds and weather, arriving simultaneously at the locality where the operations were to be carried out. The conditions are considerably altered now that the voyage under steam is of much shorter duration.

However valuable this concentration may be for certain purposes, nevertheless, there is always the danger that it may afford a clue to our ultimate intentions. Every possible artifice must be employed to defeat inquisitiveness, and, should more than an ordinary difficulty be experienced in keeping our plans from becoming known, it may be found expedient to proclaim a feigned rendezvous, which will throw spies and secret agents off the scent. Some locality might be designated for the purpose

which might appear to threaten other points more than the one on which we intend to act.

The war with China in 1860 was one of those in which the great distance of the theatre of war made a concentration of the whole force near the enemy's coast absolutely necessary.

The origin of that war was a treacherous attack made on the 25th of June, 1859, on the British and French flotillas, conveying the ambassadors of those two powers to Peking. Admiral Hope then attempted to force the passage of the river Peiho, and suffered severely from the fire of the Chinese forts; three of his gunboats were sunk. The two governments then agreed to despatch an expeditionary corps to enforce the stipulations of their respective treaties, and to avenge the insult inflicted on their national flags.

According to a return signed by the Deputy Adjutant-General, the British force which arrived at Talienwan Bay up to the 9th of July, 1860, comprised 419 officers, 10,491 men, and 1731 horses. It was organized into two divisions, one commanded by Major-General Sir Robert Napier, the other by Major-General Sir John Mitchell. Each division consisted of one company of Royal Engineers, two field batteries, and six infantry battalions. Then there were a cavalry brigade of ten squadrons, one battery of artillery, a mountain battery, a small siege train, and 250 sappers. Sir Hope Grant set down the total of the French troops at 6700 men.

The British contingent, European and Native, came almost entirely from India; our allies were not so favourably circumstanced, and their preparations had to be made at a very much greater distance from the intended theatre of operations. The time required to bring the two forces together can be estimated from the fact that the sailing transports which left Calcutta took on an average twenty-eight days to reach Singapore and fifty-seven to get to Hong Kong. After a long voyage by sea, it was but natural that the allies should desire an opportunity for completing their preparations, and with this object it was arranged to effect a rendezvous in the Gulf of Pechili.

The French established themselves at Chefoo, and the British war-ships and transports* anchored in the Bay of Talien, a point about thirty hours' steaming from the mouth of the Peiho river. Talien is an extensive bay with a small opening to the south-east and affords good anchorage in all weathers. The allied forces were landed and set to work in establishing depôts, hospitals, etc.; in getting their horses in condition, gathering means of transport, and making other necessary arrangements.

Unless the sea is as thoroughly open as it was in 1854-55 and in 1882, the transports cannot proceed singly to the base of operations. And if

* The ships of the Royal Navy, including gun boats, amounted to 70; with these was a fleet of 120 transports.

they move in one mass, they will need an escorting squadron under a flag-officer, who will regulate their movements and maintain discipline. In the latter case the naval officer commanding the escorting squadron issues the orders of sailing, the array to be observed by the transports in lines or divisions—which will generally be made to correspond with the larger tactical units of the army—all changes of destination, dispositions for anchoring, etc.

In September, 1854, the French and Turkish fleets sailed in the following order. On the east the Turkish fleet, consisting of eight ships; in the centre Admiral Bruat's squadron; on the west, or left, the squadron of Admiral Hamelin. With regard to the British, on the evening of the 6th the masters of the transports were called on board of the *Emperor*, when Captain Mends read them their instructions. Each vessel had assigned to it the place it was to occupy. The force left Baljik Bay the following day in five columns, each column was composed of thirty transports. The columns were about half a mile apart, and each one was four or five miles long. The fleet, in single column, sailed on the right.

With ships under steam, the sailing formation can be better kept than with ships under sail, the transports can better preserve their distance from one another, and the whole mass can keep closer together. In short, a steam fleet can be much

more easily and safely conducted across the ocean.

As in a caravan, the speed is regulated by the pace of the slowest animal, so, to keep transports together, the rate of steaming should not exceed that of the slowest vessel.

An embarkation is not always as expeditious an operation as might be desired. In 1854, the first soldiers intended for the Crimea were embarked on the 29th of August; on that day the Brigade of Guards and the Highland Brigade went on board, but the British transports did not sail from Baljik Bay before the 7th of September. When we reflect that the army had been attacked by cholera, we can appreciate the necessity for not keeping the men cooped up in a small space a moment longer than was absolutely obligatory. We may assume that their being kept in this instance, nearly two weeks on board was quite unexpected. Though the weather had favoured the enterprise, and the distance between Baljik and Eupatoria was not more than two hundred and forty miles, the transit across the Black Sea was very slow. The rate of speed was not above four and a half knots per hour. It could barely have been otherwise with steamers having to tow heavily-laden sailing ships.

Marshal St. Arnaud, chafing at the delay of the British in completing their preparations (principally caused by the embarkation of the cavalry being stopped by a troubled sea and heavy swell) had

sailed on the 5th. On the 8th he was overtaken by the British ships under steam. The British fleet and convoy were anchored at the rendezvous on the 9th; the French and Turkish convoys were anchored within thirty miles of them by the evening of the 11th. The landing only commenced in the early morning of the 14th.

If the adversary's fleet is likely in any way to interfere with the movements of the armada, it will be necessary to afford the latter the protection of a convoying squadron. From what we are able to gather from naval experts who have written on the subject, the aim of this squadron is to search for the enemy, and, by defeating him at sea, to remove any impediments that might stand in the way of the expedition reaching the intended theatre of operations. Interference can be best forestalled by boldly confronting the enemy, and not keeping too close to the mass of transports.

In quite recent times we have an example of this. In the Chino-Japanese war, Admiral Ito convoyed Marshal Yamagata's force to Chemulpho. His look-out ships and advanced squadron covered the main body of the fleet, which was concentrated and kept ready to repel any hostile demonstration.

CHAPTER IX.

SELECTION OF A SUITABLE LOCALITY FOR LANDING.

The country where a landing has to be effected is determined by the Cabinet—Secondary points to be ascertained by personal observation—Brueys reconnoitres the landing-places at Malta—All possible alternatives to be examined—A knowledge of the coast is essential—Good anchorage near the shore indispensable—Measures for obtaining information as to local obstructions—Considerations which may influence the choice of a landing-place—Ports, harbours, and open coast—Influence of the weather—Some cases in which rough weather prevented a landing—Knowledge of the prevailing winds at certain seasons of the year indispensable—Sir Arthur Wellesley's landing at the mouth of the Mondego—Sir John Moore's landing at Maceira—Landing in the Crimea—Landing in China, in 1860—Description of Peh-tang—Abyssinian expedition—Committee sent to examine the coast—Reasons for its recommending Zula—The reconnaissance to take into account the peculiarities of the climate—Natural difficulties at Peh-tang, and at Sfax—Localities favourable for a disembarkation.

As the object of a military expedition must always depend on the political aims and obligations of the Government, the country in which a landing is to be made, and the nature of the subsequent operations, are matters to be determined by the Cabinet. When the tension between two states becomes such as to indicate the prospect of having at no distant

date to resort to hostilities, the Government will naturally call on the Great General Staff to supply all the information it possesses, with regard to the power and country of the possible enemy.

However valuable this information may be, there will always be many secondary points on which information must be ascertained by personal observation. During the crisis, it may often be possible to send officers or confidential agents, men of tact and knowledge, to conduct secret inquiries; however, the suspicion and distrust which strangers are sure to draw on themselves at such a time will make their task a difficult one.

Previously to the capture of Malta by Bonaparte in 1798, Rear-admiral Brueys, on his way to Toulon from the Adriatic, sent one of his ships to Malta on pretence of getting repaired. In reality Brueys had received orders to surprise the place, where de Poussielgue had been endeavouring to form a party favourable to France. Considering the enterprise too risky, the Admiral concealed all hostile designs; nevertheless, during their sojourn in the neighbourhood, the French took soundings all round the island, and ascertained precisely every spot where it was possible to effect a landing.*

Once the Ministry have determined the preliminary points of the enterprise, the chiefs of the naval and military services will have to be invited to submit their views as to the most promising

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 151.

locality for disembarkation. There will possibly be several alternatives ; these must be very carefully examined, so as to select the one which appears best adapted for the purpose, and which is likely to yield the best results.

Throwing a large body of troops ashore in a foreign country requires a preliminary knowledge of the coast. The charts and nautical works referring to a particular coast will furnish much information with regard to the rise and fall of the tide, the obstructions in the way of reefs and rocks, the description of the shore, the depth of water, and the general nature of the anchorage. Notwithstanding all this, a careful reconnaissance will have to be made in most instances to ascertain the comparative merits of the various places deemed suitable for a disembarkation.

However promising a certain locality may be for the commencement of the land operations, it cannot be considered well adapted for a large landing unless it has good anchorage. It is highly important to know what is the exact nature of the anchor-ground, and at what distance from the shore deep water is to be found. A good anchor-ground requires a combination of favourable circumstances, and is of great consequence now that steam transports, being of much larger tonnage, draw more water than the smaller ships of former times.

With the great progress made in cartography and naval hydrography, with the large number of

geographical works and records of travels, with the special staff at the headquarters of the armies, whose business it is to acquire all possible information about foreign countries and to prepare schemes for war, we may with good reason presume that the difficulties heretofore experienced in ascertaining the strength of any place to be attacked, and the most suitable localities in which a landing might be attempted on a hostile coast, have considerably diminished. To ascertain beyond doubt that the navigation close to the shore has not been rendered dangerous by the establishment of submarine mines, and to gain some insight into any special defences which may have been improvised on any special part of the coast, there is no other course open but to employ spies, or to capture some intelligent individual who may be induced to supply important local information.

The character of the coast and the nature of the country thereabout are not the only points which will influence the choice of the landing-place. The selection must further be guided by the direction of the roads and the difficulties which lie along them, by the productiveness of certain provinces and the probability of being able to turn their richness to account in maintaining the invading army, and by the prospect of securing a railway line of supply. At times political reasons may make it imperative to forego the most advantageous spot in order to land in a part of the enemy's territory where we expect

to meet with the friendship, and possibly even with the co-operation, of the inhabitants.

We have an instance in early history of a reconnaissance of the most suitable landing-places. Cæsar, not being able to learn from the Gauls what he much desired to know of the nature of the coast, harbours, and landing-places in Britain, and of the warlike spirit of the inhabitants, sent C. Volusenus with a galley to acquire some knowledge on these points. The words used in the records of the operations would appear to indicate that this reconnaissance must have been somewhat superficial. It is written that Volusenus, having taken a view of the country, as far as it was possible for one who had resolved not to quit his ship or trust himself in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted Cæsar with his discoveries.

Of the places where a disembarkation can be carried into effect, first in order come regular ports or harbours, secondly sheltered bays, thirdly the open beach.

Ports and harbours, being places which are constantly visited by men-of-war and merchant ships, are more or less well known, and the same may be said, though to a lesser extent, of the principal bays, where ships often seek refuge in boisterous weather. If the beach is the only possible place for landing, its extent must be ascertained by a reconnaissance, so as to gain an idea

of the number of troops which can be landed at one time. We must also determine the positions which the troops first put ashore should seize, so as to cover the disembarkation of the main body, stores, materials, provisions, etc., or which, on the other hand, the defenders might occupy to resist the landing.

The weather has immense consequences in expeditions across the seas. To have large transports propelled by steam is a great advantage, but the landing on the beach must be carried out in boats, and here the conditions as to weather have nowise changed. Bad weather generally creates most vexatious delays when it is required to land on the open coast; delays which are invaluable to the enemy.

The landing on the island of Belleisle, in 1761, was delayed by weather for fourteen days. In 1758 and in 1801 Generals Amherst and Abercrombie reconnoitred the shore in person. In both cases the roughness of the sea delayed the landing of the troops for several days, during which the French had time to make their dispositions for meeting the attack. With reference to Sir Ralph Abercrombie's landing at Aboukir, Sir Robert Wilson states that "all the pilots accustomed to the Egyptian coast declared that till after the equinox it would be madness to attempt a landing."* Mr.

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 6.

Baldwin, in his account of the operations, shows how it was this point that led to the unreadiness of the Turks in co-operating with the British force. He denies that it was because the British fleet arrived at Marmorice at an earlier period than was expected. "The truth was, that they were astonished at the conduct of the British commanders, in venturing such a fleet and army in those tempestuous seas at this season of the year; nor could they suppose it possible that the British force would be able to effect a landing in any part of Egypt till the equinox was past."

In 1796 bad weather in Bantry Bay made it impossible for the French to put their troops ashore. In the expedition to Holland, 1799, while the gunboats and smaller vessels were getting ready on the 22nd of August to receive the troops, the wind shifted to the south-west. The transports had to weigh anchor and stand off from the land. It blew very hard for the two following days and nights, and the landing could not be effected till the 27th.*

It is very remarkable, as the subsequent chapters will show, that in most instances in which a smooth sea was highly desirable, a heavy swell or unfavourable winds should have made the operation of landing dangerous.

A knowledge of the prevailing winds at the various seasons of the year is indispensable, for

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 307.

boisterous weather will not only hinder the disembarkation, but may compel the transports to quit the coast. Steamers have a great advantage over sailing ships, inasmuch as they are not subject to helpless drifting during the continuance of a gale, can get up steam and put to sea. Of this there is a brilliant instance in H.M.S. *Calliope*, which Captain Henry C. Kane saved by taking out to sea in the disastrous hurricane at Samoa on the 15th of March, 1889.

The ship's barometer gave due warning of the approaching storm, but no one could foretell that it would be more severe than usual. The hurricane burst before the ships could escape from the insecure anchorage at Apia. Seven foreign warships in the harbour were driven ashore; but the *Calliope* steamed out in the face of the storm and was saved. The crews of the other ships cheered as she passed, paying, in Mr. Goschen's words, a tribute to the finest piece of seamanship they had seen.

In our days the instruments for foretelling the changes of the weather and atmospheric disturbances have undergone such a marked improvement, that there is less risk of being taken quite unawares. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have some guarantee that, in the ordinary course of things, a large number of ships may ride at anchor in safety at a given period of the year. Local experience is the best guide on this point.

The project of effecting a descent at the mouth of the Tagus in 1808 was deemed inexpedient, if not impracticable, owing to the bar at the mouth of the river, the strength of the French, and the disposition of the forts. It consequently became necessary to look out for some place north of Lisbon where the landing could be effected with better prospects of success. This, nevertheless, was no easy matter, owing to the rugged and dangerous nature of the coast from the Tagus to the Minho, and to the bars at the mouth of all the river harbours. The possibility of the fleet being able to remain even for a brief space of time on that dangerous offing had to be taken into consideration.

The place Sir Arthur Wellesley finally selected for the landing was the Mondego river, the free entrance to which was secured by the little fort of Figueras, which was at that time held by a detachment of British marines. Though the weather in this instance was favourable, the disembarkation of the British force, which commenced on the 1st of August, was not completed before the 5th. It may seem strange that the landing of such a small force—for the troops amounted to 8688 infantry, 349 cavalry, and 357 artillery—should have required three days. It is not, however, the placing of the troops ashore that constitutes the difficulty, it is the landing of the horses, of the transport animals, of the equipment, materials, and provisions, which

demands time, and if the conveniences are, as in this case, wanting, the operation cannot but be slow.

Looking at the probability of the insurgents deserting him in the hour of danger, Sir Arthur refused to separate himself from his ships. He had to hold to the coast for ship supplies, to avoid detailing detachments of his small force for the protection of magazines on shore, and to be in a position to cover the landing of any reinforcements.* It was only after the occupation of Lisbon, consequent on the convention of Cintra, that the British obtained a safe base of operations.

The army was unable to move until the 9th of August, owing to the defective state of the commissariat department, of which Wellesley wrote to Lord Castlereagh, "The existence of the army depends upon it, and yet the people who manage it are incapable of managing anything out of a counting-house."†

Something has been said regarding the dangerous nature of the Portuguese coast. At Maceira, where Sir John Moore effected his disembarkation, great difficulty was experienced in getting the troops ashore, and some loss of life ensued. The operations

* "I have commenced my landing, which will not be completed, on account of the difficulties of this iron coast, till either Spencer or the English reinforcements shall arrive."—Sir Arthur Wellesley to the Duke of Richmond, H.M.S. *Donegal*, off the Mondego, 1st August, 1808.

† Wellington's letter to Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

entailed five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy; the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and at the conclusion of the disembarkation it was found that no more than thirty were fit for further service.

The Crimean War offers considerable instruction on many points connected with military expeditions by sea, and on the manner of conducting a disembarkation on a hostile coast. The landing in Kalamita Bay was the largest which has occurred for a very long period of years, and of which we have a good record.

The French and English Governments having rejected the alternative of carrying the war beyond the Danube, decided to transfer the seat of operations to the Crimean peninsula. In conformity with their orders, the allied commanders had to make arrangements for ferrying across the Black Sea the two armies and a small contingent of Turkish infantry.

Crimean Tartary was a country about which little was known, and the principal concern was to choose some part of the coast where the landing could be easily effected. It had been ascertained that the Russian Black Sea fleet had retired within the harbour of Sebastopol, and it was presumed that there was no prospect of the allies being exposed to an attack whilst on their voyage across the Euxine. Our men-of-war experienced no hindrance in carrying out a reconnaissance of the


coast; at first H.M.S. *Fury* was sent to reconnoitre and report on the most suitable places for landing an army on the north of Sebastopol. The ship went so close to the shore that it became possible to make a very comprehensive survey.* Later on, H.M.Ss. *Agamemnon*, *Sampson*, and *Caradoc*, in company with a French war steamer, reconnoitred the coast and sought for a landing-place. Lord Raglan, who was on board of the *Caradoc*, examined the coast from Balaclava to Eupatoria, and after what he saw chose as the landing-place for the allied armies the stretch of beach near Old Fort in the Bay of Eupatoria.†

Marshal de Saint Arnaud, in his journal, under date of the 11th of September, writes: "I would have preferred a landing *de vive force* on the Katcha, nearer to Sebastopol. I dread the five leagues we have to march before coming to water. . . . Nevertheless, I give in; the disembarkation will be effected at Old Fort."

As will be seen later on, the attention of the Horse Guards had been directed to the smooth water anchorage and landing facilities which existed in the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch. The landing on the open beach, with all its dangers from bad weather and surf, was preferred to a safer locality. Who can tell but that the vicinity of these bays to the town may not have induced Lord

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 125.

† Ibid., pp. 156-158.



Raglan to consider a landing in either of them too risky an affair?

The landing-places secured by the French and English in the vicinity of Eupatoria were well chosen. Both of them were on shores which allowed the near approach of the fleets, and would have enabled them, had the necessity arisen, to cover the disembarkation with their guns. After the landing, both fronts were covered by the inland salt lakes, and access to the flanks was by narrow strips of land which could be easily defended.

The landing of the French and English in China in 1860 offers several points of striking interest with regard to the selection of the landing-place.

On the 26th of July all the ships in the Gulf of Pechili weighed anchor and started with a fair wind. "The ships were in long lines, one vessel behind the other, with a man-of-war leading each line, Admiral Jones' ship, the *Imperatrice*, keeping on the right flank, and superintending the whole arrangements." *

In the China War the French General, owing to his seniority, was supreme over both the land and sea services. On the question of attacking the defences of the Peiho, General de Montauban, who had taken quite a different view from that held by Sir Hope Grant and Rear-admiral Hope, proposed

* "Narrative of the War with China in 1860," by Lieut-Colonel Wolseley, p. 84.

to land his forces separately at Chi-Kiang-ho, twenty miles south of the Peiho. The British chiefs had selected Peh-tang, ten miles north of that river, as their place of disembarkation. After this had been agreed to, the arrangement had to be given up, as the difficulties of landing guns, stores, provisions, etc., owing to the shallowness of the water, appeared to the French to be too great. It was finally settled that both forces should effect their landing at Peh-tang.

Sang-ko-lin-sin had, in fact, foreseen that the allies would land there, but, as it appeared to him a very difficult undertaking, he had taken no steps to prevent their doing so.

The position of Peh-tang is one of considerable strength, for the country for two miles round the town is more or less covered by the tide. The only approach from the land side is by a causeway, three miles long and twelve feet broad, raised about two feet above high-water level. The Peh-tang-ho is about three hundred yards wide, and its entrance was defended by two mud forts. The one on the right bank of the river was pierced with thirteen embrasures, the one on the left with eleven. These forts, standing about three miles from the mouth of the river, were badly built; but had the Chinese strengthened their defences and closed the mouth of the river with a boom or with stakes, as was done at the Peiho, the capture of the forts would have been a matter of some difficulty, as the

ground in front of them was nothing but sticky mud.

On the 30th of July, the whole fleet made for the shore, and anchored about nine miles from Peh-tang. Orders were issued for landing the next morning; but this operation had to be postponed till the following day, as it grew very rough during the night.

The landing party was furnished by the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, with a nine-pounder battery and a rocket battery. The troops detailed by the French for this purpose were the 101st and 102nd of the line, a battalion of the Chasseurs, a few mounted troopers, and some rifled cannon.

The depth of water over the bar in the Peh-tang-ho proved to be only thirteen feet, and at low tide only three feet, in consequence of which large vessels could not cross. The Admiral therefore determined to put the troops in men-of-war boats, which were to be towed by gun-boats. At nine a.m. the signal was made for the boats to pull off to the various transports, and, about noon, all were loaded with the assigned number of men—fifty in each—and ready to start. Each gun-boat held a number of troops, and towed six launches; the whole crossed the bar, and about 2 p.m. cast anchor a little over a mile from the forts. A careful survey of the position was made, and beyond the town was seen a wooden gate and bridge leading to a causeway, which seemed to stretch to the Peiho.

At 4.30 p.m., two hundred men of the 2nd (Queen's) and two hundred French set off and landed about one and a half miles east of Peh-tang. The party waded ashore up to their knees in water for half a mile, and had then to struggle through sticky mud for four or five hundred yards, until a hard surface of mud was reached.

By six o'clock the rest of the Brigade was ashore, and towards evening pushed on in the direction of the causeway. It had been arranged that the British were to form on the right, the French on the left; the order of advance of the former was 60th Rifles on the right, 15th Punjaubers in the centre, and 2nd (Queen's) on the left. The brigade suddenly came on a broad ditch, forty feet wide, through which the tide flowed; the troops plunged in up to the middle in the most foul slush, and in a few seconds the whole were on the causeway. There they bivouacked, and during the night it was ascertained that the Chinese troops had evacuated the town.

Peh-tang, which became the first base of operations, was a town of about twenty-five thousand souls, and contained many excellent houses, evidently owned by the most wealthy merchants; large quantities of grain and fodder were found. The disembarkation of the main body, stores, and war materials continued during the first ten days of August. The wharves were of the rudest description, and it became necessary to construct

others. Fortunately the precaution had been taken of bringing from Hong-Kong some yards of wooden wharfing ready for use.

The ground all round Peh-tang being covered with water at high tide, the men of both armies had to be lodged in the town. We borrow Sir Hope Grant's own words to show what risks the allies were exposed to: "The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and, had we not been protected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not much more than five hundred yards square, and in it were crowded eleven thousand of our men, exclusive of the French force, amounting to above six thousand seven hundred men, and about four thousand of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched, fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking, in fact, all the accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm, the weather became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a spark fallen on one of them, it is difficult to say what would have been the result. Probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have been destroyed; and many of the men would have been unable to effect their escape out of the narrow, thickly-thronged lanes. At length heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened; but the streets became almost

impassable from the mud, filth, and dead animals. These latter seemed to cling to us persistently ; for, when thrown into the river, the returning tide cast them back on to the bank, where they decomposed in the sun, creating a horrible stench. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the pestilential nature of the place, our troops, wonderful to say, never enjoyed better health. During the whole period of our occupation we had not above one and a half per cent. sick. The French likewise were remarkably healthy." *

The collection of such a large number of men and animals in a town more or less surrounded by the tide caused some difficulty in the matter of drinking-water and fuel. Good water was found at first in large jars, but was wasted by the soldiers. A condensing-ship, however, was soon at work in the river, and supplied forty tons daily ; besides this, two large water-boats brought fresh water down from a point of the Peh-tang-ho, situated six or eight miles above the town. To meet the difficulty of obtaining fuel, the furniture, rafters, doors, windows, etc., had all to be turned to account.

In the land operations which followed, the first encounter with the Chinese occurred on the 12th of August, when they were driven out of Sinho, the allies bivouacking there for the night. The

* "Incidents in the China War of 1860," Sir Hope Grant's private journals, compiled by Colonel H. Knollys, R.A., p. 58.

entrenchment round Tanku, on the banks of the Peiho, was carried on the 14th, after which preparations were made for the attack of the Taku forts.

In Chapter V. allusion has been made to a difference of opinion as to the front to be attacked. On the 21st of August the northern forts were stormed and captured, after which Hang-foo, the Governor-General of the province, agreed to surrender all the remaining forts with their guns and military stores. On the 23rd, Admiral Hope's gunboats were masters of the river as far as Tien-tsin, sixty miles beyond Taku.

In 1867 the British Government determined to send a force under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier to Abyssinia, to rescue the British subjects detained in captivity by the Negus Theodore.

The main difficulties of this expedition were, the very limited knowledge of the theatre of operations; the great distance of the objective, as Magdala was situated three hundred and eighty miles from the sea; the poorness of the country, which entailed everything in the way of stores, provisions, etc., being brought up from the base; the inferior nature of the roads, which, being quite unadapted for wheel traffic, necessitated the employment of a pack transport of unusual dimensions; and the great scarcity of forage for feeding thousands of animals. To all these difficulties must be added the necessity of completing the operations

with the utmost possible despatch, so that the troops might be withdrawn from the highlands before the heavy rains set in.

At that time the country of Abyssinia was only known to us through the description of a few travellers; it consequently became necessary to make a careful study of the coast and routes leading to the stronghold of Magdala. A combined committee of naval and military officers was directed to conduct a reconnaissance, to examine the coast country, and to determine from personal observation which was the most suitable locality for a base of operations to be established.

The officers intrusted with this duty recommended Zula in Annesley Bay for the following pertinent reasons :—The vicinity of the most direct route by the Kumayli defile to the Abyssinian highlands; a large extent of ground suitable for encamping, with fresh water close to the shore; a good safe anchorage for any number of vessels of large size, the roadstead being almost completely land-locked and sheltered by several islands from heavy seas during the northerly gales.

The reconnaissance will not be complete unless its inquiries extend to the peculiarities of the climate at the various seasons of the year, for should the operations continue longer than was originally calculated, the troops may find themselves exposed to tropical rains and very cold weather. This knowledge will enable the Government to make

special provision in time to insure their health and comfort.

The nature of the climate in the Walcheren might have been easily ascertained. The existence of periodical fevers in the low-lying swamps at the mouth of the Scheldt indicated that the season was most unfavourable for military operations. Some foreknowledge of the rigorous winters experienced in the Crimean peninsula might have saved the British troops from much suffering in the winter of 1854-55. In Ashantee, 1873-74, the climate was known to be bad for Europeans, but the period of the year when sickness was less likely to attack the troops was chosen. The British troops arrived on the coast in the month of December, and by the end of the following March were all back in England.

It may be thought that an attentive study of a reliable map will be sufficient to reveal the best locality for effecting a landing, it is nevertheless always prudent to verify this by personal inspection. When the allies landed near Peh-tang in August, 1860, the condition of the shore does not appear to have been ascertained by a preliminary reconnaissance. In the disembarkation at Sfax, near Tunis, in 1881, the French had ascertained that the shallowness of the water near the shore offered serious impediments to a landing. The steam launches and large boats could not approach nearer than from 330 to 440 yards, and the bottom—deep

soft mud—precluded the men from wading ashore. This knowledge set them to devise some special means whereby they could land their troops dry-shod.

The selection of the locality best suited for the landing of an expeditionary corps is governed by many considerations, some of which can only be taken into account at the time. It is nevertheless laid down as a general rule that no place is well adapted for it when, from the configuration of the coast, the guns of the fleet cannot cover the landing of the troops.

Shallow shores, when not commanded by any defensive works, are favourable for a disembarkation, on account of the large number of men which can be put on land at one time. For miles along most coasts there are open beaches where troops can land on a broad front. Favourable places for the disembarkation of a considerable force are found at the mouths of rivers. Necks of land stretching out into the sea are good, above all when they are narrow so that the troops can rest both flanks on the sea with their front swept by the guns of the fleet. As an example of this may be cited the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruck, where the French landed in 1830. A level stretch of country surrounded by a semicircle of low hills—all other circumstances being favourable—would be well suited for a landing-place, for the crests of the hills could be occupied and strengthened by the first troops put

assure this protecting and conserving the best
 protection of the rest and in the same way do
 and provisions.

Looking at the measures which the enemy is
 likely to take to safeguard all those points which
 lend themselves to a dismemberment, an officer
 may find it preferable to let the chance fall on one
 which, though not the most desirable to the pur-
 pose, has been overlooked. As the intentions may
 not have assigned to it sufficient importance, and
 may not have calculated on the possibility of the
 adversary selecting such a locality, they will not be
 prepared to make a vigorous resistance, but will
 be surprised.

CHAPTER X.

THE LANDING.

Landing effected in a friendly country—Orderly array of the transports—Division of the expeditionary force—Sequence of action of the three arms—Detachments to go ashore with the first landing party—Horses need time to recover the effects of a sea voyage—Provision for the wounded—Orders for landing—Water reserve—Need for an adequate number of boats—Each transport to carry a sufficient number—Additional crews very desirable—Sir William Mends on the working of the boats—Rafts used by the French at Sfax—Horse boats and rafts—Special boats constructed in 1854 for landing artillery—Landing in Egypt and in the Crimea—Swimming horses ashore—Steam launches—Boats to advance on a wide front—Surf boats—Accommodation ladders—The arrangements for boats to be placed in the hands of a naval officer—Subdivision of the force for landing—The embarkation and landing to be rehearsed when an opportunity occurs—Demeanour of the troops in the boats—Landing stores, provisions, etc.—A conciliating policy to be observed.

THE disembarkation of a large force may be effected under essentially different conditions. In some, as would be the case when the landing is carried out in a friendly country whose ports are not closed to our vessels, the preliminary arrangements for getting everything quickly ashore can be made beforehand. In others, in which a descent is conducted on a hostile country, our measures are entirely dependent

on existing circumstances and admit of no previous preparation.

In the first case, should the locality destined for the disembarkation be at a reasonable distance from our shores, the troops can be despatched by divisions. The transports which have conveyed the first division would then return for the second, and continue to go backwards and forwards till the whole of the expeditionary force was over. It would be unnecessary in such a case to appoint a rendezvous for the flotilla, and, if there is no prospect of being molested, we might well dispense with a convoying squadron.

Leaving on one side those cases in which the disembarkation can be effected in a commodious harbour, well furnished with wharves, with plenty of manual labour and appliances, we shall devote our attention in this chapter to the best measures for a landing on the open shore. The general dispositions for such an operation, whether the enemy contests the landing or not, are nearly the same; we shall, therefore, deal simply with the operation of landing, leaving for a future chapter the consideration of the special arrangements that require to be made when a disembarkation is only too plainly the prelude of an assault.

An expeditious landing, the sea and weather being good, is simply a matter of good arrangements. As we can generally count on the eagerness of the troops to get ashore, we can be sure that there

will be no other delays than those which are inherent to the intricacy of the operation.


Anchoring a large convoy is a process which demands very careful attention, for without an orderly disposition of the transports it will be impossible to impart the necessary rapidity to the landing. As it would be inconvenient to allow them to occupy too great an extent of front, they are generally anchored in several parallel lines; the ships in each line as a rule being made to contain one of the large tactical units of the army.

In Kalamita Bay the front extended over nine miles. The transports with the British troops were drawn up in six parallel lines, in the following order—light division, first division, second division, third division, fourth division, cavalry division. The French anchored in three lines. The first, composed of war-ships, held the 1st division; in the second line was the 2nd division; in the last the 3rd division. A distinctive flag was assigned to each division; red for the first, white for the second, blue for the third. When proceeding to land, the leading boats carried at the bows flags of the colour of the division they were conveying, and others were ordered to be planted on shore where each division was to land; the brigades were ordered to form, the first to the south, the second to the north of their respective flags.

Large vessels in line should not be at less than two cables' distance apart. On these data, and

preparatory to a Disembarkation.


White.



3, *Red.*



Blue.



VZ-22-...

3rd. The troops and everything else which will not be required on shore until the landing-place is unquestionably in our hands.

One of the main points to consider in making dispositions for the landing is the sequence in which the troops should be put ashore. Infantry being the best arm for seizing and holding the landing-place, must necessarily play the most prominent *rôle* at this period. It will receive what aid it may require to overcome the enemy on shore, from the fire of the fleet and of the armed boats which will be specially detailed to clear the way for the first dash ashore.

Putting infantry into boats and landing it is not a very difficult operation; the same facility does not, however, apply to horses and gun carriages, which are not only difficult to put on shore, but are still more difficult to re-embark should the attempt to land turn out unsuccessful. Desirable as it may be to land some field artillery conjointly with the infantry, the difficulty of landing the teams must always be taken into consideration. Guns, however, can be landed if a party of soldiers or blue-jackets—as obtained in the landing at Aboukir—is detailed to drag them in the first stage of the operations.

When field guns are landed, a supply of two-inch planks should be taken in each boat for the wheels of the guns and carriages to run over; this will prevent their sinking in the sand.

With regard to carriages, an exception might be

made in favour of the small-arms ammunition and intrenching tool carts, which would in all probability be landed with their respective corps.

With the first troops despatched ashore should be one or more companies of the Royal Engineers ; these will come in useful in strengthening any promising or important position, clearing obstacles, etc. ; also, a party of seamen, furnished with a portable semaphore or other signalling apparatus, with the object of establishing communication at once between the shore and the officers who direct the disembarkation.

A beach party of seamen will render great service in hauling in the boats, in assisting to launch those that are emptied, and in drawing guns and waggons from the boats to shore.

Whether to forestall the enemy at any point, to use in scouting and gaining intelligence of his movements, to make requisitions, to damage railway and telegraph lines, or to screen the position of the landed force, cavalry will be most useful. That arm, however, can rarely be employed in the first struggle on shore, and as long as the issue is in the least way doubtful, it would be highly imprudent to land it in any quantity. All that should be done is to disembark a few squadrons for scouting and reconnoitring, when the enemy maintains an attitude of observation, and does not actually resist the landing.

The disembarkation of the cavalry is generally

put back until the mass of the infantry has been landed. This is because of the longer and more intricate nature of the operation, which is likely to have to be suspended if the sea is at all agitated.

There are two important reasons, nevertheless, why the disembarkation of horses should not be unnecessarily deferred ; first, because as soon as the transports cease moving the horse decks become very hot, and the want of sufficient ventilation causes much distress to the animals ; secondly, because if the voyage has been a long one, their limbs become stiff, and a certain time will be needed before they can be put to work.

It will always be an advantage if at a short steaming distance from the intended point of disembarkation some place can be found where, after a long voyage, horses and transport animals can be landed and exercised. It has been shown in Chapter VIII. how this point was not overlooked in the China War of 1860. Talien Bay, the rendezvous of the expeditionary force, where the horses were landed, was only some hours' sailing from Peh-tang.

In the Egyptian War, 1882, the 4th Dragoon Guards finished landing at Ismailia on the 25th of August, at 1.30 a.m. At 3 a.m. the same day the regiment marched to Mahsameh, 18½ miles, took part in an engagement, and returned to Tel-el-Mahuta, 7½ miles, where the men dismounted at

3 p.m. and bivouacked. On that day the regiment lost thirty-eight horses, which dropped dead from fatigue; there was no forage. The horses of the 4th Dragoon Guards never recovered from the effects of the strain put on them immediately after landing, many died of exhaustion after the conclusion of the campaign, many more on the voyage home.

Of the administrative services, when there is a chance of opposition, the medical is the only one that will have to be brought into action. If there is any prospect of the disembarkation being contested, provision for at least ten per cent. of wounded should be made. A proportion of boats with medical staff, bearer company, and materials for forming a dressing station, must be kept ready. The time for their landing can only be determined by the success of the troops.

As the beach must be kept clear of incumbrances, the injured must be removed as soon as practicable; a service of boats will therefore have to be organized for transferring the wounded to the floating hospitals.

A printed copy of the instructions regarding the sailing formation, position of the transports at anchor, and general arrangements for the disembarkation, should be furnished to the naval transport officer on board of each hired ship. The orders for the landing should be framed with great forethought, no detail, however trifling, should be overlooked.

As exceptional operations seldom form a subject of deep study, we shall proceed, regardless of being considered tedious, to indicate some of the principal points.

It is presumed that, previous to the serious business of the disembarkation, arrangements have been made for all men unfit for duty through sickness to be transferred to one of the hospital ships.

The troops detailed to make the first dash ashore and those intended for their support should land in the lightest possible order, and a distinction should be drawn between the articles absolutely necessary to carry out the operations and those which can be dispensed with till a later period. The latter will comprise the regimental transport, the camp equipage, and stores. An officer with the non-combatant staff and drivers will remain on board to look after all these until the time comes when they should be landed.

All that relates to the amount of ammunition, to the quantity of rations, and to the articles of kit which each soldier should take ashore, should be distinctly laid down. There should be no possible mistake in this.

In landing in the Crimea the men carried no knapsacks, but each had a great-coat, a blanket containing a pair of boots, a pair of socks, and a forage cap, fifty rounds of ammunition, and three days' rations. No tents were landed the first day, and the bivouac in drenching rain was trying.

In like manner when horses are landed the amount of grain to be carried for each animal should be specified. Both men and animals, if possible, should have a substantial meal before leaving the transports. This is a wise precaution, for who can foretell what may follow? The saying is too true that a fasting body makes but a faint heart in man or beast.

It being impossible to count on the continuance of calm weather, the troops should be made independent of all other aid for two or more days. In landing in the Crimea the roughness of the sea interfered with the disembarkation for nearly forty-eight hours. This possibility was kept in view when about to land in China, in 1860. On that occasion the British gunboats towed from the Gulf of Pechili a number of Chinese junks, holding ten days' provisions for the whole army. It was intended that these junks should accompany the landing forces to shore, a matter of no material difficulty, as they did not draw more than a few feet of water.

As the soldier is very careless about economizing his rations, regimental officers should be enjoined in general orders to give their personal attention to this point, and to remind their men how for a stated time they will have entirely to depend on the issue which has been made to them.

Though as a standing rule the water-bottles will be filled before the troops quit their transports, this

portion is extremely small, and it will be indispensable to have a reserve supply at hand. In landing at Aboukir, some difficulty was expected in procuring drinking-water; arrangements were consequently made to carry a certain quantity ashore. On landing in the Crimea, the water was found to be brackish; drinking-water was only to be procured at a distance of over four miles from the camp. On the night which followed the landing of the allies near Peh-tang, the troops were troubled by thirst, and the water-bottles which had been ordered to be filled before setting out were empty. The trudge back to the boats for water was a painful effort, still it had to be done. In this instance the precaution of taking beakers ashore had been observed, but no fatigue party had been told off to bring them up to the troops.

The water reserve can be placed in charge of the regimental quartermaster, with a squad of men to take the beakers where most wanted. Possibly no difficulty may be experienced in landing the small-arms ammunition and intrenching tool-carts; but, should this not be practicable, the same officer could be put in charge of the reserve ammunition and tools.

To carry out the disembarkation of a large force on the open beach, there must be an ample number of boats. With these and a good system—given that the sea is not agitated—the troops can be speedily transferred to land. In the expedition to

Algeria (1830), the French had two hundred and thirty boats specially provided for landing purposes, and were able to disembark forty-one thousand men in two days.

At the time when this expedition was being discussed, one of the members of the committee appointed to look into the question—apropos of a plan submitted by Captain Dupetit-Thouars—asked, “Is it possible to land twelve thousand men in one day?” The captain replied, “I have witnessed Lord Cochrane, who had not the honour of commanding the French navy, effect with the Brazilian navy a disembarkation of eighteen thousand men in five hours.” This reply silenced all objections.

For the landing of the British forces in the Crimea three hundred and twenty-six boats and twenty-four horse and gun flats had been provided. Owing to this measure and to the excellent arrangements made by Captain Mends, R.N., in eleven hours—from seven a.m. to six p.m. on the 14th of September—all the infantry divisions and twenty-four guns were put ashore. The French landed in the same day their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd infantry divisions, with eighteen guns. The arrangements on the side of the British contemplated landing in each trip six thousand four hundred infantry, twelve guns, and all the horses of the necessary staff. At nightfall the weather became bad, and the operation had to be suspended.

We may as well notice certain discrepancies

in the narratives of the expedition to the Crimea. Sir William Mends states that between seven a.m. and six p.m. of the 14th of September thirty thousand men and twenty-four guns were landed. The *Times* correspondent, on the other hand, related that the French commenced landing shortly after eight in the morning, and that about nine a.m. a gun was fired from the *Agamemnon* to enforce attention to the signal, "Divisions of boats to assemble round ships for which they are told off, to disembark infantry and artillery." Another writer in *Letters from Head-Quarters* states: "Sir George Brown and General Airey and staff were the first English on shore; half a minute afterwards a boat load of the 7th Fusileers landed. It was then twenty minutes to ten a.m." Sir William Mends, again, has stated that at nightfall on the 14th of September the weather became bad, and the operation of landing had to be suspended, nevertheless a naval officer who took part in it asserts that the crews of the men-of-war were busy landing troops and stores till 11.30 that night. We have only alluded to these diversities to show how difficult it often is to gather from several narratives a thoroughly accurate account of certain events.

When a convoy is protected by a fleet, the men-of-war boats may come in useful in putting the troops ashore. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that, as the fleet may be called upon to open

fire on the defenders, it would impair its efficiency at an important moment to withdraw a number of blue-jackets to forward the landing of the army. With greater reason, no aid can be fairly expected from the fleet as long as it has to keep guard and prevent any interference with the landing. All this shows how desirable it is to make the transports entirely independent of this aid, and to rule that each one shall be furnished with sufficient boats for disembarking all that it conveys.

In the expedition for the capture of Quebec, the transports, independently of their own boats, were provided by Government with flat-bottomed boats, whale-boats and cutters. We read that orders were issued for the flat-bottomed boats to be washed every day, to prevent their leaking.

In the preparations for the expedition to Persia in 1856, this point of a sufficiency of boats appears to have been overlooked; or, what is more probable, it was hoped to find on the spot a sufficient number of Arab boats for landing the artillery and the horses. None were forthcoming, and the disembarkation was considerably retarded.

Some few years ago this question was studied, and from the surveys of a number of mercantile steamships, conducted by the Transport Department of the Admiralty, or actually hired, it was found that their boats could carry fully-equipped soldiers as follows :—

Tonnage.	Boats.	Men.	Horse boats.	Horses or guns.	
Of over 4000 and between 4000 and 2500 tons.	10	400	3	30	6
Between 2500 and 1500 tons.	8	280	2	20	4
Between 1500 and 1200 tons.	8	200	1	10	2

It may be doubted if even the largest transports have sufficient hands to work all their boats, and possibly it might be found necessary to add for this purpose to their crews. There should not be much difficulty in getting for this service volunteers from the Naval Reserve, and as each troop-transport has a Naval Transport officer on board, the additional crew might be embarked under his immediate orders, to be employed only in connection with the troops.

Sir Robert Wilson, in connection with the landing at Aboukir, wrote, "It is to be regretted that no provision is made for the sailors in the transport service who are wounded, or extraordinary encouragement given to them when employed on such dangerous duty as the disembarkation of troops. The measure would be politic and just." * When nearing the shores of the Crimea, in 1854, a deputation from the captains of the hired transports submitted to the authorities that, whilst fully prepared as they and their crews were to do their duty to their country, they trusted that some promise would be held out to them regarding

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," Lieut-Col. Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 15.

allowances and pensions for officers and men who might be wounded, and pensions for the widows of any who might be killed. Russell states that there was considerable discontent on this point, and that some men had gone so far as to say that they would not serve. He names the crew of the ship he sailed in from Malta as particularly clamorous.

The fairness of this demand was readily admitted, and the following circular issued :—

“ Having been in communication with General Lord Raglan on the subject of officers and men employed in the transport service receiving pensions for wounds, I beg you will make known to them that the same pensions as are given to the officers and seamen of the Royal Navy will be granted to them for wounds sustained in action.”

“ W. DEANS DUNDAS.”

As the same course is likely to be adopted in future cases, this will make the crews of the hired transports face danger with great readiness and confidence.

The following words convey Sir William Mends's ideas of how the boats should be worked: “ An ordinary boat appropriated to the conveyance of troops should be cleared of all encumbrances, such as masts, sails, oars, and breakers, the whole internal space being devoted to the soldiers. Her equipment should consist of *four oars*, to be pulled in the

foremost extremity or bow of the boat, slung so as to prevent their separating from the boat when thrown out on touching the beach, *one* steering oar, and no rudder. At the stern part of the boat a grapnel, or small anchor and its cable; at the bow, a good long rope, called technically a painter; slung on the star-board outer side in becketts a good and substantial gang-board, and from the port or opposite outer side two strong poles, tipped with metal at one end; two good boat-hooks, with becketts worked on the hooks, similar to those in the Thames wherries, for securing a rope to for towing. The crew to consist of six men: one to steer, one to attend to anchor and cable, four to pull the oars, attend to the gang-boards, etc., etc., it being, in my opinion, decidedly preferable to tow boats carrying troops than to pull them with complete crews. Before arrangements can be made for landing, it becomes necessary to test the capacity of each class of boat." *

Not more than forty soldiers should be put in any one boat. A greater number would make the boat difficult to manage, whilst, in a contested landing, it would increase the casualties in case the boat were struck by the fire of artillery. Closely packed, loaded with kit, three days' provisions, and many rounds of ammunition, a soldier would make a very futile struggle in the water, and could barely keep afloat long enough for help to come to him.

In Nelson's second attempt on Teneriffe, in

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, vol. vi. p. 402.

1797, he had one hundred and eighty men on board of the *Fox* cutter. In rowing towards the mole of Santa Cruz, the cutter received a shot under water, and immediately sunk. Her commander and ninety-seven men were drowned.

Ordinary ship boats can approach the shore to within a depth of three feet; when the boats get stranded the soldiers must jump out and wade to land. In case any doubt should exist as to the depth of water near the beach, some boats should be told off to pioneer the way by sounding.

Previous to the landing of the French at Sfax, in 1881, the Admiral, aware of the difficulties the troops would experience in wading ashore, owing to the muddy and soft nature of the bottom, ordered the construction of six rafts, made out of men-of-war's spars. These rafts were towed as far as the boats could go, and then poled towards the shore. When lashed together and kept in place by an anchor at both ends, they formed a landing stage, which enabled the troops to land dry-shod.

Those transports which convey artillery, cavalry, engineers, mounted infantry, and army service corps, in addition to the ordinary boats, will require horse boats or rafts for landing the horses and military carriages. This likewise applies, though in a smaller degree, to all transports which hold infantry and staff, as the officers' chargers and regimental transport will have to be landed either at the same time as the troops or not very long after.

The French, in 1854, to provide for their field guns being landed and brought into action almost simultaneously with their infantry, had forty special lighters constructed at Constantinople. Each of these lighters could carry two guns with their limbers. The guns were not hooked on to the limber, but placed alongside of it. One of these two groups was carried forward, the other aft ; in the middle there was room for twelve horses and eighteen gunners and drivers. These lighters were drawn by rowing boats, and, from experiments made at Varna, it was found that, with a smooth sea, from the moment they touched land it took only fifteen minutes for the pieces to be in a condition to open fire.

The English used a platform, resting on two boats, a contrivance which was found to answer nearly as well as the special lighters of the French. Lieutenant Roberts, of H.M.S. *Cyclops*, had the paddle-box boats so fitted that each one could carry seven horses.

In embarking their troops on the Sea of Marmora at the conclusion of the last Turkish War, to take the horses alongside the transports, the Russians employed two caiques supporting a stage or raft. In crossing the Danube in 1877, they used a raft resting on two pontoons ; each raft was propelled by eight oars, and could convey eight horses with their riders.

Special horse-boats have been designed for

landing horses and guns in shallow water. These boats are of light draught without a keel of the ordinary kind, and easily stowed on board ship. Their dimensions are 35½ feet long by 10 feet beam, and each one can hold ten horses and two guns. These boats are fitted with fall-down sterns, which can be raised or lowered at will ; when lowered, the stern forms a gangway from the boat to the shore.

When circumstances permit, the transports containing horses should be brought close to the shore, to render the disembarkation more expeditious. There should be no difficulty in doing so, for it is presumed that the fires will not be put out until the disembarkation has been completed.

In the expedition of 1801 to Egypt, forty-eight flat boats were set apart for landing the horses. Dunnage laid in the bottom of the boats appears to have been all that was done to fit them to carry horses. It was arranged to land them in the following order :—234 horses and men of the cavalry reserve, 252 men and horses of General Finch's brigade ; in all, 486 horses and riders were to be taken ashore in the first trip. After the cavalry, the horses of the artillery and staff were to be landed. The artillery had 182 horses with 88 men, and the staff 120 with their batmen.

The special correspondent of the *Times* gives the following description of the landing of the horses in the Crimea on the 15th September. " Early in the day signal was made to the steamers

to get up steam for Eupatoria, and it was, no doubt, intended to land the cavalry and artillery there, in consequence of the facility afforded by a pier and harbour; but towards noon the wind went down, and the swell somewhat abated. . . . The work was, however, to be done, and in the afternoon orders were given to land cavalry. For this purpose it was desirable to approach the beach as close as possible, and a signal to that effect was made to the cavalry steamers. The *Himalaya* in a few minutes ran in so far that she lay inside every ship in our fleet, with the exception of the little *Spitfire*, and immediately commenced discharging her enormous cargo of three hundred and ninety horses, and nearly seven hundred men. The attendance of cutters, launches, paddle-box boats, and horse-flats from the navy was prompt, and the seamen of the Royal and mercantile marine rivalled each other in their efforts. Never did men work so hard, so cheerfully, or so well."

In the absence of boats an embarkation or disembarkation may be carried out by swimming the horses. This was actually done in both senses in the China War of 1860 by the King's Dragoon Guards.

Both in embarking and disembarking horses or transport animals, the old slings have been replaced by horse-boxes. It was remarked in the landing at Ismailia in 1882, that the animals which were slung were so upset that they did not take kindly to their food for a couple of days. This was not the case

with those which were hoisted by means of horse-boxes. In point of time there is next to nothing to be gained by slinging, as the stoppages often necessary to steady the horses kicking in the slings cause delays in the operation. Notwithstanding that horse-boxes are now carried by ships conveying horses or transport animals, as a provision against accidents, each ship should have several complete sets of slinging tackle. These can be easily stowed away.

The greater range of modern artillery compels the transports to anchor further away from the shore than obtained in past days. With this drawback we must look for some means of hastening the transit from ship to shore. Steam launches and similar vessels will be found well adapted for this purpose, and will greatly facilitate the operation of landing. Each transport should have a steamboat, able, under ordinary circumstances, to tow all the boats of the ship when loaded with troops until shallow water is reached. Steam launches will also come in very useful in towing boats loaded with stores, provisions, or materials. In the course of a day's landing the sailors at the oars would have very severe work to perform without them.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in his official despatch, assigns as a reason for the long time employed in landing at Aboukir, that the boats had to row from five to six miles. Assuming that the nearest transports lie at a distance of one and a half nautical

miles from the shore, and that each one has a steam pinnace or other means for towing the troop-boats at five knots an hour, at least half an hour should be allowed for the first troops to reach land, and proportionately more for those from the more distant transports. This will, however, depend on the conditions of wind and tide; when these are unfavourable, more time will have to be estimated.

Stern-wheel steamers seem well adapted for landing troops, owing to their small draught of water. Journeying up the Nile in the months of April and May, 1885, when the river was at its lowest, the stern-wheel steamer *Water Lily*, which drew only one foot nine inches of water, could go up the river when other steamers could not. The *Water Lily* struck the bottom several times, but by reversing the engines it soon got itself again afloat. The *Lotus*, the other stern-wheel steamer employed in the Sudan expedition, was able to carry forty-five tons, and tow twenty tons more.

On the point of speed there is much to recommend the employment of steam launches for towing several boats; once, however, they come within effective range of the defenders' guns, they must present a larger target than a single boat. A well-directed shot from one of the enemy's guns would probably sink the latter, but the same shot striking a steam launch must naturally throw into disorder the group of boats it has in tow. The only way to guard against confusion, and to minimize the losses

in the landing-party before it steps on shore, is to advance on a wide front, in a formation which has no depth. It appears, therefore, that when there is any prospect of the landing being contested, the steam launches can come in useful in crossing rapidly the distance which intervenes between the transports and the shore, which must now be greater than it used to be; but that, as soon as they come within range of the enemy's guns, by a signal from the officer directing the movement they should cast off the boats they have been towing.

As some provision should always be made for saving the men of such boats as are sunk by the enemy's missiles, the steam launches might at this stage be employed for this purpose. Each one would then follow its own boats, ready to render any assistance that might be required. This aid for men in danger of drowning should never be neglected, and, where there are no steam launches, some special boats should be detailed with this object.

When we are in actual possession of the locality where it is intended to put the troops ashore, many of the difficulties which accompany a speedy disembarkation of a large force are lessened. Even in such cases, however, there are often natural impediments which can only be overcome by making special arrangements. As examples of these we may take the expeditions to Ashantee, and the large reinforcements despatched

to South Africa for the war against the Zulus. In these instances the locality where the disembarkation was effected lay in our hands; the heavy surf at Cape Coast Castle, nevertheless, kept the men-of-war and transports in the offing, and everything had to be transferred to land in surf-boats constructed for the purpose. At Durban the bar entailed special arrangements to convey the troops and animals ashore.

The Massoola boats at Madras cross a very heavy surf and land passengers and cargo. The success of this operation can be explained on the ground of the experience which the boatmen have acquired in steering their boats through broken water, and in knowing the right moment in which a heavy pull on the oars is needed to top the waves.

Proper facilities for transferring a large number of men to the boats must be provided. At Aboukir it took six hours to put the troops into the boats and form line; in the China War, 1860, it took three hours, from nine o'clock a.m. to noon. The "sojer," encumbered with kit and arms, creeping gingerly down the ladder from rung to rung, and stepping into the boat is an object of pity for the blue jacket. To expedite the loading of the boats several commodious accommodation ladders are necessary. When in fitting the transports Sir William Mends' suggestions, already mentioned in page 244, has been overlooked, gang-planks can be prepared; these

can be supported from the ship and extend down into the water. Two planks of the proper length, each one foot and half wide and one and a half inches thick, laid side by side and battened together on both sides with strips of boards about three inches wide and one and a half inches thick, will be found to answer all purposes.

It is impossible to appreciate sufficiently the advantages which may be reaped from having shipped on embarkation lumber of various dimensions, cordage, and a goodly assortment of tools. With these any makeshift can be speedily set up, and any locality which offers itself can be readily adapted for disembarkation.

Advantage may possibly be taken of darkness to hide the preparations for landing, the troops being stowed in the boats before dawn. It will, however, be somewhat difficult to form the whole mass in line without daylight.

Wolfe and Abercrombie rightly placed the arrangement and direction of the boats under a naval officer. In the first of these two cases the orders issued on the 11th of September contained the following passage: "Captain Chads has received the General's instructions in respect to the order which the troops are to move and land in; no officer must attempt to make the least alteration or interfere with Captain Chads' particular province, lest—as the boats move in the night—there be confusion and disorder amongst them."

Each steam pinnace, row boat, and horse boat should be under the command of a naval officer or petty officer, who should be furnished with very precise instructions—written or printed—laying down very clearly what he will have to do until the entire force has been landed. For a better supervision and direction the whole mass should be divided into several divisions. Each division should be placed under the orders of a naval officer, who should comply with the instructions issued by the principal transport officer or the admiral who commands the escort squadron.

For lines of boats approaching the shore nothing is more difficult than to preserve the relative distance abreast. Some flags with iron-shod poles should be furnished to the principal boats, to plant on the beach as marks to indicate where the various parts of the line have to make for.

When the first line of transports occupies a considerable extent of front, the boats on the flanks will, in the first instance, be directed to converge on some central point. After the signal is made to proceed towards the shore, accurate dressing must be preserved, a directing boat in the centre of the line being indicated for that purpose. The boats should keep the line, neither going too much ahead nor lagging too much astern, maintaining the same extent of front and the assigned distance from each other throughout. As the shore is approached, extra care should be taken not to crowd towards the point of disembarkation.

The boats should drop their grapnels from the stern at a suitable distance from the shore, so as to haul off the moment the troops are clear of them. All risk of confusion will be eliminated when they have to pull round if the crews are ordered to pull all in the same direction; it might be laid down in such cases that they are invariably to pull to starboard.

A landing on the open beach is an extraordinary operation. Being one of which both officers and men have no experience, it is always liable to take a long time and not to be effected with the most desirable regularity. This shows how very necessary it is to rehearse, when an opportunity occurs, the embarkation in boats, their array, and the forming up of the troops on getting ashore.

The demeanour of the soldiers in the boats is a matter which must be fully detailed in the orders for landing. The following are some of the principal points to be observed. Each boat will be in charge of an officer or senior non-commissioned officer, having a naval signaller to receive and pass orders from the commander of the division.

The troops will enter the boats as expeditiously as possible, but without hurry, and sit down. The officer in charge will not permit any man to stand up, as this may endanger the safety of the boat. The strictest silence must be maintained whilst in the boats and on getting ashore.

The boats, which should bear a progressive

number, will form up in the order in which the troops are to land. The first boat of A company will carry one of the camp colours, all the rest will form in the proper order of succession on the left.

The rifles will not be loaded until the troops are formed on the beach. On reaching land, the men will form in line where they are, and, of their own initiative, the officers will rectify any slight disorder which may have occurred on getting out of the boats. The companies will wait to close, until ordered to do so by the officer commanding the battalion.

Though it would appear but natural that the boats which convey the first landing-party should clear the beach speedily, so as to make room for the next party, nevertheless some judgment must be exercised on this point. Should the landing be contested, and the first troops not succeed in making good their footing on shore, they must have means for retiring to their ships. The most rational arrangement would appear to be for the boats to withdraw only by a signal from the principal transport officer, on the orders of the general commanding, who, from his ship, will have a clear view of the battle-field. The instructions for the guidance of the naval officers commanding the boats must be very explicit; in any case, to avoid confusion, the beach should be well clear of the first line of boats before the second is permitted to approach it.

Given that the whole of the transports have a

sufficient number of boats, the first lot will not be required to hurry back in search of reinforcements ; only when the boats are insufficient will they have to return for more troops. Distinguishing flags or pennants can be displayed by such transports as have troops to land in the second and other trips, and this will assist in guiding the captains of divisions to those transports which are included in their instructions.

The troops detailed to support the first dash ashore should get into their boats at the same time as those belonging to the first party, and be ready to form line as soon as the order is given.

Special directions will be signalled to all transports conveying horses or transport animals as to the moment when they are to commence putting the horses in the boats.

After taking the troops ashore, the boats will be employed in landing the camp equipment, stores, supplies, forage, ordnance, field hospitals, etc. If all this has to be done without the aid of steam, the sailors who row should be periodically relieved, for the work will be necessarily severe.

To provide for those cases in which the surf breaking heavily on the beach stops the disembarkation, and cuts off the landed troops from their floating base, a heavy barge might possibly be anchored some way from the shore with hawser lines made fast on land. Something of this kind was done towards the end of the Zulu War, and the following

description of the arrangements made on that occasion is given by Captain H. J. Fletcher Campbell, R.N.

"Later on came the work of establishing a landing-place on the Zulu coast, where there is nothing in any way approaching a harbour, or even a sheltered place.

"A spot was selected, called Durnford, where the beach was sandy, and clear of out-lying rocks, but exposed to the full force of the wind and swell from the South Indian Ocean.

"Cargo-boats were procured specially for the purpose, and men hired to work them, trained for this particular service by long experience of the dangerous bars of the East African Coast. The boats were those ordinarily used for passing through the surf on this coast; they were capable of being closely battened down, as the water frequently broke over them; they were fitted with strong timber heads at the bow and stern, through which the hawser worked.

"Three anchors were laid out, outside where the surf was breaking, and strong hawsers carried from each of them through the surf to the beach, and there secured to sand-anchors, buried above high-water mark; the hawsers were buoyed inside the sea-anchors, and the cargo-boats brought to these buoys by a steam-tug when loaded. They then picked up the bight of the hawser, passed it into the places prepared for it in the bow and stern, and

slipped along it to the beach, where men were in readiness to remove the freight.

“The ships anchored about one and a half miles off the shore, and remained comfortable enough while the weather was fine, but had to put to sea when the breakers got up. A large quantity of stores were safely landed in this way, and sick men embarked; in fact, it had the effect of transferring the base of operations from Durban to within a few miles of the army itself.” *

Following the landing, the staff will have to set about allotting ground to the several divisions, branches of the service, and administrative departments. Nothing positive can be laid down, but ordinarily, the landing of the stores, provisions, and forage will be taken in hand as soon as the mass of the troops have been disembarked. Flags of different colour can be set up to show where the divers articles of provisions, etc., are to be deposited in the first instance, an arrangement which will greatly reduce the labours of the various services. We may enumerate the principal articles the supply officers will need to keep distinct; these will be: flour, biscuit, preserved beef, groceries, spirits, field ovens, oats, and hay. Separate places should be set apart to receive the hospital and the camp equipment.

* “*Naval Brigades*,” a lecture read at the Royal United Service Institution on the 30th of June, 1882, by Captain H. J. Fletcher Campbell, C.B., R.N.

On landing, the staff of the administrative services should be enjoined to repair to the place indicated for the collection of their stores, there to receive from their respective chiefs instructions as to the work they are to attend to.

Until the land transport has been got ashore, fatigue parties will have to be furnished by the troops to clear the beach. The sooner the arranging of the provisions, stores, and materials can be taken in hand the better. Cases, bales, casks, sacks, etc., will accumulate very fast, will get mixed and piled one over the other, until a separation of the mass will become a very laborious task indeed. To remove them speedily to the various depôts, it is very essential to have some officer to see that the several kinds, as they come to land, are deposited in distinct localities.

The advantages to be reaped by winning over the inhabitants of an invaded country are many ; but, from some unexplained reason a conciliating policy is not always followed. When Bonaparte landed in Egypt, though the people did not receive him with professions of friendship, still he found no enemy to oppose him. His first act, the wanton storming of Alexandria, was not likely to gain for him the friendship of the people. Sir R. Wilson, in referring to the assault of the city by the French, stigmatizes it as a cruel action—one unworthy altogether of Bonaparte.*

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," Lieut.-Col. Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 17.

In landing in the Crimea a body of Spahis under the command of some cavalry officers, appropriated a large flock of sheep and cattle, and in high delight drove them into camp for the use of their troops. On this subject the special correspondent of the *Times* remarked, "Such *razzias* caused an amount of evil quite disproportionate to any paltry gain made by plundering those poor people. They frightened them from our markets, and, though for the moment successful, threatened to deprive us of the vast supplies to be obtained from their goodwill."

If we only reflect on the immense difficulty which is always experienced in feeding an army in the field, it will be seen how imperative it becomes to issue the most stringent orders against any over-awing of the inhabitants, and all arbitrary appropriation or destruction of their property. Should it be necessary to strike terror amongst them, the general commanding will know how to issue his orders on that point. The troops should be enjoined to treat the inhabitants with all the kindness and courtesy compatible with the caution of the soldier; their customs and religious opinions should be respected. In a foreign country, in one which we enter by force, the strictest discipline must be observed, for experience has shown that the least relaxation of its bonds will soon degenerate into license.

CHAPTER XI.

NAVAL BRIGADES.

Assistance which the Royal Navy gives in disembarkations—
Seamen and marines often formed into a landing-party—
Napoleon's seamen of the Guard—The Crews of the Russian
Black Sea fleet take part in the defence of Sebastopol—The
French navy takes part in the defence of Paris—Detach-
ments from several ships of war landed and formed into a
naval brigade—Assistance obtained from the British men-of-
war's men in the Crimea—Peel's naval brigade in the Indian
Mutiny—The naval brigade in the Zulu War and in the
Sudan—Gallant repairs of the *Saffeh* boilers under fire.

THE great assistance which sailors can render in a disembarkation, be it carried out under fire—as at Cape Breton in 1758, in Egypt in 1801, and other instances—or not, is well known. Their strength in pulling, in hauling, their contempt for danger, their great readiness of resource, their cheerfulness and their willingness are of the greatest value when the soldiers find themselves in quite an abnormal situation.

As a rule now a very friendly feeling exists between the naval and military services, and this

becomes more evident when warlike operations bring them together.

There are on record a large number of instances in which seamen and marines have been formed into a landing-party to co-operate in an attack by sea, and have gallantly carried important works and positions enabling the fleet to effect the object in view. Most of these certainly have been minor operations, still our men-of-war's men have often been employed on shore in conjunction with the land forces. At the siege of Louisbourg they lent a hand in building the batteries; in the memorable defence of St. Jean d'Acre British seamen and marines were landed to man the works, and infused confidence amongst the undisciplined Turks; in the landing at Aboukir it was a body of seamen furnished by the fleet that dragged the guns up the heights.

Napoleon had the navy represented in his Imperial Guard, and the seamen of the guard rendered signal services in his wars. In March, 1807, during the siege of Dantzic, they led from Thorn to Marienwerder, on the Vistula, the barges containing provisions. In doing this they had to contend with the floating ice which encumbered the river, exposed to the fire from a fortified island and the fort of Graudenz. They passed under their fire during the night, lying down on the bottom of the barges, which were allowed to drift with the current, the seamen simply attending to the steering.

In 1808, the Emperor conceived the idea of

organizing a fleet out of some of the French war-ships which had sought refuge in Cadiz after Trafalgar. The remnants of the unfortunate fleet commanded by Villeneuve only amounted to five ships, viz. the *Héros*, the *Neptune*, the *Algésiras*, the *Argonaute*, and the *Pluton*. A marine battalion of the Imperial Guard, between six hundred and seven hundred strong, was detailed to march with General Dupont's force from Madrid to Cadiz, to form part of the crew of these ships. Whilst Dupont halted at Cordova to await the arrival of his other divisions, the ships being suddenly bombarded by the insurgents were compelled to strike their colours. Notwithstanding that the original organization provided that they were to be used as combatants only in case of extreme need, the seamen of the guard were then employed as soldiers, and fought with remarkable valour at Baylen.

In the campaign of 1809 Napoleon foresaw what services he might expect from his seamen of the guard in crossing rivers and navigating the Danube. On the assurance of Vice-admiral Decrès that the battalions of the flotilla at Boulogne were equally capable of serving on land as at sea, he ordered a battalion twelve hundred strong, under the command of Captain Baste, to join the Army of the Rhine. This marine battalion was attached to the engineer corps.

From a letter written to the Minister of Marine on the 19th of June, 1809, it appears that the Emperor

was not quite satisfied with the efficiency of this battalion. Owing to his remonstrances it was reinforced and improved before the day of Wagram, and did very good work in that battle. At its very commencement, on the night of the 4th of July, special armed vessels, under the direction of Captain Baste, ferried Couroux's brigade across the Danube, and the marine troops were instrumental in the capture of the Maison-Blanche redoubt. The pontoniers and marine battalion had been very active in bridging the river from the island of Lobau, and their services were not forgotten in the order of the day. Subsequent to the defeat of the Austrians, the marine battalion undertook the navigation of the Danube, with the object of facilitating the maintenance of the French army.

Marshal Massena had the seamen of the guard and a battalion of the flotilla attached to the engineers, under General Dorsenne, in 1810. They did nothing of any note, but in March, 1811, we find them forming part of the rear guard when the French retired from their position in front of the British lines of Torres Vedras.

The largest force of seamen Napoleon employed with his armies was in his Russian invasion. In that campaign he had a company of seamen of the guard two hundred strong, a battalion of the Boulogne flotilla a thousand strong, and a second battalion of French and Dutch sailors, furnished by Vice-admiral Ver-Huell's fleet. The whole force

was under the command of Rear-admiral Baste. The Emperor had formed immense magazines of provisions at Dantzic and at Koenigsberg, and besides his large transport train, contemplated turning all the waterways to account. The Prischhaff, the Prégel, the Deine, the Vilia, and the Frederick canal were to be used. General Ségur states that the supplies ascended the Prégel on large boats as far as Vehlau, and on smaller ones up to Insterburg. Other convoys went by land from Koenigsberg to Labiau, and from that by the Niémen to the Vilia as far as Kowno and Vilna.

Beyond Kowno the Vilia was too winding and shallow for navigation. From that point forward the marine troops were principally employed in building bridges, and in the retreat, at the crossing of the Beresina, they afforded great assistance to the pontoniers under General Eblé. On reaching Kowno, the Grande Armée found that Admiral Baste had got a considerable amount of supplies there from Dantzic.

The seamen of the guard and a battalion of the flotilla were reorganized in 1813, and fought at Lützen and at Bautzen. Later on they were employed in moving sick and wounded to Magdeburg, and bringing up provisions from that place, also in replenishing the fortified places on the Elbe with the provisions which came from Hamburg. At Leipsic they fought bravely, and covered themselves with glory.

Their leader, the gallant Admiral Baste, was killed at the battle of Brienne, on the 29th of January, 1814, whilst in command of an infantry brigade. In that campaign, in the absence of a pontoon train, the seamen of the guard re-established, on the night of the 4th of March, the communication over the Marne.

After his return from Elba, Napoleon, on the 8th of April, restored the Imperial Guard and the companies of seamen. The latter formed part of Rogniat's force which captured the bridge at Charleroi, and blew in the gates of the town.

To come nearer to our own times, the crews of the Russian Black Sea fleet worked the guns during the defence of Sebastopol. Kinglake, referring to the first days of that memorable siege, writes, "Expecting the attack of a victorious host, and abandoned by their own defeated army, an admiral with some thousand sailors and workmen, all guided by the skilled engineer whose achievement has made him illustrious, were preparing the defence of Sebastopol." *

The Black Sea fleet disappeared. Korniloff Nachimoff, Istomine, and their crews mostly died bravely at their post : their vessels were destroyed by their own hands. The last to go were the steamers, which were burnt on the 12th of September, four days after the fall of the place.

On shore seamen are well fitted for working

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 114.

heavy guns, which is akin to their occupation on board ship on the day of battle. The gun, indeed, is the weapon which the British sailor learnt early to trust to. Lord St. Vincent was so impressed with the importance of the crews being made efficient gunners that he issued an order for a general or partial exercise every day, whether in port or at sea, to be performed on board of each ship of the squadron. Their constant exercises with heavy ordnance renders seamen well adapted for manning batteries during a siege.

In the French expedition to Algeria, 1830, two battalions of seamen, fourteen hundred men, were landed, to form the garrison of the intrenched camp at Sidi-Ferruch (the base). The General, who was harassed on the lines of communication, and had an extended position to guard in the face of a troublesome enemy, was forced to solicit the co-operation of the navy. The Admiral remonstrated on being called to land his seamen, adducing as a reason the feebleness of the crews on board of the men-of-war; in reality, he was disturbed by the computation of the garrison required to man the intrenchment, which had originally been set down at five thousand men, and the fear of a possible attack. The two commanders naturally enough looked at the question, one from a military, the other from a naval point of view. The first urged a combined action of the two services; the second, fearful of incurring responsibility, acceded to it, but with bad grace.

In 1870, when the Franco-German war broke out, the French Minister of Marine and of the Colonies was Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, the officer who commanded the sailors in the trenches before Sebastopol. The Government approved of his suggestion that the French navy should be called to share in the defence of the Capital. The order was given for twelve battalions of seamen to be formed, with the object of manning six of the forts which protected the city of Paris.

We have seen in Chapter III. how at the outbreak of the war it had been intended to send a powerful fleet to the Baltic, to make a useful diversion in that direction, and to land a body of forty thousand men under General Bourbaki. The defeats in August prevented any troops being diverted to this end, and the crews of the men-of-war at Brest and at Cherbourg, destined for the Baltic, were sent to Paris. This, undoubtedly, impaired the efficiency of the fleet; but it was already too evident at that time that, without a body of troops to act on land, the efforts of the fleet could not be of any importance.

Vice-admiral Baron de la Roncière-le-Noury was appointed commander-in-chief of the marine contingent. The twelve battalions formed a total of 8308 officers, petty-officers, and men; besides these there were four battalions of marines, with a total all told of 3258 men and 1861 marine artillerymen; in all, a force of 13,427 men. The

navy also had a flotilla on the Seine, with an effective of 17 officers and 490 seamen.

A detail of the work performed during the defence of Paris will be found in "La Marine au Siège de Paris," by Vice-admiral Baron de la Roncière-Le-Noury.

The sailors were made to look at a fort in the same light as a ship, to observe the same habits, to follow the same *régime* as obtained in a man-of-war. To foster this, the ordinary board-ship language was used; thus, the parapets were called the bulwarks, to go out of the fort was to step ashore, etc.

Detachments from the crews and marines of two or more ships of war have often been joined together on land, and formed into a Naval Brigade. There are many instances of such an organization in our latest wars; naval brigades were employed at the siege of Sebastopol, in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, in the wars in China, Abyssinia, Ashantee, in Zululand, in the Sudan, and in Burmah.

As our ships are not long in making an appearance in any place on the coast where there is a serious disturbance, their crews are often the first men available for action. Most of our expeditions, indeed, are commenced with an insufficiency of troops, and the smallness of the land forces has made us thankful enough to accept aid from the sister service. In other cases, the naval authorities

have shown a certain eagerness to secure for their officers and seamen some share in the most stirring episodes of a campaign. Much will depend in every case on the fleet being able to spare the men without any serious inconvenience, and having nothing to fear from the enemy's naval forces.

The sailor does not come in for much comfort on quitting his ship to take his place in the ranks of a naval brigade. The idea that he is in for a spree ashore must soon force itself out of his mind. What lies before him is clearly depicted in the following comparison between a soldier's and a sailor's life, drawn by the able pen of Sir William Russell. "The soldier may have the sunny side of the wall in peace, but assuredly he has the bleaker side in times of war. Wherever the sailor goes he has his roof over his head, his good bed, his warm meal. He moves with his house about him. If he gets wet on deck, he has a snug hammock to get into below, or a change of clothing, and his baker and his butcher travel beside him. From a wet watch outside, the soldier is lucky if he gets into a wet tent; a saturated blanket is his covering, and the earth his pillow. He must carry his cold victuals for three days to come, and eat them as best he may, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, with no change of clothing and no prospect of warmth or shelter." The Naval Brigade man's life on shore is as thorough a change as it could well be, but what is really surprising is to see how cheerily

and readily he submits to all its hardships and discomforts.

If there are many rivers to cross, lakes, or canals for inland navigation, or boat work of any kind, there will be much scope for the employment of an organized body of blue-jackets.

That marines can be better spared from the ships than blue-jackets there can be no doubt; the former have also the advantage of better training on land, for after every spell of service afloat, on rejoining the head-quarters of their division, they are again put through their drill. The marine can take his place as an efficient soldier on shore at any moment, and his life afloat has made him more fitted to adapt himself to the strange circumstances of war. As a body they can be speedily reinforced, for their special organization is such that at a few hours' notice they are ready to sail. When the Royal Marine Light Infantry land as a regular unit, they are formed into one or more battalions, and perform nothing beyond infantry duties; a naval brigade, on the other hand, can be turned to account in other ways.

In view of being required to take place in the ranks of a naval brigade, both officers and men should be trained beforehand, for there must be many details of land warfare with which they are not necessarily acquainted. The system of attack, out-post duty, etc., which require some practice, can hardly be learnt when the business of the

campaign has commenced. In fact, the question of organizing a naval brigade pre-supposes that the men have been drilled and exercised beforehand, and that the officers have a good idea of how to handle their men on shore.

Captain H. J. Fletcher Campbell, R.N., in a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution,* has gone fully into the question of clothing, arming, and the necessities of naval brigades in general. They can land as a fighting body, as their arms and kit can be supplied from the ship's stores; what remains to complete, the camp equipment and land transport, must be drawn on shore wherever the brigade is formed.

And here it appears desirable to give a short account of some of our naval brigades. With regard to the Crimean War, Kinglake writes: "From on board the allied fleets large bodies of men were landed, and they were ordered—or rather permitted, for the men were burning with zeal—to take part in the active operations against Sebastopol. The brigade of English seamen thus placed at Lord Raglan's disposal was under the orders of Captain Lushington, and Captain Peel undertook the manning of a battery with a number of his sailors from the *Diamond*."† According to a return furnished by the Admiralty, besides four hundred marines put ashore at Eupatoria, 1786 officers and seamen, and

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxviii. p. 872.

† Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 297.

1530 officers and marines were landed from the British fleet to aid the land forces in the siege.

The French navy did likewise. Thirty pieces of artillery—twenty guns of thirty and ten howitzers of twenty-two—with thirty rocket tubes of the marine artillery were ordered to be landed, whilst Captain Rigault de Genouilly of the *Ville de Paris*, was appointed to command a thousand seamen, of whom one half were to work the guns and the other to support them.

During the Indian Mutiny, Captain Peel, V.C., commanded the *Shannon* naval brigade, which formed part of Sir Colin Campbell's force. Another naval brigade was formed by the crew of H.M.S. *Pearl*. The *Shannon's* brigade had heavy guns and rocket tubes. The guns were sixty-eight hundredweight, and forty men were assigned to each one to work it and to draw it in action. In the battle against the Gwalior contingent at Cawnpore, 6th of December, 1857, the novel sight was witnessed of a heavy gun moving in front with the skirmishers.

The naval brigade in the Zulu War was composed of detachments from H.M.'s ships *Boadicea*, *Active*, and *Shah*. It served ashore for eight months. This brigade numbered forty officers and over eight hundred men—a body in strength equal to a strong battalion—with two twelve-pounder Armstrong guns, four field guns, five Gatlings, and six twenty-four-pounder rocket tubes.

The naval brigade in the Sudan was very small. At Abu Klea the return furnished on the 17th of January, 1885, shows only five officers and fifty-three petty officers and seamen. The second section joined the head-quarters after that battle, and the marching-out state on leaving the Abu Klea wells on the 23rd of February gives a total of eleven officers and a hundred and four petty officers and seamen.

In this instance the naval brigade did not as usual march on foot, but crossed the Bayuda desert like the rest of the column, mounted on camels. Lord Charles Beresford's instructions were to get hold of General Gordon's steamers at Metemmeh, on the Nile, and to man them. The rescue of Sir Charles Wilson's party when wrecked at Wad-el-Habeshi on its return from Kartum was as brilliant a deed as any naval brigade has ever performed. The boiler of the small steamer *Safieh* was damaged by one of the enemy's shots. The crippled steamer, rotten with age and caulked with rags, lay at anchor two hundred yards from the enemy's works for ten hours, whilst Mr. Henry Benbow, R.N., put a patch on the boiler. Early in the following morning the commander of the *Safieh*, Lord Charles Beresford, was able to rescue the little band of Englishmen who had ventured to Kartum.

CHAPTER XII.

BASE OF OPERATIONS.

The base can only be formed after landing—Difficulty of securing a commodious port—A sea base cannot be organized everywhere—Landing at Old Fort in the Crimea—The French refuse to attack the Star Fort—Dangerous position of the allies—Flank march to the south—Balacava as a base was insufficiently covered—Advantage given to the Russians by occupying a corner of the peninsula—Benefit of having a seaport for a base—French expedition to Rome in 1849—The French miscalculate the strength of the resistance—General Oudinot defeated—Advantages derived from the port of Genoa in 1859—Capture of Bushire in 1856—Abyssinian expedition, base of operations at Zula—McClellan's change of base from the Pamunkey to the James—Egyptian expedition in 1882, Ismailia a very convenient base.

The efficiency and maintenance of an army in the field are always dependent on a good base. In operations by land the formation of this base constitutes an essential part of the preparations for war; when, however, the theatre of war lies far away from our shores, the base can only be established and stocked after the army gains a footing in the enemy's country.

On landing, a commander can never rely on

PORT AND CAMP OF ZULA. ANNESLEY BAY.

To Eskdale

Stone Pier
Condenser
Eng. House
Stores and
Engine Shed
General Store Shed
Commisariat Pile Pier
Fire Machine
Condenser Island

Scale
0 100 200

ANNESLEY BAY

lighting upon sufficient provisions and forage wherewith to meet the most pressing wants of his troops, and must be prepared to find the local resources and the crops removed or destroyed. Nor is there any prospect of his being able to lay hands on that vast assortment of war materials and stores, without which military operations are impossible. Unless, therefore, he can establish a good base of operations in which to store all that his transports hold, he will have little chance of effecting anything of importance.

Raleigh, alluding to the first invasion of Africa by the Romans, shows how they captured Clupea, and adds, "Now had they a port on the African side, without which all invasions are foolish."

Only by a rare chance it is possible to seize a commodious port to turn into a sea base of operations. The principal of these are protected by powerful works and batteries, and are held by a garrison of sufficient strength to undertake their defence; whilst those of minor importance, and therefore less adequately protected, seldom have a sufficient area for the anchorage of a large number of steamers and ships of heavy draught, nor have they the conveniences in the way of wharves, etc., required for landing speedily all that belongs to an expeditionary corps. Moreover, they may possibly not be well situated with regard to the intended course of operations.

In a sudden dash the garrison taken unawares

may not find itself in a sufficient state of readiness to offer a stout resistance. There is also the chance that the chief magistrate of a seaport, which is not in an adequate state of defence, may be inclined to surrender, to save the town from the ruinous effects of a bombardment.

Apropos of the failure of the expedition against Rochefort, Wolfe wrote, "I am not sorry that I went, notwithstanding what has happened. One may pick up something useful from among the most fatal errors. I have found out that an admiral should endeavour to run into an enemy's port immediately after he appears before it; that he should anchor the transport ships and frigates as close as he can to land; that he should reconnoitre and observe it as quickly as possible, and lose no time in getting the troops on shore." All this was possible in 1757, but it is not so now. With the greater destructive power of modern ordnance, and the greater value of the warship, what admiral would dare to venture so close as Wolfe would have wished?

A sea base cannot be organized everywhere. To establish it ample wharves are needed for landing simultaneously with the troops large quantities of war materials and provisions, spacious buildings for housing the sick, for the storage of perishable articles for officers etc., also plenty of manual labour and transport. As all these are wanting when a disembarkation is carried out on

the open beach, the seizure of a seaport is often the first operation undertaken after the landing of the troops. This was the object Bonaparte had in view when, with the handful of infantry he had managed to get ashore, he assaulted Alexandria immediately after anchoring in front of the deserted shores of Marabout.

After the capitulation of Algiers in 1830, the French abandoned the exposed bay of Sidi-Ferruch for the port of Algiers. They were hardly in a better position, for there was only a small creek near fort Bab-Azzoun where the provisions and stores could be landed. The port was very cramped and encumbered. When the attention of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief was drawn to the serious consequences which might have arisen from this, forty-eight ships, which held two months' supplies for the army, had already been in the roadstead for ten days, exposed to any wind which might have blown from the north. What added to the other difficulties was the scarcity of carriers—for the inhabitants were too indolent or unfriendly to lend a hand—and the absence of roads between the landing-place and the gates of Bab-Azzoun and Bab-el-Oued.

The Crimean War offers some very instructive lessons with regard to the establishment of a base, and being the largest invasion by sea which has occurred in this century, it will be not amiss to look at what happened. Having effected a landing,

confident in their strength, the French and British commanders advanced on Sebastopol without having established a base for the supply of their armies, or as a point of refuge where, in case of a reverse, the re-embarkation of the troops could be effected without obstruction. However, they were not long in recognizing all the inconveniences and risks of having to rely entirely on a floating base.

In advancing from the landing-place near Old Fort, the allied armies could only carry with them a small amount of provisions and necessaries, they could not replenish or repair the waste, as in ordinary cases, from ample means stored in the rear. The scarcity of land transport would have made it impossible to secure a steady flow of supplies, if nothing else would. No option was consequently left to them but to depend on their fleets; but these fleets could not land everywhere what the combatants needed, and it was soon found that this landing could only be carried out at the mouths of the rivers.

In point of fact, not only was the subsistence of the allies dependent on the fleets, but, in case of defeat, their only safety lay in holding the enemy in check whilst the whole force re-embarked. For an army of sixty-three thousand men this was a most dangerous predicament, for the connection between the troops and the fleet was dependent on the continuance of favourable weather.

After the defeat of the Russians on the Alma, Marshal St. Arnaud refused to attack the Star Fort

without laying formal siege to it. An opinion was prevalent that this fort was only part of an extended line of works, and would be stubbornly defended by the Russian army which had retired from the Alma. St. Arnaud also alleged that the Russians had constructed works to command the mouth of the Belbec. Kinglake suggests that possibly the French commander was kept from the undertaking, as, on account of the position occupied by his army, on the right of the allies, the burden of the work would have fallen on the French. Whatever may have been the real reason, a bold course could not have been expected from a commander who was grievously ill in health.*

On the 25th of September the allies were in a dangerous position, for a Russian army of twenty thousand men, part of the force which had fought at the Alma, was on their left flank. Their utter state of demoralization could not have been suspected, as the battle of the 20th had not been a signal discomfiture.

"By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the north side," writes Kinglake, "was the want of a safe harbour on that part of the neighbouring coast which was north of Sebastopol

* On Monday morning, the 25th, Lord Raglan, Sir John Burgoyne, and other staff officers, proceeded to the French headquarters, to decide on the course to be pursued in the forthcoming attack on Sebastopol. Marshal St. Arnaud was very unwell.—"The British Expedition to the Crimea," by W. H. Russell, LL.D., book ii. chap. v.

Bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be driven from the coast by stress of weather, as to put the allies in peril for their supplies." *

With reference to this phantasm of the French commander Kinglake states: "Before the time of Todleben's arrival, the Star Fort had been examined by the engineers, and it was soon ascertained to be so faulty in construction as to be of comparatively little use." † This may have been true enough, but often in war a commander is not fortunate enough to obtain what to him would be most valuable information. In this instance, if the allies had the least conception of the low estimate the Russian Engineers had formed of the Star Fort, the operations would have taken quite a different turn. For the defence of the north side the Russians had eleven thousand men. "Korniloff did not seriously imagine that, with this force, or with any fresh number of seamen which he might draw from the ships, he could offer a successful resistance to a resolute attack against the Star Fort by a victorious army with a strength of between fifty and sixty thousand. Colonel de Todleben did not deceive him, and he did not deceive himself." ‡

"A separate order directed that vast quantities of the ammunition and other stores should be transported from the north to the south. All day (21st

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 47.

† Ibid., p. 182.

‡ Ibid., p. 187.

September) the number of vessels employed in obeying this order were crossing and recrossing the roadstead. The timely removal of these stores tends to show that the defence of the north side against the allied armies was regarded at the time as an almost desperate undertaking."*

Owing to the supposed strength of the defences on the north side, the allied commanders decided to make a flank march round the head of the harbour, by Mackenzie's farm, to cross the Tchernaya, and attack Sebastopol from the south. On that side the town was more open, and the fortifications were known to be in an incomplete state.

What had most influence on this decision was that, by transferring the operation to the south of Sebastopol, the allies would secure the harbour of Balaclava and the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch, which would give them safe bases. This was a point of great consideration, for their situation, in a country destitute of resources, was very hazardous as long as they had to rely on their fleets for all that they needed. This aid was entirely dependent on the continuation of fair weather a condition on which it is always impossible to place any reliance. In a somewhat analogous case, Sir Arthur Wellesley represented to Sir Hew Dalrymple, after the battle of Vimiero, that "the fleet was a precarious resource, because the gales common at that season of the year would

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 148.

certainly send it from the coast, if it did not destroy a great portion of it." *

The adoption of Balaclava as a sea base was one of those strange accidents which are often witnessed in war. Who would have ever conceived turning the little land-locked haven, so like in appearance to a highland tarn, into a base of operations for an army? The bay measured about fourteen hundred yards in length by two hundred and thirty in breadth, and had enough depth of water to float a ship of the line. The rocks were so steep and precipitous that ships could be moored quite close inshore. Towards the sea the channel which leads to it is quite invisible, so completely do the cliffs overlap it.

As a base, Balaclava had the disadvantage of not being quite covered by the British army; it lay open to attack, and not long after its occupation the Russians attempted to carry it. The French, who at first laid claim to it, were more fortunate, as the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch were perfectly safe. With regard to these bays, Kinglake shows how, in November, 1853, General Mackintosh called the attention of the Horse Guards to a memorandum he had furnished in 1834, and wrote, "The large bay, marked D, at once suggests itself as the most suitable place to land a battering-train and siege stores." After the allies had failed in capturing Sebastopol on the

* Napier, "*Peninsular War*," bk. ii. ch. v.

18th of June, the French pushed on the completion of their fortifications at Kamiesh. These were raised to cover a retreat, in case the siege had to be abandoned.

The march round to the south of Sebastopol may have given the allies good bases of operation, but they were shut up in one corner of the peninsula, leaving the whole country to the Russians, who, being in absolute possession of their lines of communication between Sebastopol and the rest of their territory, were free to pour reinforcements into the town, and gather a large army to attack them when it suited their purpose. It was a choice between two evils—a safe base or none at all—for north of Sebastopol there was no place which could have been turned into a suitable base for a large army. The very existence of the allies, once they had landed in the Crimea, depended on maintaining a safe and constant communication with the sea.

Many of the difficulties which attend the landing of an expeditionary corps vanish when, by good fortune, it is possible to gain possession of a convenient seaport. The attention paid to coast defences, however, makes such cases rare.

In 1849 the French Government decided to send an expedition to Italy, to restore the city of Rome to the Sovereign Pontiff. A fleet suddenly appeared before Civita Vecchia, and General Oudinot, the commander of the force, demanded from the local authorities the immediate surrender of the

town. Civita Vecchia was a walled town, with a bastioned enceinte in good state of repair, and a citadel which commanded the harbour. As an attack from another republican nation was a thing which the Insurrectionary Government was far from expecting, no measures had been taken to put the place in a state of defence, or for giving it an adequate garrison. The local civil and military authorities, taken by surprise, could not but recognize the futility of offering any resistance. The French fleet was consequently allowed to enter the harbour, and Oudinot lost no time in turning Civita Vecchia into a safe base of operations.

The principal lesson which we are taught by this expedition is how easy it is to miscalculate the strength of the force required to accomplish a given object. The number of the French troops in this instance was very small, the French Government having been assured that at the very sight of their soldiers the gates of the city of Rome would be opened, and the citizens would joyfully welcome them as their deliverers. No account appears to have been taken of the well-known timidity of the Roman people, of the daring spirits which ruled the city and of the large number of soldiers and volunteers, who, after the war in Northern Italy, had been steadily finding their way into Rome.

On the 30th of April, as General Oudinot, without taking any extra precautions, approached the city, his troops were received with a smart musketry

fire from the walls and outlying positions, and half a battalion, which had been allowed to pass through one of the gates, was isolated and captured.

This check revealed the real state of affairs. The French commander solicited an armistice, and whilst, by diplomatic negotiations, Mons. Ferdinand de Lesseps kept the Roman Government in play, considerable reinforcements were despatched from France. When Oudinot found himself in possession of sufficient troops and materials to undertake a regular siege, he suddenly broke off the negotiations, declared the armistice at an end, and invested the city.

Ten years later the French made common cause with the Piedmontese, and declared war against Austria. In this instance, they were equally fortunate in their base; Genoa offered great facilities for it. The large area of the harbour, its depth of water, the great number of wharves, their connection with the railways leading through Piedmont and Lombardy, and the assistance rendered by the population of a large mercantile town, were of signal assistance to the French.

In 1856 an expedition sailed from Bombay, and on the 4th of December the island of Karak in the Persian Gulf was occupied without opposition. On the 7th, the troops, under General Stalker, were landed at Halilah Bay, near Bushire, and the position of the Persians in the ruined fort of Reshir, near the sea, was carried on the 9th, after two

hours' fighting. The Persians retreated into the town of Bushire. The fleet bombarded the town; but only when the British and native troops had reached a point within a thousand yards of the walls did the Governor haul down his flag and surrender. Bushire thus became Sir James Outram's base of operations.

The simple fact of capturing a seaport town is not in itself all that is needed. Should the enemy assume a threatening attitude, other operations must at once follow to make the base safe. In this instance the Persian general, Shujan-l-Mulk, had to be driven from his intrenched camp at Burazzain, and the Persian army had to be defeated in the battle of Kûsh-ab, to ensure the undisturbed possession of the base.

In an expedition conducted against a badly-organized enemy, there is seldom a likelihood of the landing and preliminary operations being seriously opposed. In the Abyssinian expedition, the low-lying coast round Zula Bay lay beyond the frontiers of the Ethiopian dominions. In fact, in 1868 the strip of country from the sea up to the mountains was held by the Egyptians, who were friendly to us. The main difficulty in that instance was, in suddenly turning a bare plain into a vast base of operations.

The formation of a base on the seashore, as a joint naval and military undertaking, requires to be intrusted to officers who have a certain amount of

experience in embarking and disembarking troops and stores, and who can work harmoniously together. Only officers who have a great knowledge of all the requirements of an army, and who are directed by chiefs who possess great forethought and aptitude for business, can attend to everything, without overlooking the most minute details.

We not only miss in such a case the many facilities which are found in a regular port, but the nature of the enterprise calls for the greatest possible energy and speediness.

The control of a large fleet of transports, their anchorage, the provision of boats and barges for transferring everything to land in the strict order of its necessity, with the greatest possible despatch, is the business of the navy. A more laborious task still is the prompt removal and orderly storage of the vast quantities of materials of all sorts, equipment, provisions, and forage, which the army may have received from the navy. The military have not only to find a place for everything, but have to provide land transport for the rapid clearing of the landing-place. Only a very able, active, and business-like base commandant can direct the efforts of the military staff. His presence at the landing-place is required from the very first, for, unless the work is taken in hand from the very commencement of the landing, the confusion will gradually increase until it will tax the powers of the most energetic and hard-working man to get things into order.

In his despatch of the 1st of June, 1868, Sir R. Napier assigns to Sir Charles Staveley the credit of laying the first foundation of order at Zula. His must have been a difficult task, for up to his arrival there had been no guiding hand at the place of disembarkation. Sir Charles took immediate and vigorous measures to remedy matters, and these had mended much by the time Sir R. Napier landed and assumed command of the force. To control a large fleet of transports there was needed a capable naval officer, and one was found in Captain (afterwards Sir George) Tryon. That officer's great readiness of resource, activity, and high professional attainments singularly fitted him for such a responsible post.

In the Abyssinian expedition great pains were taken to form a good base. A general officer, the Resident at Aden, was withdrawn from his military and political duties to assume command of Zula. A plan of its port and camp, taken from the first volume of the official records of the expedition, faces this chapter. The plan shows in a very clear manner the various headings for which provision should be made at a base of operations; and we invite attention to it, as it may serve as a very useful guide in future expeditions.

An outcry was made on account of the heavy cost of this expedition. Possibly in this instance the greatest attention was not paid to economy;*

* Sir Robert Napier, an officer of great experience in war,

but if we compare it with others which England undertook in the early years of the century, we shall find that some of these cost much more, without the same results. The expedition to Walcheren, for example, in which the troops had only to be conveyed across the British Channel, cost twice as much. But when Sir Robert Napier, after a very long march through an unknown country, destitute of good roads, food, and forage, entirely fulfilled his mission, England, in 1809, only lost prestige and some thousands of good soldiers through sickness.

General McClellan's operations before Richmond, in the second year of the Secession War offer an instructive example of a base established on a river, followed by a series of operations conducted to transfer that base from one river to another. It may be observed that, wilfully ignoring the bold offensive adopted by the Confederate leaders, McClellan always spoke of his retreat from the position on the Chickahominy as a change of base of operations, through a flank movement.*

When, on the 4th of May, 1862, the Confederates when preparing for the expedition to Abyssinia, urged that no expense should be spared, this being the most economical plan in the long run.

* "Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac! Your achievements of the last ten days have illustrated the valour and endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by superior forces, and without hope of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement always regarded as the most hazardous of military expedients."—McClellan's address to his army on the 4th of July, 1862.

evacuated Yorktown, McClellan advanced on Richmond by way of Williamsburg. The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent by water to a point on the right bank of the Pamunkey in the vicinity of West Point. On the 16th, headquarters, with the divisions of Franklin, Porter, and Smith, moved to White House, five miles beyond Cumberland, where a permanent depôt was at once organized. As the army settled down on both banks of the Chickahominy, White House became the base of operations. The Richmond and York River Railway, which crossed the Federal position on the left, formed its line of supply. This line from White House to the main camp measured eighteen miles. Tunstall station, from which two roads lead in the direction of Hanover Court House and of Mechanicsville, is five miles from White House.

The important depôts at White House were guarded by a very small force, and the steamers and other vessels lay as securely on the Pamunkey as in any of their more northern rivers.

Apparently McClellan's design was to adopt the James River as a pivot of operations, and to rest one flank of his army on the James as soon as the navigation of that stream should be opened. Early in May, when the Federals advanced, the *Merri-mac*—the only vessel of any power which the Confederates possessed to protect the James River and the water approach to Richmond—blocked that

water-way. Shortly afterwards that ironclad was scuttled and abandoned, as her heavy draught of water would not allow her to ascend the James River.

After that event the Union gunboats controlled the James to within eight miles of Richmond.

McClellan, however, before reaching the Chickahominy (May 14th) had applied to President Lincoln for every possible reinforcement. "I ask," he telegraphed, "for every man that the War Department can send me." To this appeal the President replied that he would direct McDowell's corps—between thirty-five and forty thousand men strong—to co-operate with the Army of the Potomac. Nevertheless, he would not send the reinforcements by water, as the General had proposed. McClellan was directed to extend his right flank to the north of Richmond so as to communicate with McDowell, who in his turn was commanded to prolong his left, and thus form a junction with McClellan's forces. With reference to this arrangement McClellan wrote: "Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream."

As will be shown in a subsequent chapter, the Government at Washington was dismayed lest the Confederates, taking advantage of the absence of

the Federal forces, should pounce upon the capital. A similar fear, but with greater reason, was always uppermost in the mind of the Confederate Commander-in-chief, who once said, "that he had got a crick in the neck, from having to look back over his shoulder at Richmond."

On the 12th of June occurred Stuart's raid, which, notwithstanding all the applause it gained elsewhere, was accorded but scanty notice from McClellan. All he writes about it in his report is: "The burning of two schooners laden with forage and fourteen government waggons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's station, and a little *éclat*, were the precise results of the expedition." The General appears to have ignored at the time the *prestige* which the Confederate cavalry gained by that exploit. On the news of the approach of the raiders, Colonel Ingalls, who was quartermaster at the White House, took all the measures in his power to defend the stores. The shipping which crowded the river cast off from their moorings, and prepared to make all speed to Yorktown.

On the 26th of June—the first of the seven days' battle—before being attacked, McClellan, finding the enemy in his rear, and having every reason to believe that the communication with the Federal supply depôt at the White House would be severed, directed his Quartermaster-General to telegraph

to Colonel Ingalls : "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every waggon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our dépôts on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement as long as the wire works ; after that, you must exercise your own judgment."

General McClellan explains in his report that, in case the communications with the dépôt at the White House should be severed by the enemy, a change of base to the James River had been contemplated for some time. In fact, on the 18th of June he had made arrangements for transports, with supplies of provisions and forage, under convoy of gun-boats, to be sent up the James River.

Colonel Ingalls had made suitable dispositions at the White House ; the gun-boats were ready for action, the trees in the vicinity of the dépôt were cleared away to afford range for the artillery, the transports and other ships were laden with stores, and bales of hay were piled round the buildings, from which the contents had not yet been removed,

in order that they should burn well should they be set on fire.

Frequent telegrams from head-quarters proved that the line had not as yet been cut, but every preparation for an immediate and rapid retreat down the Pamunkey was made.

White House was abandoned on the 28th. At 12.30 p.m. that day, the Confederates took possession of the York River Railway, and Colonel Ingalls was apprised of the capture of the telegraph station by an uncomplimentary message wired along the line by some of the enemy. So excellent were the dispositions taken by the officers in command of the troops, depôts, and gun-boats, that almost everything was saved, and but a small quantity of stores were destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

General McClellan had evidently, by the 3rd of July, effected his change of base, and, at Harrison's Bar, he found the transports sent up the James River in accordance with his instructions of the 18th of June. After so many sacrifices, however, he did not appear satisfied with his new base, for he writes to the President: "Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon and musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gun-boats can drive them out."

An attack of this nature occurred about half an

hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1st. The Confederates brought some light batteries to Coggin's Point and the Coles' house on the right bank of James River, directly opposite Harrison's landing, and opened a heavy fire on the Federal shipping and encampment. This lasted about thirty minutes, when the enemy were driven away by the fire of the Federal guns. No harm was done to the shipping, but, as a preventive measure, a party had to be ferried across the river to destroy Cole's house and clear the timber ; this was followed by the occupation of Coggin's Point. On the 5th of August a force of twenty thousand Confederates was reported to have arrived at a point six miles lower down than Harrison's Bar, on the right bank of the river ; but General McClellan, always inconsistent, had declared the previous day that the communications had, by the co-operation of the gun-boats, been rendered perfectly secure.

On the 3rd the Major-General commanding the United States Army had telegraphed to him that it had been determined to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek, ordering immediate measures to be taken to that effect. The two armies of McClellan and Pope could not render any assistance to each other, with the enemy directly between them and ready to fall with superior numbers on either. General McClellan remonstrated, but the arguments against a continuance of operations from the base on the James River

were too convincing, and he had to submit. General Burnside, with thirteen thousand men, was sent to Aquia Creek, and the rest of the troops marched by way of Williamsburg and York Town to Newport News, and prepared to embark for the Potomac.

When our troops went to Egypt in 1882, the sufferings Bonaparte's soldiers had to endure during their march to Cairo were too well known to counsel a repetition of an advance from Alexandria. The season of the year was the same in both instances, yet the conditions of Egypt had considerably changed. Railways had been constructed, connecting the capital with the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and a superb waterway, the Maritime Canal, had put those two seas in direct communication.

In the middle of the month of August, Arabi held the whole of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria and Suez, and being confident that England would not dare to violate the neutrality of the Canal, was not in the least alarmed by the presence of some small British warships at Ismailia.

Whether the neutrality of the Canal was violated or not is a question that can be easily answered. England was acting against a rebel, and by using the Canal for military operations she was taking advantage of it in support of the rightful ruler of the country. If the Khedive's consent was not solicited, it was merely to prevent Arabi from getting an idea of what was intended, for his cause

had many sympathizers who would certainly have put him on his guard.

It had been foreseen that as soon as Arabi became alive to the fact that the British intended to operate from the side of the Canal, he would have collected his forces to make a stand on the border of the cultivated ground about Tel-el-Kebir.

As a base of operations Ismailia was excellent ; its occupation placed the British forces on Arabi's flank, with a shorter line to Cairo, for, whereas Alexandria was a hundred and twenty-seven miles from the capital, Ismailia was only ninety-six. There was also the advantage of a railway with a fresh-water canal running alongside of it. The railway from Suez to Cairo runs parallel to the maritime canal, and at Nefiche, where the line takes a sharp turn to the west, it joins the railway from Ismailia. Once Nefiche was occupied the two forces from England and from India were in direct communication by land and by water.

In the opinion of competent naval officers the Suez Canal can be blocked, and for a time rendered unnavigable, by sinking a large ship in the narrow channels. In this instance, the captain of the French *Messagerie* steamer the *Melbourne*, which was coming from Suez, by refusing to tie up and let the troop transports pass, blocked the Canal for some hours, whilst the grounding of several of our largest vessels proved with what ease Arabi might have hindered the passage of our ships.

In many expeditions by sea the transports, and the warships employed to protect them, have been exposed to danger from gales and boisterous weather. In 1882 all the ships found a safe anchorage in deep water in Lake Timsah; the naval and military commanders were thus relieved from the anxiety which the doubtful sojourn of the fleet on the coast would naturally have caused.

Ismailia was deficient in many conveniences required for landing a considerable force with its accumulation of stores, materials, provisions, etc. There was but one pier, which, though solidly built, was small; as, however, the landing was unopposed, the Royal Engineers could at once provide additional means for facilitating the operation. The importance of completing the disembarkation as speedily as possible should never be overlooked, nor was it so in this instance; nevertheless, the sequence in which the materials will be needed on arrival is not always taken sufficiently into consideration in our preparations. As the wharfing materials were shipped in slow-going vessels, which sailed at a somewhat late date, they were not forthcoming when most needed.

The plan of operations followed was to occupy Cairo as soon as possible after an action had been fought, and to seize the point where the defeated army of Tel-el-Kebir might have effected a junction with the Egyptian forces then at Kafr-el-Dauar,

Cairo, Damietta, Rosetta, and Es Salihiyeh. Notwithstanding that they were covered by a line of intrenchments, studded with redoubts armed with fifty-eight pieces of artillery, the rebel troops—38,500 in number—made such a contemptible stand that the glory of their opponents in overcoming them was considerably lessened. With the flight of the demoralized Egyptians from the battle-field of Tel-el-Kebir the whole of the rebellion fell to the ground, and the authority of the Khedive was promptly re-established.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ATTACK.

The initiative rests with the invader—Large number of troops now kept ready for action—Circumstances which may make the enemy inferior in power—Every alternative to be studied to assure an undisputed disembarkation—Serious risks incurred in landing in the face of the enemy—Much will depend on the ability of the opposing commanders—Arabi's want of military knowledge—Surprise is the foundation of a successful disembarkation—Talmash at Brest, 1694—Demonstrations and false attacks—Rapiditv in execution—Disastrous attempt to land at Bogas—Captain Cole's alacrity in landing at Java—Every endeavour to be made to land at some inadequately-defended point—Steamships favour demonstrations—Best battalions and best leaders to be put ashore first—Arrangements to be made with the Admiral on the action of the fleet—Ship guns against field artillery—Bombardment of Sfax—Expenditure of ammunition in covering a resisted landing—Attack of Kosseir in 1799—Expenditure of ammunition in the bombardment of the Lissa forts—Alexandria and Yalu—Wolfe's remarks on advantages of gallant attempts—Enemy if near must be followed up—Datis yields the initiative to Miltiades—Want of enterprise on the part of Said Mustapha Pasha at Aboukir.

Success in landing on a hostile shore depends principally on three conditions—

(a) Absolute freedom at sea, which must preclude the possibility of any interference by a foreign naval force.

(b) A sound plan and unity of purpose in the naval and military commanders.

(c) A body of troops commensurate with the object in view, aided by a naval force capable of preparing the landing by sweeping the coast with its guns.

Notwithstanding that all recent improvements in weapons and destructive engines, and the greater state of readiness for war so characteristic of our days, have considerably augmented the power of the defence, in military operations across the seas, the initiative rests as much as ever it did with the invader. He has the great advantage of knowing his plans and of being able to choose his place and time. His opponent, on the contrary, can do no more than determine the part of the coast which needs to be most carefully watched ; he cannot foresee the exact point at which he will be attacked, and cannot but be harassed by the uncertainty of what is going to be done against him.

The difficulties of effecting a landing on a hostile coast are now considerably augmented by the very large number of troops which the principal states can place in the field, and can concentrate in a very short space of time. On the other hand, the provision of a large mass of transport ships must always impose some bounds to the number of

combatants which can be sent by sea to engage in military operations abroad. The difference in the conditions of the two parties is sufficient to show that undertakings of this nature can only be seriously entertained when the opponent is naturally weak, or when he has been enfeebled by special circumstances. We may well doubt if any one would ever be so imprudent as to assail in this manner the whole untouched military power of a nation.

In our last expedition to Egypt the troops landed in that country amounted in number to nearly one army-corps. To convey these from England, from the Mediterranean stations, and from India, a total of one hundred and twenty-four transports were required. This number of ships, though in itself large enough to need very careful direction, was only sufficient for the transport of thirty-five thousand men, with their horses, transport animals, followers, war materials, stores, and provisions. What is there to prevent an enemy, who is on the look-out, and is well informed, concentrating a larger force by turning to account all the railways available?

Of one thing we may be sure, that whenever there is a prospect of a country being invaded, the defenders will be found very active in gathering all the means of resistance on which they can possibly lay their hands. In our first and second Afghan wars, as well as in many other contests

with rude nations, what was the host brought together to meet the invasion, but the nation in arms?

It may be rightly supposed that in assuming the *rôle* of aggressor, a commander is not merely impelled by the generally admitted fact that the attack is the safest road to success, but that he feels sufficiently strong, and is confident of being able to overcome his adversary. A variety of circumstances may have contributed to make the enemy entirely, or, at a given moment, relatively, inferior in power. He may have been careless or tardy in his preparations; he may be weak in having to guard an extensive frontier or many vital points; he may have to contend with other forces, or may have suffered crushing defeats; lastly, he may be hampered by internal troubles and a disaffected population. One or more of these adverse circumstances will have made it evident that he can be attacked with a fair promise of success.

A landing in the face of the enemy is much akin to the assault of a work. If the enemy's forces outnumber the attackers, it is not prudent to attempt it; and it is even a risky undertaking when the numbers are about equal. As a failure would be accompanied by a heavy sacrifice of life, the most rational course to pursue when the enemy is found to be on the alert, strong, and well posted, is to endeavour to find some other landing-place.

A footing secured on ground swept by a hail of projectiles will entail such terrible losses, that on very rare occasions will a commander consider himself justified in risking such a hazardous enterprise. Every alternative which his talent can suggest will have to be very diligently examined, so as to hit on some plan which will assure the disembarkation of his army being effected free from molestation from the enemy. By disseminating false reports, and by making demonstrations at various points, a skilful commander can hold his adversary in suspense, and may thus be able to out-manceuvre him, and induce him to leave a certain favourable locality without troops.

On the risks attending a disembarkation in face of the enemy, let us quote some of the most recent opinions. Major Elmslie, R.A., in his prize essay (1895), states, "Generally speaking, it would appear that so great is the power given by all these modern weapons for sweeping with a hail of projectiles any given area, that any attempt to land troops in face of the enemy thus armed must now be considered almost impossible, owing to the tremendous loss which must certainly be sustained." *

Captain Rose, R.M.A., in his essay, as the following words prove, arrives at the same conclusion. "And it is not only in range and accuracy that guns and gunnery have improved, but also in

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. 207, p. 479.

rapidity and death-dealing power generally. The quick-firing gun, and the automatic machine-gun, will also be most deadly in the hands of the defenders of a coast-line; so much so that it seems an almost hopeless task for a force to land by means of open boats in the daytime, in the teeth of an opposition well organized and well posted for defence, unless in vastly superior numbers, or after a most careful preparation by artillery fire. . . ."

In one of the most notable instances in which a landing was successfully carried out in the face of the enemy, at Aboukir—given in detail in Chapter XVII.—the attacking force sustained a loss of over six hundred men in about half an hour. The guns of the defenders, at that period, were of the smooth-bore pattern, while the infantry were armed with flint-locks. We can well imagine how much more severe the loss would have been had the defenders been covered by shelter trenches, and been armed with the more perfected weapons of the present day.

The following example is given to show the temerity and imprudence of insisting on an enterprise, when everything unmistakably demonstrates that there is no hope of the landing being successfully achieved.

In 1694 an expedition was fitted out to attack Brest. The Earl of Berkeley commanded the fleet, which comprised thirty-eight English war-ships and twenty-three Dutch. Lieutenant-General Talmash

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. 209, p. 693.

commanded the troops, in number about ten thousand. Every effort was made to keep the expedition a profound secret, but the Jacobites were very prying and active in gathering news. Tidings of the expedition were sent to James,* who lost no time in communicating them to the French Government.

On the receipt of this intelligence large bodies of troops were concentrated near the point to be attacked, and the most talented engineer of the age was sent to put the defences in proper order. The British fleet was delayed for a month in the Channel by adverse winds and this accident gave the French greater time to prepare.

Vauban planted batteries to sweep every point where the invaders might attempt to land. Cannon bristled on every side; three hundred guns and ninety mortars were in position. The ships had been taken out of reach of shell fire, and, besides a regiment of dragoons, there were four thousand regular troops, three hundred bombardiers, and three hundred gentlemen volunteers.

On the 6th of June the English fleet anchored outside Camaret Bay, eight miles south of Brest. Here Talmash proposed to land, and, marching on

* The Earl of Marlborough wrote to King James on the 4th of May, stating that he had "but that moment ascertained that twelve regiments of infantry and two regiments of marines were about to embark, under the command of Talmash, for the purpose of destroying the harbour of Brest and the shipping which lay there."

the town, to attack Brest from the rear. The following day the French, finding the fleet within range of their guns, opened fire from the batteries on the western point of Camaret and from a castle in Bertheaume Bay.

Talmash had no certain knowledge of the force he had to contend against or of the strength of the defences. The Marquis of Carmarthen volunteered to reconnoitre the bay; he did so, surveyed the defences, and reported that they were very formidable. Both Berkeley and Talmash believed that the Marquis had over-estimated their strength, for they were ignorant that warning had been long given to the French, that they had collected troops in rear of Brest and Camaret, and had fortified the entire coast.

At first it was proposed to send two sixty-gun ships, the *Monk* and the *Diamond*, into the bay to cover the landing, but the Marquis of Carmarthen objected; the two ships he held would be insufficient because the enemy were well prepared, intrenched behind breast works and redoubts, and supported by fourteen squadrons of horse.

On the 8th, six more ships were added to the first two, but when they were posted by Carmarthen, they had to sustain a most destructive cannonade. The fire from the western point of Camaret and from the Point de Filletts was terrible, and three new batteries were unmasked. Carmarthen seeing that the enterprise was even more dangerous than it had

appeared to him the day before, sent an officer in all haste to inform Talmash. It is inexplicable how the General could have persisted in attempting the landing.

The eight English ships by their fire drove the French twice out of the Fort of Camaret; but wherever there was any possibility of landing, great bodies of troops were seen posted behind intrenchments. Talmash insisted that the troops were not regulars, but a mere rabble of peasants who would not withstand an attack, and urged his troops to pull for the land. They advanced, notwithstanding the dreadful fire of cannon, and got on shore, but there was confusion in the attacking party. Talmash was mortally wounded and carried back to his boat, and the French sallied out and compelled the assailants to beat a hasty retreat, capturing some whose boats were stranded in shoal water. The Marquis of Carmarthen had great difficulty in getting the ships out of Camaret Bay.

Macaulay completes his narrative of this unfortunate operation in the following words: "The nation remembered the services of the unfortunate general, forgave his rashness, pitied his sufferings, and execrated the unknown traitors whose machinations had been so fatal to him. There were many conjectures and many rumours. Some sturdy Englishmen, misled by national prejudice, swore that none of our plans would ever be kept a secret from the enemy while the French refugees were

kept in high military command. Some zealous Whigs, misled by party spirit, muttered that the Court of St. Germain's would never want good intelligence while a single Tory remained in the Cabinet Council. The real criminal was not named, nor, till the archives of the House of Stuart were explored, was it known to the public that Talmash had perished by the basest of all the hundred villainies of Marlborough." *

In the year 1797 an idea was prevalent that the Viceroy of Mexico, who had sailed from Vera Cruz with a large amount of treasure, on hearing of the British cruisers on the coast of Spain, had anchored at Santa Cruz, in the island of Teneriffe. Nelson and Troubridge conceived the idea of capturing these fabulous riches in that port, and, after much entreaty, Earl St. Vincent sanctioned an expedition with that object.

On the 21st of July, 1797, a thousand men with scaling ladders and other necessary implements were embarked on board of the frigates *Seahorse*, *Terpsichore*, and *Emerald*. The intention was to effect a night landing and endeavour to capture the fort on the north-east side of the bay of Santa Cruz. The frigates were hindered by a stiff breeze, and had to contend against a strong current. When day dawned they were still about a mile from the landing-place, and were discovered by the Spaniards.

* "The History of England," by Lord Macaulay, chap. xx. p. 489.

The capture of the heights overlooking the fort failed, as these were found to be strongly occupied by the Spanish troops.*

Warned as the Spaniards were, it was more than imprudent to persist in the attempt. Nothing, however, may have appeared impossible to an officer, who, notwithstanding the crippled state of his ship, had in a recent action captured the *San Nicholas*, of 80, and the *San Josef*, of 112 guns. The first check may have only stirred Nelson to further efforts to show that "there is nothing which Englishmen are not equal to."

Foiled in his attempt to gain possession of the fort, Nelson made it a point of honour to accomplish the object of the expedition, and turned his attention to the town. On the 24th of July he made a demonstration against the heights, and at eleven o'clock at night, at the head of nine hundred and sixty men, led an attack on the Mole, where there was some prospect of his not being expected. When within half gun-shot from the place selected for the landing of the main party, the boats were discovered, and a heavy fire of musketry and grape-shot was directed on them from the citadel and houses at the head of the Mole. The attack failed, and when Nelson was in the act of stepping out of his

* To give a more imposing military appearance to the attacking party, Nelson made many of his sailors don scarlet uniforms and imitated the buff belts, which he had not, with strips of calico.

boat, he was grievously wounded by a grape-shot in the right elbow.

Troubridge, who commanded the second attacking column, Hood, and Miller met at daybreak in the centre of the town. Their united forces amounted to three hundred and forty men, and without means of retreat or help they found themselves face to face with eight thousand Spaniards. Fortunately the governor accorded Troubridge more favourable conditions than he could have hoped, and his men were conducted on board their ships.

This operation, which was principally prompted by cupidity, cost the lives of a hundred and fourteen men with a hundred and five severely wounded—greater casualties than were experienced in the brilliant victory of Cape St. Vincent. The Spanish force in the island was considerable; some idea of this might have been formed by bearing in mind the dispositions of the defenders on the 21st.

A somewhat similar experience to that which befell Troubridge occurred a few years later at Buenos-Ayres. After the defeat of a large body of Spanish troops with a loss of ten guns, it was arranged that a column from General Whitelock's force should capture the city. This column was divided into fourteen detachments, each one of which was to advance by a different street. These detachments marched down unopposed till they had reached the centre of the city, then suddenly a murderous fire was opened on them from every

window and roof. Taken thus at disadvantage there was nothing left for the troops to do but to surrender; this they did in succession. Only the detachments on the border of the city escaped a similar fate.

James, in volume iv. of his "Naval History," relates that on the 28th of June a landing was effected without opposition, within thirty miles of Buenos-Ayres; on the 5th of July an attack was made on the town; the British troops, under Brigadier-General Crawford, were overwhelmed by numbers, and compelled to surrender, with a loss of two thousand five hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Liniers, the commanding officer of Buenos-Ayres, offered to deliver the prisoners if the attack was discontinued, to which proposal General Whitelock acceded.

There is no absolute superiority in the offensive or the defensive, both have their good points. The matter rests entirely with the leader, and the result will depend on his ability in applying the salient points of either in his favour.

Much of the invaders' success will always hinge on the military knowledge and ability of the opposing commander, for an unskilful adversary will warrant greater boldness in planning, and vigour in execution. When we look at our expedition to Egypt in 1882, there cannot be the least doubt that much of its success was due to the incapacity of the Egyptian leader. It was but natural that an

individual who had suddenly risen to the command of the rebel army, more on account of the popular ideas of which he was the exponent than from any special display of military talent or knowledge, would be deficient in many of those qualities which are needed to form an able commander. Arabi did not detect the most vulnerable point of the theatre of war, and displayed singular carelessness with regard to the Suez Canal. Not only did he omit to take any measure for obstructing the passage, but even after the intention of sending an expedition to Egypt had ceased to be a cabinet secret, he abstained from closing the Canal on our ships-of-war, and placed no impediment in the way of our officers reconnoitring that waterway and the capabilities of Ismailia as a future base of operations.

Arabi may possibly have counted on our respecting the neutrality of the Canal, and may have been strengthened in that idea by Mons. De Lesseps; the opinions of the latter, however, were his own, for not being the accredited representative of France in Egypt, he could not speak with any authority. To all intents and purposes he was a private individual, simply the Director of the Suez Canal Company.

Slatin Pasha states that the Mahdi would have been better pleased had General Gordon been taken alive, "for it was his intention to convert him, and then hand him over to the English Government in exchange for Ahmed Arabi Pasha, as he had hoped

that the latter would have been of assistance to him in helping him to conquer Egypt."* The Mahdi must have been singularly short-sighted if he really did pin his faith on Arabi, for there was absolutely nothing in his career to show that the banished chief of the revolt was gifted with any military talents.

When Massena invaded Portugal in 1810, Napoleon, in his letter of instructions, wrote:—"Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike."

The success of any undertaking on the enemy's sea-board depends on the thoroughness of the surprise. Surprise constitutes the very foundation of a successful disembarkation; and, from what has been said of the present advantages of the defenders, it will be seen how much more necessary it has become for a commander not to disclose the essence of his plans, and to confide his intentions only to a very few of his most trustworthy subordinates. Hannibal was very reticent. Of him Livy wrote, that it was in the concealment of his design that he mainly rested his confidence of success.

The prosperous issue of the operation is brought about by the paralyzing effect which a sudden and unexpected onset has on the defenders. When by any accident, however, they have been put on their guard, or through circumspection keep well on the alert, the examples we have quoted show that it is imprudent to persist in the attempt.

* "Fire and Sword in the Sudan," p. 344.

Many of the advantages of the defenders may be neutralized by cleverly-designed demonstrations and false attacks, the real point of landing being studiously concealed, and seized by a dash ashore when the adversary is intent on preventing a landing on other parts of the coast. In 1688, William's preparations for a descent on England were fully known; nevertheless, he tried to lead King James into error, and by the direction taken by his fleet endeavoured to strengthen the belief that the landing would be effected in some part of Yorkshire.

A night landing in calm weather may present considerable prospect of success. The arrangements must, however, be very simple. Whatever the night operations may be, the greatest pains should be taken in framing the orders, and, as it is very difficult to rectify any mistakes, it is more than ever necessary to see that the chief's intentions are thoroughly understood. This is more than ever necessary when there is a chance of falling in with the enemy, for there is dreadful confusion in every night fight.

Secrecy and suddenness are two great factors in an aggressive disembarkation. As soon, however, as our intentions can no longer be concealed, the utmost energy must be employed, for, as Bacon rightly remarks, "when things are once come to the execution there is no secrecy comparable to celerity." The adversary must not be permitted

to recover from his surprise, the disembarkation must consequently be conducted with all possible rapidity, so that the enemy may be prevented from bringing up reinforcements or strengthening his position. The following case is given to illustrate the unfortunate consequences which may result from giving the adversary time to gather forces for the defence.

In the latter part of 1799, Sir Sidney Smith, to draw the attention of the French from the Turkish army then advancing from the side of the desert, attempted a landing of Turkish troops near Bogas. The boats of the *Tigre* first took possession of a ruined castle, situated on the eastern side of Bogas; the inundation of the Nile had isolated this castle from the mainland, leaving a passage which was fordable.

The French from a redoubt on the mainland tried to dislodge the garrison. The firing between the castle and the redoubt lasted for three days, when the magazine at the redoubt blew up and silenced one of the French 36-pounders. Orders were then given to disembark, and on the 1st of November a landing was attempted.

"The delay had given time to the French to collect a force more than double that of the first division landed, and to be ready to attack before the return of the boats with the remainder. The French advanced to charge with the bayonet. The Turks, when the former were within ten yards of

them, rushed on, sabre in hand, and, in an instant, routed the first line of French infantry. Their impetuosity, however, carried them too far, and the fate of the day was suddenly changed. The flanking fire from the castle and boats, which had hitherto been plied with effect, was now necessarily suspended by the impossibility of pointing clear of the Turks in the confusion. The French then turned a random fire on the boats, to make the latter take them off; and the sea was covered with turbans. The Turks sent up piteous moans for assistance, which with difficulty and risk was afforded them; all being brought off, except two thousand killed, and about eight hundred, whom the French took prisoners, by wading into the water after them." *

By seizing a favourable opportunity and acting quickly, an alert officer will be able to place his troops on shore before the enemy has time to come up. We have a remarkable example of this in the expedition sent to Java in 1811.

After the capture of the Isle de France the British Government resolved to complete its dominion in the East by wresting from the Dutch the island of Java. Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty commanded the land and Commodore W. R. Broughton of the *Illustrious* the naval forces. At Malacca, in the end of May, the troops from Madras and Bengal effected a junction,

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 303.

making a total of 11,960 officers and men, of whom 5344 were Europeans. On the 30th of July the fleet arrived off Boompjis island, which lies abreast of the Indramayo River on the Java coast; there it lay till the 2nd of August in expectation of being joined by some frigates which had been sent out to gain intelligence. That day the fleet had not proceeded far before the frigates hove in sight; the officer who had been deputed to reconnoitre the Java coast reported that the village of Chillingching, about twelve miles to the east of Batavia, was the most convenient place for landing the army. The ships accordingly anchored abreast of Chillingching on the 4th of August before two o'clock p.m. The spot had been so well chosen, that before dark eight thousand men were landed.

The sudden approach of the fleet had kept the enemy from ascertaining the intended place of landing, in time to send a force thither to guard it. Captain Cole, seeing the necessity for rapid action, made a signal from H.M.S. *Caroline* for the army to disembark immediately, and took his ship close to the shore. The boats were not arrayed in any special order, but despatched as soon as filled with troops. The wisdom of this action was recognized when, soon after dark, the advanced guard had a skirmish with the enemy's patrols, as, but for Captain Cole's alacrity and promptitude in making the signal, much time would have been lost in marshalling the boats, and

this would have enabled the Dutch to take post in a wood at the back of the beach, which might have occasioned a heavy loss to the invading force.

It may appear strange to suggest that the attack should be delivered where it appears most difficult. Yet such a step has much to recommend it, for experience shows that it generally meets with success. The enemy, relying on its natural difficulties, does not guard it adequately ; often the locality is entirely neglected and scarcely comprehended in the plan of defence.

To return to the attack on Teneriffe, Nelson fixed on the Mole as the landing-place for his crews. Though it was commanded by thirty or forty guns, he looked for success to the audacity of his plan ; he wished to surprise the enemy by suddenly seizing the spot where he was least expected.

It is reasonable to believe that most states with a sea-board have considered all the possible points where an invader might land, and have made some preparations to meet such a contingency. These, however, may not have been made on a sufficiently large scale. To draw the enemy's attention from any desirable spot demonstrations should be made in other places, advantage being taken of the moment when he is off his guard to put the troops ashore.

The application of steam as a motive power has added immensely to the possibility of effecting a successful surprise on the open beach. It has

multiplied an invader's chances, owing to the promptness with which advantage can be taken of any neglect or indecision on the part of the opponent. Steamships lend themselves to this, for a demonstration can be made with a portion of the forces to rivet the enemy's attention to a false locality, and, as soon as this object has been attained, the steamers can withdraw and rejoin the rest of the armada more speedily than the enemy's troops can march on land. The transports which contain the troops which are to be landed last are those which should be employed for this ruse; they will answer a better purpose than in being simply kept riding at anchor.

At the landing in the Crimea, the 4th Division of the French army, commanded by General Forey, was ordered to execute a demonstration to divert the attention of the Russians. This demonstration was composed of five steam frigates or corvettes (French) and three British warships. In the neighbourhood of the Alma there was a camp of about six thousand or seven thousand Russians, on which the British ships and the *Caffarelli* opened fire. The French troops were embarked in boats and rowed to a distance of a hundred and twenty yards from the shore, as if intending to land. The Russians did not return the fire, but struck their camp and moved further inland. The allies then moved towards the Katcha, where the scouts only discovered two Cossack posts; they then steered

for the north, and at night rejoined the rest of the fleet.

Sir Walter Raleigh quotes the case of Canutus and Edmund Ironside. "For Canutus, when he had entered the Thames with his navy and army and could not prevail against London, suddenly embarked, and, sailing to the west, landed in Dorsetshire, so drawing Edmund and his army thither. There finding ill entertainment, he again shipped his men and entered the Severn, making Edmund march after him to the succour of Worcestershire, by him greatly spoiled. But when he had Edmund there, he sailed back again to London; by means, whereof, he both wearied the King and spoiled where he pleased ere succour could arrive." *

Whilst the aggressor's troops undergo no fatigue on board ship, the defenders will be greatly harassed in having to follow by land a fleet steaming up and down the coast; and there is no comparison between the distance troops can march in a day and that which steamships can cover in the same period of time. This was so even in the old days of sailing, as we find acknowledged by Sir Walter Raleigh in the following words: "For there is no man ignorant that ships, withyut putting themselves out of breath, will easily out-run the soldiers that coast them. '*Les armées ne volent point en poste*'—'Armies neither flye, nor run post,' saith a marshal of France. And I know it to be true that a fleet of ships may

* "The History of the World," by Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight. Edinburgh edition, 1820, vol. v. pp. 53-59.

be seen at sunset, and after it at the Lizard, yet by the next morning they may recover Portland; whereas an army on foot shall not be able to march it in six days."

We may be reminded that since the above passage was written, such things as railways have been introduced, and that the lines often skirt the coast. This is very true, and there is no comparison between the rapidity with which large bodies of troops can be conveyed by land from one distant point to another now, with what obtained in Raleigh's time. Nevertheless we cannot count on railways for the sudden transport of large masses of men of the three arms, for the preparations for such an operation require a certain time. The utmost that could be done in the twenty-four hours—if the rolling-stock is at hand—would be to start a strong division of the three arms. But, even now, with all the speed of railways, a fleet of transports has the best of it, for railway trains must go from point to point, according to the way the lines are laid, whilst, on the open sea, steamships can move in any required direction, and can alter their course whenever it is found desirable.

What relates to the simple arrangements for the landing has been explained in a previous chapter. No fixed rules can be laid down for disembarkations in the face of the enemy; much must always depend on the judgment of the naval and military commanders, on the nature of the

information in their possession, and on their ability in fathoming the adversary's intentions. It is natural to suppose that a skilful leader will not neglect to put his best battalions and his most reliable and enterprising lieutenants ashore first, indicating to the latter the positions which they will have respectively to seize and strengthen.

The best battalions to lead the attack are those which, besides having high-spirited and intelligent officers, possess a strong feeling of self-esteem and a long record of gallant deeds. As a rule, such corps show most determination in the face of danger, and obstinacy in holding their ground.

It is best never to linger over an arduous or necessary task. When a step of importance is resolved upon, the sooner it is carried into execution the better. Delays are only productive of indecision, for the risks get magnified until the difficulties of the enterprise become appalling. "When the army is landed," wrote Wolfe, "the business is half done." *

Before attempting the landing, the officer commanding the troops will have settled with the Admiral the part to be taken by the fleet, whose heavy armament must, in a contested landing, cover the disembarkation of the troops. It has always been held that such an operation should be prepared by the fire of the ships' guns and of such armed boats as approach the land with the troops.

* Wolfe's letter to his father, Halifax, 20th of May, 1758.

In the landing at Aboukir, owing to the shallowness of the shore, the guns of the British fleet could do little in covering the landing. Now that the range of the guns is greater, they will be able to co-operate with the landing-party, though they may be compelled to lie some considerable distance from the shore.

The defenders cannot engage in an artillery duel with the enemy's fleet unless they have guns of heavy calibre. If they only possess field artillery, the ships will have a considerable advantage in being able to keep out of range of the shore guns, whilst their mobility will allow them to search with their fire every corner of the defenders' position.

It remains to be proved whether the immense accession of power claimed for the guns of the fleet would outbalance the advantage the defenders have in occupying a strong position on shore, and sweeping the approaches to it with a rapid and well-directed fire. The fire of the fleet must in any case cease as the boats near the shore, and it is when the invaders are on the point of landing that the field-pieces of the defenders, if they have not been silenced, will cause the greatest havoc and disorder. The defenders' batteries can remain under cover, and only open fire at the right moment. By not disclosing their position to the enemy, the gunners of the fleet will be at a loss as to their whereabouts.

The best rifles can command a very extensive

area, consequently the landing may be disputed even if there are no troops on the beach to be swept away by the fire of armed boats. Thin lines of skirmishers, without artillery, delivering their fire from behind natural or artificial cover, would be quite sufficient to cause great slaughter amongst the troops in the boats, and the fire of the fleet is not likely to have much effect on troops in extended order, or even on their supports, if due care is taken to keep them well under cover.

A prolonged fire by the fleet in covering a resisted landing might place it in a serious predicament should a naval action follow, on account of the expenditure of ammunition. James relates how Captain Bell and the frigates *Daedalus* and *Fox* attacked Kosseir in 1799. The two frigates retired, having affected nothing beyond battering the fort—which was occupied by one hundred French soldiers—and ruining the town. A landing-party of seamen had to re-embark hurriedly, leaving on the beach a six-pounder gun. The French boasted that six thousand round shot fired by the two frigates in the bombardment, were picked up in the fort and town. "This amounts," James states, "to about three-fourths of the shot to which two frigates of the class of the *Daedalus* and *Fox* are entitled; nor, at such a distance from home, was it very easy to supply the deficiency." *

When Lord Exmouth bombarded Algiers, the

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 302.

firing lasted from three to ten p.m. The amount of ammunition expended during that time by six British line-of-battle ships and four frigates came to thirty-nine thousand rounds. The five Dutch frigates are stated to have fired ten thousand rounds. The total weight of round shot was estimated at five hundred tons.

In the bombardment of the sea defences of Sebastopol by the allied fleets on the 17th of October, 1854, H.M.S. *Agamemnon* fired three thousand five hundred shot and shell. At the bombardment of Sveaborg, on the 9th and 10th of August of the same year, the Russians calculated that the English and French fired ten thousand shells in eleven hours on the first day. The damage done to the fortifications and batteries was small, for the attacking ships lay too far off.

In 1866, at the naval battle of Lissa, Admiral Persano, when attacked by the Austrian fleet, had to engage with his shell rooms and magazines partially empty after a two days' bombardment of the Lissa forts. One of his ships, the *Re d'Italia*, had fired one thousand three hundred rounds.

Before landing at Sfax in July, 1881, the town was bombarded on the 5th by the *Reine Blanche* and *Chacal*; on the 6th by the *Reine Blanche* and *Alma* in the forenoon, and by these and the *Pique* and *Chacal* in the afternoon; on the 7th by the *Reine Blanche*, *Alma*, *Hyene*, and *Chacal*. On the 8th by a boat attack assisted by the *Chacal* and *Hyene*.

The day after the arrival of the rest of the French fleet, on the 15th, the attack was resumed by the ironclads, eight in number, gunboats, and boats of the squadron, the latter armed with Gatlings and machine guns. The landing was effected on the following morning, and was preluded by a fierce bombardment. It seems strange that such a large employment of artillery should have been deemed necessary, for the Arabs had no powerful artillery, and their resistance was feeble.

Referring to the bombardment of Alexandria, Wilson writes: "As the supply of ammunition was limited, the reserve stores not having as yet arrived from Malta, and as it was possible that the forts would not be silenced by a one day's bombardment, the ships had to be careful not to waste a shot."* The firing commenced at 7 a.m., and the signal to cease was made at 5.30 p.m.; it had lasted ten and a half hours. "If the firing," argues Wilson, "had continued longer, shot and shell might have run short, as the *Inflexible* had only ten rounds apiece for her heavy guns, and the *Sultan* not enough ammunition for more than another hour's bombardment." In summing up the results of the bombardment, he shows that the difficulty of supplying ammunition is overwhelming.†

* H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. i. pp. 342, 348.

† This difficulty had been experienced before. It is a well-attested fact that at the time of the Armada the English ships were so deficiently supplied with ammunition as to be unable to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet.

"As Tegetthoff drew off at Lissa when apparently he had the Italian fleet in his grasp, so Ito retired at Yalu. In either case it was probably the want of ammunition which led to the withdrawal. With heavy guns and limited displacement, the supply carried cannot be inexhaustible." *

Were it only a case of a direct attack, a disembarkation conducted in face of the enemy might be well considered foolhardy; nevertheless, there may be circumstances which may sanction the attempt being made. An attack may be delivered in the first hours of the morning, when darkness has hidden the preparations for landing; or there may be some natural cover, coves, necks of land, etc., neglected by the defenders, which may afford to some portion of the landing forces an opportunity for securing a firm footing on shore. It is always possible to develop a first footing, when the officers are enterprising and understand how to make the best of an advantageous position.

It should be borne in mind that each of the invader's divisions will require at least sixteen transports, which, when anchored in line, will occupy a length of over three and a half miles. The defenders would need a considerable force to hold thoroughly such an extent of front, and there is always the probability of finding some part of their position weakly guarded, or some portion of their troops posted on ground which is decidedly unfavourable for their action.

* H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. ii. p. 103.



There are, generally speaking, many fortuitous circumstances, pieces of unexpected good-luck, which only need an officer gifted with courage and great readiness of resource to turn them to profitable account. The essential thing is to take immediate advantage of anything which tends towards the fulfilment of the General's plan.

The array of the armada, both in length and in depth, must be considerable; this of itself—given, as it is reasonable to suppose, that the invaders are the strongest party—favours an attempt being made to attack the enemy in flank, whilst their attention is riveted to their front by ostentatious preparations made for landing. If the turning movement succeeds, it will cause a change in the dispositions of the defenders, which may greatly facilitate the task of the main landing-party. This may possibly be able to gain a footing on shore without incurring very serious opposition.

Although the examples of landings in which the defenders have opposed a vigorous resistance are few, still all such have been seriously criticized. Amherst's and Abercrombie's have been dispraised on account of the great risks incurred; their operations were, however, in keeping with the bold and dashing spirit of the chiefs who conceived them, and of the troops that executed them.

The following words show how Wolfe understood the truth of the old adage, *Fortuna juvat audacis*, "that in war something must be allowed

to chance and fortune, seeing it is, in its nature, hazardous and an option of difficulties: that the greatness of an object should come under consideration, opposed to the impediments that lie in the way; that the honour of one's country is to have some weight; and that, in particular circumstances and times, the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage to the nation than otherwise, seeing that gallant attempts raise its reputation and make it respectable; whereas the contrary appearances sink the credit of the country, ruin the troops, and create infinite uneasiness and discontent at home." *

Alluding to the loss sustained by the Northerners in Hampton Roads on the 8th March, 1862, Mr. H. W. Wilson remarks, "There is an inheritance of heroic example which is necessary to a nation's life; death and defeat, if they are confronted with greatness of soul, raise the spirit of a people. The Northerners were facing the South in a life and death struggle; they were yet to suffer many defeats; there were yet to be times when victory seemed hopeless. But the thought that these brave men had so nobly met their end, not bowing to calamity, but confronting it unappalled, fired the navy, and raised the temper of the nation. National character is a more sacred thing than even human life. So, when the *Cumberland's* last gun was fired, half buried in the water, the people of the United States might know that no odds,

* Letter from Wolfe to a personal friend, 5th November, 1757.

however great, would overcome the tenacity of their sailors, if led by men who knew how to inspire them; and the people of the Confederacy might well have felt that the victory would never be theirs." *

It was said, many years before, of the Highland clans at Culloden, that in great attempts it is glorious even to fail; and certainly there is very much truth in Sir Walter Scott's exclamation, "Never talk to me about brave blood being shed in vain; it sends a roaring voice down through all coming time."

If the enemy is near, a commander should not simply content himself with landing the troops, but should lose no time in moving forward to attack him. Historians have justly condemned the inaction of the Persian commander in one of the earliest invasions by sea (490 B.C.) of which we have a fair record. Datis disembarked his army, and encamped on the plains of Marathon; his galleys, according to the custom followed in those days, were drawn up on the shelving beach. Notwithstanding that the Persians were far superior in number to the Greeks, Datis remained inactive, and surrendered the initiative to his adversary.

Five out of the ten Athenian Generals voted for holding the strong position overlooking the plain of Marathon, arguing that it afforded great advantages to a small force against the masses of the

* H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. i. p. 17.

assailants. Miltiades counselled a bolder course, and induced Callimachus, the War-ruler, to give the casting vote in favour of an attack of the Persian host.

The only reason adduced in explanation of Datis' want of enterprise was that there were at that time machinations going on amongst the Athenian partisans of Hippias. To place greater trust in treachery than in the valour of his troops was highly blamable in a commander who led an army then deemed invincible, and which, in several encounters with Greek troops, had invariably beaten them. The terror which the resistless career of the Persian arms inspired was a great element of success ; but this was wasted in the hope of securing a bloodless conquest.

In 1799 Said Mustapha Pasha threw away his best chance of success. At the time of his arrival at Aboukir, in July, Marmont had in Alexandria only eighteen hundred troops of the line and two hundred sailors of the Nautic Legion. The Turkish commander first directed his attention to a redoubt held by Captain Godard, and to the little fort of Aboukir. Having captured these, he disembarked his forces ; but, instead of marching boldly on Alexandria, he began intrenching himself in the peninsula.* This gave Bonaparte ample time to repair to Alexandria, and to gather sufficient troops for an attack of the Turkish works.

* James, "Naval History," vol. ii. pp. 296, 297.